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ABSTRACT

Montesquieu and Early Liberal Thought:
The Dilemma of the Citizen in the Modern State
September 1981

Stephen J. Rosow, B.A., Columbia University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Jerome King

This study probes the origins of the modern theory
of citizenship through a reint erpretat ion of the works

of Montesquieu.

I

interpret Montesquieu as a 'conser-

vative-liberal' who shares the fundamental assumptions
of the liberal theory as it had developed in the late

sixteenth through the early eighteenth centuries while

distinguishing himself from the Lockean tradition.

I

examine Montesquieu's theory of citizenship in his two

major works, The Persian Letters and The Spirit of the
Laws through an analysis of Montesquieu's own view of

the context of his thought.

I

develop his reading of

the eighteenth century context through an analysis of

Montesquieu's theory of human nature and his theory of
history* as well as through an analysis of the way in

which liberal theory prior to Montesquieu, formulated
the theory of citizenship.

The fundamental concern of

vi

Montesquieu's theory,

I

argue, is how can individuals,

whose self-interested private action is considered the

primary legitimate sphere of action, act to produce the
public good.

Montesquieu solves this dilemma by devel-

oping the primacy of a public but non-political sphere
of action, described by

'moeurs' and

'manieres,

'

which

is made consistent with the needs of the state through

the conception of the "general spirit" which universalizes the particular elements of the social life and tra-

dition of a particular nation.

The dissertation con-

cludes by drawing out the implications of my interpre-

tation of Montesquieu for
of citizenship.

a

contemporary critical theory
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INTRODUCTION
The question

I

want to investigate in this disser-

tation has both historical and contemporary relevance.
I

am interested in understanding the conception of cit-

izenship, the relation between ruler and ruled, which

governs the self -interpret at ion of citizens in the modern state.

The contemporary debate among social and

political theorists about the nature of the contemporary
state lacks an adequate understanding of the historical

development of the liberal theory within which individuals define their public roles.

By returning to the

historical roots of that theory and probing its philosophical presuppositions

I

hope to begin to supply a

historical dimension lacking in current theories.
My choice of Montesquieu as a subject of inquiry
is rooted in my understanding of

what

I

'liberalism'.

I

follow

take to be two senses in which we currently use

the term.

In the larger sense we use it to describe the

general or

'total'"*"

theory which historically fed the

bourgeoisie's rise to power during the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries and legitimated capitalist social
relations.^

This theory involves crucial assumptions

about the nature of man as an autonomous individual who

1

2

acts more out of self-interest and passion than out of

reason and the public good.

I

will argue in Chapter

Three that with regard to a theory of citizenship, liberal theory in this general sense rests upon a theory
of political knowledge which polarizes the knowledge

necessary to the citizen and that necessary to the
ruler.

Further, the general theory assumes that a

stable political order can only result from the media-

tion between private interests and the public interest
by an autonomous

'civil society' which is public but

not political.
In a more narrow sense we use the term 'liberalism'

to refer to a particular tradition within bourgeois

ideology developing out of Lockean social contract

theory with its particular defense of private property,
However, in the

the market and the minimal state.

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries another tradition
emerges within the general theory of liberalism, accepting its fundamental presuppositions, which reaches dif-

ferent conclusions about the nature and role of the

state from those of the Lockean tradition.

tradition, which might be called
ism,'"^

is this

'conservative-liberal-

which Montesquieu initiates and which

to investigate.

It

In the conclusion

I

I

want

will show how in-

vestigating this strain of the liberal tradition sheds

new light on the contemporary dilemma of
the liberal

citizen.
The central problem which the liberal theory
of

the citizen seeks to solve is:

given a conception of

individuals as autonomous actors whose pursuit of selfinterest is necessary and legitimate as the primary
sphere of action, how can self-interested action be
made, or make itself, consistent with the public inter-

est?

It

seems to me that this question crosses the

historical horizons of both eighteenth century political
thought and contemporary thought.
will suggest reasons why

I

In the conclusion I

believe current liberal

society is unable to solve this dilemma and how the
study of Montesquieu broadens our own historical horizons by opening up new possibilities.

The institutions

created with primary reference to the Lockean tradition
seem to me able to sustain only a weak and contradictory

notion of citizenship.
In this context there are two general reasons for

focusing this study on Montesquieu.

The first, which

I

have already mentioned, is that the strain of liberalism

which he initiates provides

dilemma of the citizen.

a

different view of the

The Lockean tradition argues

that the institution of private property along with the

market can successfully transform private interests into

4

the public interest.

The classical formulation of
this

argument is in the political economy
of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries and
has spawned a long

development.

It

current debate.

is still a strong component of
the

The tradition deriving from Montesquieu

attempts a different solution.

Rather than insisting

that the market serve this mediating function,

'conser-

vative-liberals' assign that role to a particular
na-

tional spirit and tradition.

I

will try to show in the

course of this study that this view leads Montesquieu
to highlight different facets of the problem of the

citizen which tend to be overlooked in the current
debate and which might inform possible solutions.

The

tradition that develops out of Montesquieu allows us to
locate possibilities for restructuring current social
and political institutions in order to promote a fuller

notion of citizenship and civic virtue.
The second reason for concentrating on Montesquieu
is that his theory provides a more complete view of the

early modern state than any other.

His work seems to

me the culmination of the various historical traditions
that lend support to an early theory of the modern
state.

His theory combines Natural Law theory developed

by Pufendorf and Grotius together with the individualism
of both Lockean epistemology and French moral theory.

5

Understanding the synthesis which his work attempts can
tell us much both about the early modern state and about

the structure of liberal thought.
The study of Montesquieu is in two parts.

The

first develops the context of Montesquieu's theory of

the citizen through his own eyes.

This section of the

dissertation makea two arguments:

that the philosophi-

cal grounding of Montesquieu's theory must be sought in
"his

theories of man and history, and second, that his

theory must be seen to emerge out of the historical context as Montesquieu himself could have conceived it.

Hence the first chapter develops Montesquieu's theory
of man as a moral theory which he constructed as a basis

for a theory of history which could mediate between the

empiricist and rationalist methods available in the
early and middle eighteenth century.

The key notion of

this attempted synthesis of competing methods is

Montesquieu's conceptualization of historical law and
causation.

I

argue that the idea of developmental his-

attempt
tory which guides this theory is central to his
solve the
to use the spirit of the law and tradition to

dilemma of the liberal theory of the citizen.
Chapter Two develops Montesquieu's use of his
the context in
theory of history in order to delineate
state could
which an adequate theory of the modern

6

emerge.

For Montesquieu an adequate political theory

had to grow out of an understanding of the European
state system.

Many of his major arguments were devel-

oped first in works on what we would now call interna-

tional politics

— "Considerations

sur les Richesses de

L'Espagne," "Reflexions sur la Monarchie Universelle en
Europe,

"

and "Considerations sur les Causes de la Gran-

deur des Romains."
these works in De

Montesquieu borrowed freely from
L'

Esprit des Lois and it is essential

to understand the political context they sought to

describe.

Crucial to his theory of citizenship

Montesquieu's study of international politics led him
to recognize the need for new forms of political action

based upon the free movement of goods across borders
and for a reinterpretat ion of the classical model of a

republic as a commercial republic.
The third chapter sets a bridge between Parts
II of the

dissertation.

In it

I

I

and

develop the philosoph-

ical presuppositions of the liberal theory of citizen-

ship which developed in the late sixteenth through mid-

seventeenth centuries.

The chapter first traces Bodin's

critique of Aristotle's definition of citizenship, arguing in its place that the life of the citizen can be

properly understood only in terms of the opposition of
public and private life.

Next

I

develop Montaigne's

7

theory of the self and lastly the theory of
political
knowledge in Bacon and Hobbes which polarizes the
knowledge of the citizen and that of ruler.
Part II of the dissertation is divided simply into

two chapters, the first dealing with the theory of the

citizen in the Lettres Persanes and the second with that
of De L' Esprit des Lois

.

I

have dealt with these sep-

arately mainly because they seem to me to be radically

different works which Montesquieu wrote with radically
different purposes in mind.

By this

I

do not mean to

imply that the theories which emerge out of the different works do not have similarities.

Five on De L'Esprit des Lois

,

I

Indeed,

in Chapter

try to show that the

questions and issues raised by the earlier work became

central to the latter work.

But despite similarities

I

think it is misleading to treat both works as involved
in a unified and consistent theory.

My interpretation of the Lettres Persanes is based

upon the reading of the story as a novel, as a coherent

piece of fiction rather than as

disparate

a series of

and only tangent ially related vignettes about the French

society and politics of the Regency.

This line of

interpretation has begun to be investigated by recent
works by J. Robert Loy and Marshall Berman and my par-

ticular interpretation owes much to theirs.

4

The

8

fiction of the Lett res Persanes represents a theory of
the citizen as an autonomous individual whose nature is
to strive for freedom and self-expression.

The drama

of the harem and the dialectical relation between the

classes of characters (eunuchs and wives; wives and
Usbek; Usbek and eunuchs) depicts the tragedy of self-

destruction that results from the inability of the
political order to allow for free self-expression, the
most extreme form of which is despotism.

The need for

political institutions adequate to accomodate self-

expression is carried over as a central theme of the
mature theory of De L'Esprit des Lois

.

In the later work Montesquieu seeks to develop a

universal politics which successfully absorbs the selfinterests and needs of the particular elements of the
society.
1'

The key to this theory is the concept of

esprit general.

I

argue that this fundamental concept

of
attempts to unify both the 'subjective' elements

embodied
action, depicted in the Lettres Persanes and

notion of the
in the mature theory primarily in the

principle of

a form of

government, with the objective

in the familelement of political institutions embodied
of powers.
iar constitutionalism of the balance

fundamental synthesis,

I

argue,

The

is achieved with some

Montesquieu's dual notion
but not complete success by

9

of law as growing out of everyday social relationships

and at the same time enforcing and instilling proper
norms, and by his traditional notion of the spirit of

the constitution as rooted in the fundamental laws of

the kingdom.

CHAPTER
iMAN

I

AND HISTORY

As is well known. Part

I

of Leviathan is devoted

to the study of man, that 'matter' and
'artificer' of
the great Leviathan, the 'artificial
man ^ This
.

'

knowledge is to be gained not by reading books
but by
reading into man himself to consider "what
he does when
he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc.
."
.

.

By looking inside himself man will discover
what is the

nature of all men:

"

.

.

.he

shall thereby read and

know what are the thoughts and passions of all other

men upon the like occasions."^

Hence we can take the

individual mind as a model for all minds; the passions
of men are the same,

ferent.

although their objects may be dif-

Montesquieu will likewise claim that the

passions of all men are the same everywhere.'^
In the Preface to De L' Esprit des Lois Montesquieu

says:

"I

began my inquiry by examining men

.

.

."

—

curious claim since nowhere in the work, especially at
the beginning, does he explicitly develop a theory of

human nature as did his predecessors like Hobbes who
began with the same claim.

Rather, he begins by dis-

tinguishing the nature of the various laws that govern

10

11

man's world, giving the reader an analytic tour through
the anatomy of history.

However, his claim had already

been fulfilled by his development of a philosophy of

human nature in earlier works, the Lettres Persanes and
the "Essai sur les Causes qui Peuvent Affecter les

Esprits et les Characteres

.

If

"

ophy of human nature to Hobbes

'

we compare this philos-

abstract individualism

we can see why Montesquieu chose to depart from the

style of his predecessor.

Montesquieu does not follow Hobbes

's

procedure

because for him the passions are inextricably linked to
their objects in ways they are not for Hobbes.

Man's

spirit can only be known through its involvement in the

historical and cultural world.

Whereas Hobbes and Locke

analyzed the human mind in terms of abstract faculties
of thought,

Montesquieu looked to a matrix of relation-

ships with the historical world and found resultant

principles of action.

From the complex relations of

thought and its objects Montesquieu postulates, in

manner that is foreign to Hobbes and Locke,

a

a

diversity

of human nature according to particular circumstances

demanding not sequential but simultaneous understanding
of man and his environment.

Out of this view of human

nature Montesquieu develops a philosophy of history

wherein men can be studied only through an examination

12

of the anatomy of the historical world.

This chapter

will be devoted to the theories of man and
history that

Montesquieu counterposed to the models established
by
Hobbes and Locke.
Montesquieu seeks to explain historical events on
their own terms, to de-mystify their genesis, development and demise.

He claims to "derive my principles,

not from my prejudices, but from the nature of things."^

Montesquieu's heightened awareness of the historicity
of human action led him to construct a philosophy of

history which could situate contemporary politics* in
order to illuminate both its empirical development and
its theoretical meaning.
a direct

result of this philosophy of history.

I.

1.

His theory of citizenship is

Man as Moral Agent

Pessimism as the foundation of the theory of mind

and history

.

In the Preface to De L' Esprit des Lois

Montesquieu sets out the book's purpose in
but not quite fatalistic tone.

a

pessimistic

He is under no illusion

as to his prospects for success, not even expecting his

work to be given adequate and fair consideration by
most of his readers.
of themselves,

Prejudice makes men ignorant

and social life is such as to be always

governed by prejudice, except for those men "of such

13

exceptional genius that they can understand
everything
about the constitution of a state."

matter how absolute, has limits.

Knowledge, no

The most complete

enlightenment would still face the prejudices instilled
in life by a particular culture.

magistrates," he asserts,
nation."

"The prejudices of

"originate in those of their

Wise rulers may understand the causes of

evils and the method necessary to correct them, but

they must continually be aware of the evils their new

policies will inevitably engender.

Men confront a world

which they can scarcely control, even when they understand its complexities and the depths of its soul.

Their own nature is conceivable only in terms of par-

ticular relations with the particular objects of their
world.

Nature is not to be controlled, as optimistic

prophets of progress believed.

Rather, Montesquieu's

pessimism about man's ability to control nature, and
his resulting view that man is destined to accomodate

himself to nature, established the tone for his theory
of mind which in turn grounds his theory of history.
In the "Essai sur les Causes qui Peuvent Affecter

les Esprits et les Caracteres," published sometime

prior to De

L' Esprit

des Lois (the date is uncertain)

Montesquieu seeks to provide
ological foundation for

a

a

psychological and physi-

causal theory of explanation

14

in history.

in this essay he develops his
theory of

mind more fully than elsewhere.

His main sources are

Essay Con cerning Human Understanding
(1689) and
the sensationalist psychology which developed
from it,
and John Arbuthnot
(1733).

'

s

L'Essai sur les Effets de I'Air

Following Locke, Montesquieu asserts that

initially all ideas derive from sense experience:
An idea, then, is only a sentiment that one
has on the occasion of a sensation that one
has had, a present situation on the occasion
of a past situation.

Together with Arbuthnot

'

s

physiology based upon the

flexibility of nerve fibres, Montesquieu develops a

mechanical view of mental functioning.
best when it does so out of habit,
a

The brain works

like the "fingers of

clavichord player" which "no longer depend on the

will." 9

Montesquieu establishes this physiological

theory as the grounding of his theory of climatic determinism.

The diversity of types of characters in differ-

ent climates is dependent on various physical causes

(temperature, wind, food) which make the fibres more or
less flexible and moist.

Hot climates tend to produce

flexible, active fibres which make people more spirited,

cold climates having the opposite effects.

Most types

of characters exist somewhere on a continuum between the

15

extremes.

Taken together the various physical causes

prescribe particular characters under particular circumstances

.

But Montesquieu wants to limit the applicability
of Arbuthnot

'

s

and Locke's paradigm.

Human character

is not molded merely by physical causes but primarily

by moral causes.

the society,

causes:

""^^

Through the "general education within
physical causes give way to moral

"Moral causes form the general character of a

nation more, and decide more of the quality of its
spirit than physical causes

"''"'
.

The idea of moral

causes leads Montesquieu to minimize the machine like

character of the mind, arguing that

it

is most appro-

priate to non-reflective reflex actions.

Instead he

replaces it with a more fluid notion of the mind as a

reflective organ, capable of making autonomous moral
judgments.

The mind does not merely rearrange ideas in

order to create more complex ideas.

Moral judgments are

a different sort of idea requiring an understanding of

external objects in such a way that men would know how
to respond to them properly.

Montesquieu refers to

Locke's sensationalist psychology for different reasons

than his contemporaries.

He is not concerned so much

with how the human animal processes sensations, but more

16

With how, through reflection, he mediates
between himself and the objects in the world,
Montesquieu wants
to develop the side of Locke's psychology
which eighteenth century philosophes like Condillac and
Helvetius
want to expunge, the capacity for reflect ion. ""-^
He is at one with Locke in prizing comparison
as

the mind's most important faculty.

For Locke, compari-

son remains possible only between simple ideas in
the

mind, but for Montesquieu it composes the proper rela-

tion between sensations and their objects.

The educa-

tion of the individual consists of two things:

"procur-

ing ideas to ourselves;" and "proportioning them to the

just value of things
a set of

One does not first develop

ideas and then a set of moral rules.

Rather,

the acquisition of ideas must have an evaluative content,

ideas must be in 'accurate proportion' to their

objects.

The aim of Montesquieu's psychology in the

"Essai" is to discover how men can produce a harmony

between themselves and their world.

This harmony is

the key to Montesquieu's conception of the 'good' man:
It is not enough to have many ideas and many
ways of feeling; it is necessary still that
there be a harmony between these ideas and
things.
It is foolish to be struck more than
necessary by an object; it is foolish not to
be struck enough.-'-^

17

2.

Moderationt

Mont esquieu's reinterpretat inn nf

Aristotle's Ethics.

Montesquieu uses Locke's sensa-

tionalism to develop

a

moral theory akin to Aristotle-e-

s

search for the mean between extreme forms
of action,

transforming this doctrine into the quest for the
proper
relation between the acting subject and his
objective
world.

For Aristotle, discovery. of the mean produces

the just man who understands his own goodness, knowing
that his intentions are as righteous and just as his

actions; for Montesquieu, moderation produces in the

individual the sense of just proportion, a comfort in
the world which dissolves the antipathy between subject
and object.

This idea of proportion is echoed in

Usbek's discussion of justice in Letter Eighty-three of
the Lett res Persanes

.

"Justice," he declares,

"is a

true relationship of appropriateness which exists be-

tween two things, and this relationship is always the
same, no matter by whom considered, whether it is God,

or an angel, or finally a man.""*"^

Moderation and

just proportion are natural relations which describe

man's moral attitude towards the world.

Montesquieu

has Usbek conclude his letter by echoing the doctrine
of Artistotle's Ethics:^^

When a man performs a self-examination,
what satisfaction for him to realize that he
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has a just heart
This pleasure, sober as it
may be, must delight him.
He finds that his
being is elevated as much above those without
one as he is elevated above tigers and bears.
Yes, Rhedi, if I were sure of always following
inviolably that equity which I have before my
eyes, I should think myself the foremost among
men.
1

Locke's sensationalist psychology acts as a catalyst for Montesquieu's reinterpretat ion of Aristotelian

ethics.

By opening the mind to empirical understanding,

Locke added a dimension not available to Aristotle.
However,

in Montesquieu's eyes,

negate Artistotle.

Rather,

it

Locke's theory did not

demanded that the Ethics

be reinterpreted and incorporated in a moral theory

appropriate to modern conceptions of science and nature.
Aristotle had opened the Ethics by claiming that:
"Every art or applied science and every systematic in-

vestigation, and similarly every action and choice, seem
to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been well

defined as that at which all things aim." 1 7

However

noble and proper this program was for the classical
Greek,

for Montesquieu and his contemporaries this ideal

could no longer usefully guide action.

In a society in

which men were more inclined to self-interest than to
the public good, the classical virtue of self-renun-

ciation would lead one to be swallowed up by the intrigues of modern politics and the ethics of capital
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accumulation.
goals.

In this context,

human action must seek new

The good man who can leap from practical to
con-

templative wisdom would last but a short moment in
Parisian society.
However, the 'man of spirit' (I'homme
d' esprit)

would flourish in such a society.

He could re-

construct society according to its proper spirit of moderation, mediating his self interest through respect for

others.

He must be the product of a good education,

feel-

ing as well as knowing the proper moderation in his action
in the world.

1

He must know the world clearly and im-

mediately; acting not according to abstract rules or principles but according to the particular circumstances which
confront him.

He is a continually self-conscious and act-

ing subject who creates himself within the world:

A man of spirit knows (connoit) and acts in a
momentary manner, with which he must be acquainted in which he must act; he creates himself, that
is to say, at each instant, on the actual need;
he knows and he feels the accurate relation which
exists between things and himself. 20
It

is this idea of the active subject, creating himself

within the material world which Locke's psychology supplies to Montesquieu's reinterpretat ion of Aristotelian
ethics.

Montesquieu's concern for the differences be-

tween ancient and modern life is crucial to his moral
theory-

He concludes his discussion of the man of
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spirit in the "Essai" by stating that what
really dis-

tinguishes the classical Greek moral vision from
the

modern one is that the Greeks lack the crucial notion
of 1 esprit
'

:

Here is a song of the Greeks:
"the
first of all goods is health; the second,
beauty; the third, wealth amassed without
fraud; the fourth, the youth that one passes
with friends " At no point is the 'esprit'
mentioned, which is the principle attribute
of our modern times. 21
.

Locke's psychology unleashes the individual as individual.

Montesquieu attempts to apply the Aristotelian

principle of moderation as the primary moral rule to
the action of concrete individuals confronted by other

individuals
However, it is not only the Greeks who lacked the
idea of

1
'

esprit

.

Montesquieu's pessimism about the

prospects of contemporary life penetrates the discussion
of the man of spirit in such a way that foreshadows some
of the most important principles of his philosophy of

history.

The man of spirit requires the absolute con-

junction of theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom, of

knowledge and action.
rarely found.

Yet this requires men that are

Theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom

are separated by a nearly unbridgeable gulf.

Some men

are capable of being philosophers, others of being men

21

of the world, but the man of spirit,
the subject who freely

creates himself in harmony with his world,
must be both,
and few men are capable of that.
it is worth quoting Montesquieu's statement of the dilemma of the
man of spirit
at some length:

A man of spirit is then more universal, but
he is
(m the narrow sense) very rare. He must unite
two almost physically incompatible qualities:
for there is really as much difference between
that which is called a man of spirit in the world
and the man of spirit according to the philosophers, as there is between a man of spirit and a
fool.
The spirit, for men of the world, consists
in approaching the most distant ideas; the spirit, according to the philosophers, in distinguishing them. According to the first man of
spirit, all the ideas which have some relation,
(however distant they may be) are awakened; they
are so distinct, for the other, that nothing is
capable of confounding them. 22
The result of modern spirituality in Montesquieu's

view is that modern man must reject the purely contemplative life as a valid expression of the ends of knowledge.
The purpose of knowledge must always be practical, even if

that knowledge is of the most theoretical sort.

The formal

goal of knowledge is the extension of

The aim

1'

esprit.

of Montesquieu's greatest work, De L' Esprit des Lois

to teach men to think.

,

is

He insists that he does not seek a

mere compendium of laws but an understanding of their spirit

so as to inform the creation of stable and just polities

according to the particular circumstances of the various

22

nations.

The central task of reason is to
understand both

the physical and historical 'facts' of
the world.

But

facts alone are useless, they lead to mere
confusion and
many painful pages of manuscript thrown to
the wind.
Montesquieu could only discover truth "once I discovered
my

principles "--only then did history make sense.

But

those principles must derive from the knowledge we
gain
from reflecting on the facts of history, and if our
prin-

ciples are correct then our knowledge will be useful.

Here

lies the true failure of ancient philosophy:

Knowledge gives much extension to the
spirit.
The ancient philosophers lacked such
consciousness (manquoient de connoissances
They had good spirits; they made little use
of them.
They never penetrated to the heart
of the question; they wanted to explain what
was inexplicable, and spent their time giving
reasons for false facts on the basis of principles which were as completely false. 24
)

The ancients failed to adequately explain the

world because they could not penetrate the depths of the

human mind.

Because they tried to understand the wrong

things, the nature of the abstract Good, the internal

moral content of physical nature, they did not recognize
that true knowledge must derive from the depth of the

human mind, and is justified in so far as
human spirit.

it extends the

The mind is an autonomous whole, a self,

which interacts with the objects, including other

23

selves, around it and makes its own judgments
about the

appropriateness of actions.
However, the ancient world presented some glimpses
of the self,

cide.

if only negatively,

in the power of sui-

A passage from the original 1734 edition of the

"Considerations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des
Romains" which was supressed in later editions^^ asserted that the power to commit suicide allowed the

ancients to do greater things than the moderns, whose
religion forbids it.
is

Montesquieu's choice of language

interesting, for he describes suicide as

that one takes over oneself:"

"It

a

"power

is certain that men

have become less free, less courageous, less disposed
to great enterprises," he asserts,

"than they were then,

by this power which one takes over onself, one is able
at any moment to escape from all other power."

In the

Lettres Persanes Montesquieu had already presented a

modern defense of suicide as

a

direct consequence of

the Newtonian view of man's diminished place in the

universe.
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Since the defense of suicide plays a

crucial role in Montesquieu's moral theory, as

it did

for Montaigne and seventeeth century French moralists,
it

is worth quoting from Letter LXXVI at some length:

European laws are merciless against those who
take their own lives. They are made to die.
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so to speak, a second time.
They are infamously dragged through streets; they are
covered with ignominy; their possessions are
confiscated
It seems to me, Ibben, that such laws
are quite unjust. When I am overwhelmed
with
grief, misfortune, scorn, why should they want
to prevent me from putting an end to my troubles, and why cruelly deprive me of a remedy
that lies in my own hands ?
Why should they want me to go on working
for a society of which I am no longer willing
to be a part? Why should they insist, despite
my feelings, that I hold to a convention that
has been made without my consent? Society is
founded on mutual benefit. But when it becomes a burden to me, who can keep me from
renouncing it? Life was granted to me as a
favor; therefore I can give it back when it
is no longer one.
The cause stops; the effect should therefore stop too
But, you will say, you are disturbing
the order of providence.
God has united your
soul and your body and you are separating
them.
You are opposing his plan and you are
resisting him.
What does all that mean? Am I disturbing the order of providence when I change the
modifications of matter and square a ball
which the primal laws of movement that is to
say, the laws of creation and conversion of
matter have made round? Certainly not, for
I am using a right given to me, and in this
sense, I can disturb all of nature as much as
I please without being told that I am obstructing providence.
When my soul is separated from my body,
will there be less order and less arrangement
in the universe?
Do you believe that this new
combination will be less perfect and less dependent on general laws? Do you think the
world has lost something thereby? Or that the
works of God will be less great, or, rather,
less immense?
Do you believe that my body, having
turned into an ear of grain, or a worm, or a
piece of turf, will have turned into a work
Do you think
of nature less worthy of her?
that my soul, cut off from everything earthly
.

.

—

—

.
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it once possessed,

[emphasis added]

has become less sublime?

This defense of suicide seems on wholly
modern grounds:

the Newtonian view of men as small inconsequential
parts
of God's universe and the view of social
life as a con-

tractual relationship which men can opt out of when

it

no longer serves its original purpose, or even
when they
no longer want to live in it.

Even the language

— sui-

cide as "a remedy that lies in my own hand "--implies a

modern conception of agency and self that Montesquieu
argues is lacking in the classical theory of mind.
Yet this avid defense of suicide based more on

despair than honor, the traditional stoic defense, is
not altogether incommensurable with the more traditional

defense Montesquieu gives in "Remains."

They both rep-

resent man's assertion of power over himself; in both

instances man freely takes the reins directing his life.
The moral import

(and power) of the act of suicide is

no less in either case.

Whereas the stoic could assuage

the painful thoughts of leaving the world by his iden-

tification with the natural harmony of the universe,

Montesquieu could not.

Indeed, Montesquieu believed

that men of his time could not conceive of such an idea
of greatness.

But short of the grandeur of the stoic

vision, Montesquieu did see the need to assert oneself

26

in the world and sometimes against
it.^"^

Therefore,

he could accept the Newtonian defense of
suicide in the
Lettres Persanes as a sort of reinterpret at
ion of stoi-

cism.

The nobility of the act of asserting control
over

one's life is really consistent with the
cosmological

vantage point which Montesquieu assigns to the self.
Man stands in the world as a fragment of it, capable
of

knowing his own condition and struggling against it.
The difference between animals and man, Montesquieu

asserts in the opening book of De

L'

Esprit des Lois

,

is

that man is cognizant of the fact that he will die.^^

Suicide,

'the power one takes over oneself,'

is the ul-

timate expression of the self in a world he cannot

otherwise control.
Neither the classical Platonic ideal of reason

overcoming the passions and putting the soul in line nor
the rationalism of the seventeenth century natural law-

yers captures adequately the structure of the spirit.
It

is crucial to recognize that Montesquieu makes modest

claims for reason precisely because rational action is
not the primary end of human action.

Passion governs

men's behavior far more than reason.

His critique,

similar though less philosophically sophisticated than
Hume's,

is that man is,

by nature, more a passionate

than a rational animal; that human nature is the reverse
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of the Platonic

ideal— the passions put reason to their

own use; reason does not control the
passions.

Montesquieu's view, as in Hume's,

if

In

moral judgments

were to be based upon the rational intuition
of a natural moral law, then the world would certainly
be a bas-

tion of immorality.

The psychological foundations of

human action are more complex, requiring

a moral theory

which expresses not merely one faculty of the mind, but
the spirit as a whole.

Men are governed more by self-

love than by their faculty of reason.

To build a moral

theory on the basis of natural law would be at best
futile and at worst dogmatic and authoritarian; com-

pelling and constraining people to act according to
moral principles and values
to accept.

it

is not

in their nature

Montesquieu's rejection of the dogmatic

rationalism of natural law, along with his rejection of

the moral implications of empiricism which we discussed
earlier, distinguished him from the main currents of

seventeenth and early eighteenth century secular moral
theory.

His philosophy of human nature charts a new

course which is filled with potentialities for

a

phil-

osophy of history and a theory of citizenship.
3.

Human nature and the origin of society

nature for Montesquieu was not fixed as

it

.

Human
was for both
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dogmatic rationalism and empiricism.

Only the biologi-

cal structure and function of the mind
are universal in
men.
But to understand man's nature one must
understand
his social life.
Individuals cannot be understood outside of the various particular influences that
affect
and determine their behavior.

Physical factors such as

climate or the geography of the nation they inhabit
and
social factors such as laws, moeurs and manieres, to-

gether mold the particular character of societies and
individuals.

In Montesquieu's view,

investigating in-

dividuals abstracted from the social and physical situation is useless and misleading

The relation be-

.

tween man and the world is like that between

a subject

and object in a sentence, men in their particular cir-

cumstances acting as the verb.

Together they form a

context in which each can be better understood.

The

concepts of proportion and moderation provide the rules
of syntax which constitute discourse between man and

his world, and this discourse determines his nature.

Men bind together in society out of natural inclinations not out of rational assent.

In Book I,

Chapter

Two of De L' Esprit des Lois Montesquieu distinguishes

the first four laws of nature.

Following Hobbes and

sensationalist psychology he presents a materialistic

interpretation of natural law claiming that the laws of
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nature are "so called because they derive
exclusively
from the constitution of our being.
order to learn
what they are, it is necessary to consider
man before

m

the establishment of society.

Montesquieu seems

to follow Hobbes further, depicting man's first
instinct
as one of self-preservation and his first
psychology as

one of fear:
Clearly, the first, ideas conceived by man
would not be speculative: he would concern
himself with the preservation of his being
before investigating its origins. Such a
person would feel only his weakness; his
timidity would be very great.
But here the agreement with Hobbes dissolves,

Montesquieu's framework is very different.
war is the initial condition of nature.

for

Peace,

not

Hobbes had er-

roneously attributed ideas and motives to men in their
animal state that required for their genesis the more

complex institutions of civil society.

The Hobbesian

state of war presupposes complex concepts on the part
of individuals,

such as the understanding of their es-

sential equality, which could arise only with particular

political and social configurations.
petual war in the state of nature,

Rather than a per-

"every man would feel

himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself
an equal."

Montesquieu draws the opposite conclusion
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from that of Hobbes:

"No one would seek to attack
any-

one else; peace would be the
first law of nature."
Just as Montesquieu's notion of
the natural state
is different from that of Hobbes
so also the way to the

creation of society is different.

The social contract

plays no role in Montesquieu's view.

Society must arise

out of man's instincts in the state of
nature, not his
reason.
Against the rationalism of contract theory,

Montesquieu uses the language of animal attraction
and
passion to describe the formation of civil society:
I have said that fear would lead men
to
flee one another.
But encouraged by all the
indications that such fear was universally
shared, they would soon come together.
Besides, they would be drawn by the pleasure
felt by one animal when approached by another
of the same species
A third law would follow from their natural inclination for one
another
In addition to whatever men feel originally, they succeed in acquiring knowledge.
Thus they possess a second tie that does not
exist for other animals.
They have, then,
another new motive for uniting; the desire to
live in society is the fourth law of nature,
[emphasis added]
.

Even the addition of knowledge to inclination does not

produce the rational construction of society, but the
'desire' to live in society.

Society must develop 'or-

ganically' from human instincts.
the Lettres Persanes

,

Much earlier, in

Montesquieu had already criticized
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the idea that primitive men joined together
rationally
to form a civil society.
Society has its

roots in na-

tural human relations.

The family, he argues, is the

first natural association followed closely by society.

Paternal bonds are natural and society develops out of

them as a matter of course.

It

is abnormal and a pro-

duct of socially constituted norms that individuals
would ever isolate themselves from one another.

Direct-

ing his argument at Hobbes, Montesquieu claims:

"If men

never formed any societies, if they abandoned each other
and fled each other's company, we should have to ask the

reason for this and search out why they stand off from
each other. "^^

Montesquieu derives relativistic conclusions from
his emphasis on the social context of human action.
are different in different societies.

Men

In Letter XXXIV

of the Lett res Persanes Montesquieu has Rica say to

Ibben
I shall continue to write to you, and I
shall teach you things far removed from Persian character and spirit.
It is certainly
the same earth carrying both countries, but
the men of this country where I am and those
of the country where you are are quite different
.

It

is a constant theme throughout Montesquieu's works,

which scholars have often noted, that to understand men
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one must understand their particular
situation in time
and space; their national spirit, their
individual so-

cial role and their particular education.

Following his

'organic- conception of human association
Montesquieu

praises the naturalness and importance of human felicity,

and decries the void created by a lack of human

association and friendship.

In Letter XXXIV of the

Lettres Persanes Rica compares his culture's social

individualism unfavorably to the friendship amid French
society

:

This Asiatic sobriety derives from the
dearth of intercourse between people. They
see each other only when forced to do so by
ceremony. Friendship, that sweet bond of
hearts which creates a gentleness of existence
here, is practically unknown to them.
They
withdraw to their houses where they always
find a social company awaiting them, so that
each family group lives, so to speak, in
i

solat ion

This idea is especially important in Montesquieu's

praise of cosmopolitanism and commercial capitalism,
both fundamental components of his theory of citizenship .

4.

From the social to the political self

.

The belief

that human nature is intertwined with the social world

finds its fullest expression in the Lettres Persanes

.
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Constantly the Persian travellers and their
subjects at
home demonstrate that the passionate life
of men and
women is bound up with the political life;

what is most

personal and private is at the same time political.
the final letter, Roxane, Usbek

'

s

in

most cherished wife,

reveals that she has decived her master and announces
her suicide.

The immodesty of Usbek

'

treatment of

s

women as objects of both his lust and his paternal

'his'

political power is in the end negated by this act of his
most beloved object.

Usbek

's
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Roxane, the former object of

love and passion and subject of his political

domain, must reject both roles if she is to reject
either.

First,

she rejects her position as the subject

of his political power,

leading the other women in the

seraglio to take lovers, covertly but emphatically defying Usbek

'

s

rule.

By doing so she asserts her poli-

tical freedom against Usbek

'

s

despotism.

lived in servitude," she declares,

been free."

"but

"I might have
I

have always

She continues by proclaiming that not only

has she always been free, but that she has turned

Usbek

'

despotism back on him:

s

"I

have rewritten your

laws after the laws of nature, and my spirit has ever

sustained itself in independence." 3 6
lover,

By taking a

and committing suicide in the wake of his murder

by Usbek

'

s

eunuchs, Roxane has negated her role as the
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object of Usbek's passion.

her subjectivity.
and the book,

m

her final act she asserts

The final paragraph of the letter,

reads:

My language, no doubt, seems new to you.
Could it be that after having overwhelmed you
with sorrow, I should even yet force you to
admire my courage? But it is finished. The
poison consumes me. My strength is leaving
me.
The pen falls from my hands.
I feel even
my hatred weaken.
I am dying.

The use of the first person and the constant repetition
of the possessive

'my'

is in complete control.

seems to emphasize that Roxane
Her acts of defiance must be

simultaneously personal assertions of her self and ex-

pressions of her struggle for freedom against repression.

By rewriting the laws of repression 'after the

laws of nature,

'

her spirit has 'ever sustained itself

in independence.'

Roxane

's

declaration, so to speak, completes

Montesquieu's theory of mind.

Human beings are social

animals meant for constant intereaction with others and

always subject to certain forms of public life.

Roxane

's

freedom.

In

case personal freedom is necessarily political
In the discussion of De L' Esprit des Lois

(Chapter Five)

I

will show that whatever the form of

government Montesquieu seeks to safeguard the space for
self-expression.

In despotism,

he will argue this is
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impossible, wheras in both republics and
monarchies this
is possible if self-expression is
limited as much as

possible to -society' while
from the state.

But now

I

it

is kept at a distance

want to complete the argument

of the present chapter, demonstrating how
the theory of

man

I

have described so far grounds Montesquieu's theory

of history.

II.

1.

Particulars and Universals

The nature of history and the historian

.

Montes-

quieu's concern for the social constitution of human
nature led him to urge new standards in the study of

history which respected the autonomy of particular
events.

Particular events and cultures in history must

be understood in their own right,

dices of the age of the historian.

free from the preju-

Montesquieu's own

historical work followed this insight.

In the Preface

to De L' Esprit des Lois he writes:

When I have had to consult the works of
the ancients, I have sought to understand the
spirit in which they were written.
Otherwise
I might have considered as similar cases that
in fact differed; I might have missed those
differences that separate cases ostensibly
similar. ^
In order to understand the past one must recapture its
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spirit.

Indeed, Montesquieu seems to have seen
his role

in the debate over the ancient French
feudal tradition
as in part to restructure the debate
itself, to change

the way questions about the past had been
asked.
For example,

in Montesquieu's view, both Boulainvilliers

and the Abbe du Bos were involved at least as
much in

political polemics as they were in writing history.
In the midst of his own discussion of the origin of
the

French monarchy Montesquieu implicitly attacks them,
warning of the dangers of interpreting the past through
the present.

Their interpretation distorted the past

by reading it as if it were coexistent with the present.

The striving "to render modern all the ancient centur-

ies," which Montesquieu charged his adversaries with

doing, deprived the ancient world of its authenticity
and uniqueness.

His judgment of those who failed to

respect the historicity of the past was unequivocal:
"To transport into remote centuries all the ideas of

the century in which one lives, is the source of the

deepest confusions." 40

As

I

showed above, this same

spirit which led him to attack both Boulainvilliers and

du Bos guided Montesquieu's critique of Hobbesian contract theory.

This mode of critique led Montesquieu to envisage
a

new role for the historian as one who could relate
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the past as it was, purged of the preconceptions
of the
present.

His praise of Ceasar's and Tacitus

's

accounts

of the ancient legal codes of the Germans
reflects this

new ideal for the historian:

These two authors can be found in such harmony
with the codes of the laws of the barbarous
people that we have, that in reading Ceasar
and Tacitus one finds these codes throughout,
and that in reading these codes one finds
Ceasar and Tacitus throughout 41
.

Montesquieu's ideal historian transports himself into
the past age, blending himself with his subject matter.

Montesquieu himself attempts to do this in order to understand the contribution of Saint Louis to the French
legal tradition,

for him a crucial moment in the crea-

tion of modern France.

The code as it appears to the

modern historian is confused, combining different and
sometimes contradictory legal traditions.

Indeed, the

glory of Saint Louis was his ability to unite traditional with Roman law.

The historian who wants to

understand Louis' contribution properly must study
in the spirit of the times in which it was written.

What is, then, this compilation that we call
of Saint
by the name of d Establissement
Louis? What is this obscure, confused and
ambiguous code where French jurisprudence is
continually mixed with Roman law; where one
speaks as a legislator and sees a jurisconsult; where can be found an entire body of
'

it
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:urisprudence on every case, on all points of
civil law? To understand this it is necessary
to transport oneself into those times.

Montesquieu understands the demands of historicity
even
more than Meinecke's great reint erpretat ion claims.
Despite an apparently naturalistic theory of causation,

Montesquieu made demands on the historian more akin to

nineteenth century historical idealism and the Romantic

conception of history than to the materialistic rationalism of his more well known theoiry of climate.

Recog-

nizing the seeming incompatibility in these two views,

Montesquieu seeks a philosophy of history which synthesizes the contradictions between these two systems of

understanding.

The purpose of the remainder of this

chapter is to trace that synthesis, especially as

it

provides a basis for the theory of law which is crucial
to the theory of citizenship in De L'Esprit des Lois .43
2.

Developmental history

.

As many commentators have

recognized Montesquieu's nascent historism led him to
embrace a wide ranging cultural relativism.
it

However,

also led him to develop a fundamentally new type of

history in De L'Esprit des Lois which posits a theory
of historical development.

For Montesquieu the present

could only be known by knowing the past.

He asserts

that this is the reason that he studied the old Germanic
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law. 44

But he has not completely given up
more tradi-

tional attitudes towards history.

As many passages in

De L'Esprit des Lois demonstrate
history is still a

storehouse of lessons to inform the statesman's
present
actions as it had been for renaissance
historians such
as Machiavelli and Bodin.

Yet,

plays a greater role too:

it

rect knowledge of the present.

for Montesquieu history

is the condition of cor'

It

is a constant and

important theme in his work that there has been a
break
in the historical continuity of the western world
and

that we can only recognize its consequences if we un-

derstand the historical development which necessitated
it.

In the next chapter we shall see how this break

has rendered the ancients' solutions to political problems,

such as the virtuous republic and imperialism,

utterly inapplicable to contemporary circumstances.

I

will show in Chapter Five that this leads Montesquieu
to conceptualize the political future in terms which

transcend the analysis of the traditional forms of government.

In the face of the growing nation-state and a

world capitalist economy political analysis based on

traditional ideas about forms of government reflect
inadequate conceptual tools.
The most neglected, although crucial, historical

work in Montesquieu's major treatise deals not with

40

traditional subject matter— nations, laws,
rulers,

wars—but with the development

of institutions and

social practices.

In Book XXI of De L' Esprit des Lois

Montesquieu writes

a

history of the development of com-

merce from the ancient world to the present.

This book

illustrates his notion of developmental history better

than any other.

The first five chapters are introduc-

tory advancing the theory of climate's strong influence

on the ways of life of different peoples and on their

modes of commerce.

The last two of these are devoted

to citing the general differences between ancient and

modern commerce.

With Chapter Six the history of com-

merce begins with 'the immense treasures of Semiramis,
and ends by analyzing Spain's fall as due to its failure

to harness the power of modern commerce, allowing the

Dutch and English to command international trade.
On the way Montesquieu discusses the various revolutions
in the structure of commerce,

from the ancient world to

the Athenian 'empire of the sea,'

through the revo-

lutionary expansion of commercial networks under Alexan-

der and the supremacy of the Egyptians after his death.
He continues to discuss the commerce of the Roman Empire

and the disastrous effects of its breakdown.

He finally

surfaces in the modern world through a discussion of the

technological advances, praising particularly the com-
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pass, that broke the cages of
barbarism and freed commerce to spread across the
globe taking on far greater
importance than ever before. As if
to drive the point
home Montesquieu ends the book
with a chapter which

makes

plea for free trade and competition
as perhaps
the best way for Spain to retain
some of the economic
and cultural values of the trade
with the New World
drawing on his earlier essay on the
riches of
a

Spain.

—

S^^entific history:

l aws

and causes

.

Montesquieu

seeks to give philosophical depth to his
developmental

theory of history with his scientific theory
of 'laws'
and

'causes.'

His view of law begins similarly to tra-

ditional seventeenth century natural law theory
with the

proposition that law is in essence human reason.

The

essential condition of the universe is the invariable
regularity of law logically prior to both the material

existence of the world, which exists as possibility, and
God.

The beginning of Book

I

of De L'Esprit des Lois

echoes Grotius's famous phrase from the "Prolegomena"
of The Law of War and Peace that the rationality of na-

tural law would be valid even if God did not exist :47
Thus the creation, which might appear to be
an arbitrary act, presupposes rules as invariable as the fatality dear to atheists.
It
would be absurd to say that the Creator could
govern the world without these rules, since
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conIf the world were not

r^i-^^^^i
rational,
governed by unchanging

laws, then men could have
no knowledge of it.

Yet

immediately after his affirmation
of natural law
Montesquieu departs from Grotius
and the natural law
tradition shifing to the language
of Newtonian science
to describe the internal
relations of the system
of

laws

:

These rules are in an invariable
relation to
one another.
Between two moving bodies acting upon each other, motion
is received, increased, diminished, or lost in
proportion to
their respective mass and velocity.
diversity is uniformity; every change,Everv
con"
^
stancy.
'

The use of the physical analogy
is not limited in

Montesquieu's work to this passage.

In fact, this sci-

entific view seems to play a far more
important role
than the view taken from the moral
natural law tradition.
In the opening chapter of the all
important Book
V,

"The Laws Provided by the Legislator Ought
to be

Relative to the Principle of Government," Montesquieu
states the physical nature of the system most clearly:
The relationship between the laws and this
principle stretches all the springs of government, and the principle in turn receives new
strength from the laws. Thus in physics, an
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action is always followed by a reaction. 49

Montesquieu's notion of historical law
seeks to combine
both a moral dimension drawn from the
rationalist natural law tradition and an explanatory
dimension drawn from
Newton and empiricist science.

Montesquieu's definition of 'laws' as "necessary
relations deriving from the nature of things,

seems

to imply for him two ideas of necessity.

laws

First,

are necessary because the world is in essence
rational.
As we saw above,

laws are the preconditions for the

world's existence.

If

it

were not governed by invari-

able laws of reason then the world could not exist.
Laws in this sense imply a moral compulsion.

If

laws

embody a universal rationality then universal justice
must be the obedience to law, to which all beings,

intelligent or not, are subject.

With relation to the

moral compulsion of law the difference between men and
less intelligent beings on the one hand, and physical

beings on the other, is that men are imperfect, led by

their nature to contradict laws, whether of God, nature
or men.

Just as for Plato justice and law transcend the

material world of appearance, embodying the universal
'good,

'

so they also do for Montesquieu.

Implied in Montesquieu's use of his definition of

44

law,

however,

essary.'

is an almost antithetical
meaning o£

•necin the first case laws
are logically neces-

sary, they exist a priori.

Yet laws, along with
their

corollary 'causes,' describe
the actual movement of
history, they are necessary to
make sense out of empirical history.
Montesquieu rejects the idea that
history
is governed by any laws which
are extrinsic to it, such
as the 'fortuna' of Machiavelli
or the divine Providence
of Bossuet
If

Montesquieu had clearly distinguished
these two

ideas of law, as contemporary social
science tries to
do, the task of understanding
his theory would perhaps
be easier.
We could cite his confusion
and treat his
two views of law as separate.
However, Montesquieu does
not clearly distinguish them not
because of a lack of

philosophical acumen but because he sees
as dimensions in a single system of
law.

a need for

both

Montesquieu

considers both the rationalist and the
empiricist paradigms of law as inadequate by themselves and
attempts
to transcend them by incorporating both
into a single

system of law.

Before trying to judge Montesquieu's

success we must examine his theory of law linked to
his

theory of historical causation more closely.

Continual flux and stasis are important categories
of Montesquieu's historical ontology,

forming the basis
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of his crucial distinction between
general and particu-

lar causes and between physical
laws and laws of intelligent beings.
The more general causes are, the
more
fixed their effects will be.
The more particular (in-

dividual) the causes are, the more arbitrary
the actions
seem and the less knowable and predictable
their effects
are.

Montesquieu opens the first part of the "Essai
sur
les Causes" by clearly distinguishing these
two levels

of causation:

These causes become less arbitrary to the
extent that they have a more general effect.
Thus, we know better what gives a certain
character to a nation than that which gives a
certain character to an individual (un particulier), that which modifies a sex than
that which affects a man, that which forms
the genius of societies which have embraced a
general way of life than that of a single

person 51
.

On the most general level human history is fixed or
in more modern language determined.

mine the character of a nation.

mean that individuals within

a

Climate will deter-

However, this does not

particular nation subject

to a particular tradition and set of laws will act in

the way that the climate prescribes.

Were their social

traditions not to intervene to counter the influence of

physical laws the determinism of physical causes would
be more pronounced.

Hov/ever,

through education and the
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development of tradition men can struggle against
the
determinism of physical causes often countermanding

their less useful and more dangerous commands.
Physical causes, then, are only one part of the

system of laws and causes which govern Montesquieu's

universe.

As soon as men begin to think and a nation

begins to develop a particular spirit and tradition
they are absorbed under moral causes.

Although

Montesquieu's philosophy of history contains

a level at

which behavior is determined, viewed as a whole the sys
tem of laws and causes demands human initiative, knowl-

edge and self-conscious action.

Human history, like

human nature is the saga of man's total relationship to
his physical and moral environment.

In some cases the

physical causes overtake the moral causes producing
relatively static society.

For example, Montesquieu

uses this to explain the predisposition of oriental

nations toward despotism:
The oriental peoples have a certain indolence
of mind reinforcing that sensibility which
makes them so sensitive to every impression.
Such indolence of mind and body makes them
incapable of any action, any effort, any
Their souls, once they have
resistance.
received an impression cannot be rid of it.
For this reason oriental laws, moeurs, and
manieres, even if of no intrinsic importance,
such as their mode of dress, remain today

what they were a thousand years ago.^-^

a
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Climatic influence, however, is not always
determinative.
In fact, societies often rise to
greatness
by counteracting the effects of physical
causes.
"The

more physical causes incline men to inaction,
the moral

causes ought to counter such effects. "^^

The task of

the legislator is to understand the determinism of
physical causes

(and the general Ifevels of moral causes) and

to mold the best possible polity out of them, even if
it

means struggling against them.

Montesquieu's disen-

chanted history has no room for causes that men cannot
recognize and, at least in principle, counterbalance.
The limits to understanding history are limits pre-

scribed by man's passionate nature, not limits inherent
in nature.

The irrationality that we recognize in human

history is not that of the world itself but of human
nature.

It

is crucial to recognize,

so as not to over-

rationalize Montesquieu's doctrine, that irrationality
is not so much a fault of human nature as a necessity
of it.

Just as universal reason is a precondition of

the material world passion and subjectivity are precon-

ditions of human existence.

Without these society would

never have developed out of the intercourse of primitive
men.

For Montesquieu neither fortune nor Providence is

necessary to explain the irrational in history.
what is necessary is scientific knowledge.

Rather,
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De L- Esprit des Lois proposes
to establish such

knowleage.

Like Montesquieu's other major
works, it
undertakes to explain the structure
of political and
social life through an analysis of
the 'spirit' of the
laws:

that system of laws and causes which
motivates

and describes a particular political
situation.

There

must then be some principle which captures
the internal
dynamic of that system, which gives the
system motion
and internal cohesion.

Montesquieu discovers this prin-

ciple in 'utility,' a principle which for him
embodies
both of the conceptions of 'necessity' mentioned

above.

In the first place Montesquieu follows Machiavelli
in

linking utility to the stability of the state,
deducing
the proper laws of a particular government from what
is

necessary to preserve it.

This is embodied in Montes-

quieu's famous definition of liberty as security.
The moderate government which acts so as to preserve its

liberty will adopt the best laws.

To establish laws on

any other basis is to invite, indeed to guarantee, the

destruction of the state.

Furthermore, to depart from

the principle of utility and the preservation of liberty
will require plunging the state into civil war and the

adoption of cruel and inhuman public policies.

If the

Romans had constructed public policy solely to ensure
the preservation of liberty not only would they have
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maintained their greatness but they
would also have prevented the cruelties of civil war and
the atrocities of
the later emperors. But utility does
not merely prescribe the proper course of action embodying
the most

just and best possible laws under the
particular cir-

cumstances, it also describes the movement of
the laws
of history.
All events in history can be explained
by

their causes which are either physical or moral
(tradition).

Human history requires men to reflect upon their

circumstances and to act self-consciously to create the
best possible polity.

Yet as they reflect they will

come to recognize the laws of history which are as fixed
as those of physical nature.

The task of the legisla-

tor is to turn this scientific knowledge of the 'necessary system of relations' into concrete historical reality.

Above all, Montesquieu wanted to demystify his-

— to purge it of all notions of 'fortuna' and 'Providence' —yet not lose its spontaneity and subjectivity.

tory

We can see this system at work in Montesquieu's portrayal of Roman history.

Rome fell because of its own internal contradic-

tions which for Montesquieu typify the contradictions

embedded in the classical Republic as a form of government.

In Book II,

Chapter

2

of De L' Esprit des Lois

Montesquieu uses Rome's failure to follow the principles
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of a republic to demonstrate
the centrality of utility
for the laws of history:
It is essential to fix the
number of citizens
who may participate in assemblies.
Otherwise
It would be uncertain whether
all the people
had spoken, or only one part of it.
At Sparta
the number was fixed at ten-thousand.
Rome
was destined to rise from insignificance
to
grandeur, to experience all the vicissitudes
of fortune.
At one time almost all its citizens were outside its walls; at another,
all
Italy and much of the rest of the world
were
inside them.
The number of citizens was never
fixed, and this was among the principle causes
56
'

of Its ruin.

Rome was able to rise to preeminence in the world
be-

cause

it

best embodied the spirit and virtue which makes

for greatness in republics.

This spirit led to the per-

fection of the arts of war and territorial expansion.

While the polity remained in harmony, its citizens moved
by the spirit of virtue and the public good, the state

could prosper both at home and abroad.

During its rise

to greatness the Roman polity preserved liberty at home
and adopted good laws for the preservation and continued

expansion of the empire, such as the wise policy of allowing conquered territories to retain their own laws
and way of life.

However the dynamic of imperialism

while leading to Rome's greatness also mandated its

destruction.
The emphasis on militarism,

so necessary to the
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greatness of the Roman spirit,
accentuated class division within the state, creating
a rift between two types
of citizens.
The virtues of conquest
are not suited to

the peaceful life of the city:

We hear in the authors only of the
dissensions
that ruined Rome, without seeing
that these
dissensions were necessary to it, that they
had always been there and always had
to be.
It was the greatness of the
republic that
caused all the trouble and changed popular
tumults into civil wars. There had to be
dissensions in Rome, for warriors who were so
proud, so audacious, so terrible abroad could
not be very moderate at home.
To ask for men
in a free state who are bold in war and
timid
peace is to wish the impossible. And, as
a general rule, whenever we see everyone
tranquil in a state that calls itself a republic,
we can be sure that liberty does not exist
there

m

This class division led to a usurpation of political

power by the military and the privatization of government in the persons of generals who led soldiers more

loyal to their chiefs than the state.
Class polarization and the privatization of gov-

ernment developed as well out of the mode of production

consequent on the greatness of Roman expansion, the
city's wealth becoming more and more based upon foreign
sources.

However, as the soldier class grew in strength

the traditional mode of the distribution of wealth based
upon the equality of the citizenry gave way to the ag-
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grandizement of the soldiers through
increased shares
of booty and tribute.
Furthermore, as the wealth of the
city grew private interest dwarfed the
public
good.

The

antithesis of civic virtue motivated the
people, leading
on the one hand to the eclipse of the
power
of the Sen-

ate by the military and on the other to
increased de-

mands by the plebs.

The system of political and social

life became unbalanced as conflicts latent in
the struc-

ture of the state exploded onto the surface.
But the tragedy of the Roman empire,

and of human

history, is that both Rome's greatness and fall were
necessary, mandated by the laws of history.

Certainly

there were more correct policy choices which would have

prolonged the life of the republic

— Montesquieu

claim that Rome "lost its liberty because
the work it wrought too soon."^®

it

does

completed

However, human his-

tory moves by internal contradictions.

Men must insti-

tutionalize their social life through laws and government.

But to do this is to fix the flux of history

which itself never remains fixed.

Statesmen must create

laws out of the particular circumstances of their society at a given time in history but that history is

fluid; circumstances change often because of the laws

themselves.

As Montesquieu's depiction of Rome's his-

tory is meant to demonstrate, the most important move-
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m^nt in history is that
motivated by the choices of
men.
For Rome, as for all polities,
there is a gulf between

creation and maintenance of the
state; as in the case
of Rome, they contradict each
other:
It is true that the laws
of Rome
powerless to govern the republic. But became
it is
°^ common observation that good laws
^^'^^^J^
which
have made a small republic grow
large
become a burden to it when it is
enlarged!
For they are such that their natural
effect
was to create a great people, not
to govern

There is a considerable difference between good laws and expedient laws— between
those that enable a people to make itself
master of others, and those that maintain its
power once it is acquired. 59

When we discuss Montesquieu's view of political
knowledge and the legislator in Chapter Five we shall
see how

important this gulf between creation and stability is
to

political life.

It

is important to recognize that this

gulf is part of the structure of human history giving

meaning to the vicissitudes of law in the flux of history

4.

.

The success of the synthesis;

particular

.

It

the general and the

remains to assess Montesquieu's attempt

to synthesize the two dimensions of law, the empirical
and the moral/rational,

in a single theory of history.

Laws both bind men morally and describe the physical
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determinants of their action.

m

their latter aspect

laws are invariable, men cannot
deny their need for food
and the general effects of
cliamte, but in their moral
aspect laws can be and are broken
by men.
in Book I of
De L- Esprit des Lois Montesquieu
claims that intelligent
beings are bound by the physical
aspects of laws as are
all other animals.
Eut the intelligent world is
not so
well governed as the physical:

For although the intelligent world
also
Its laws that by nature are invariable, has
it
does not follow them without deviation
as does
the physical world its laws.
The reason for
this is that individual intelligent beings
are
limited by their nature and hence are subject
to error. On the other hand, because of
their
nature, they act by themselves.
Thus they do
not always observe their original laws, and
do not always obey even those they made for
°0

themselves

.

Yet there is an ambivalence in Montesquieu's
seeming

distinction between laws as physical constraints and as
moral rules,

for the thrust of his argument as we de-

scribed it above is that law plays both roles simultaneously.

Either Montesquieu is sunk in a quagmire, con-

founding descriptive and normative laws, as some critics
maintain, 61 or he conceives law as containing both
•

4.

•

normative and descriptive content necessarily.

The

thrust of my argument in this chapter has been that the

latter is central to an understanding of Montesquieu's
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Philosophy of history.

m

describing what Montesquieu

seems to have meant we must
be careful to dissociate
our own conceptions of law from
Montesquieu's.
the
early eighteenth century
discussions of law were still
governed by the aura of natural
law theory which never
conceived of a disjuncture between
normative and descriptive dimensions of law. Even
the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century
empiricists following Bacon
and Newton only imperfectly enunciated
this distinction.
Viewed historically, the complexity of
Montesquieu's

m

theory of law derives from his recognition
of the seeming incompatibility of the two
dimensions of law

and his

conviction that no theory of law could be
complete without both.^^
For Montesquieu laws establish the necessary

course of action if an end is to be properly
achieved.
This fundamental relationship is the same
for physical
as well as positive law.

its proper end.

Law orients man's action to

Man "might at any moment forget his

Creator
God has reminded man by the laws of religion.
Such a being (man) might at any moment forget
himself; philosophers have reminded him by the
laws of morality.
Made to live in society, he
might forget his fellows; legislators have
recalled him to his duties by political and
civil laws. ^3
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Laws express in the material
world the rational ends
of
God's creation, a creation
which, as we have seen,
must
itself be rational.
If the compulsion
which brings the
physical as well as the moral
world into existence is
'rational' then it must 'ought'
to be as well as 'be.'
On the most general level,
Montesquieu does not seem to
distinguish between the physical
and the spiritual
world.

(In this sense he may actually
have been closer

to Spinoza than he thought:)

Whether the theory is in-

ternally consistent or not Montesquieu
held to it and
developed it consistently through De
L' Esprit des Loi
The confusion and true novelty of
Montesquieu's
view was the way he distinguished
between the general
and particular levels of phenomena.
There was a qualitative difference in the phenomena at
various
.. .

levels.

The particular level of human existence
embodies the
full and tenuous life of the free and
active subject,

whereas the general level embodies the
invariability of
a strict determinism.
This is evidenced in Chapter
3

of Book

I

wherein he states the traditional view of

natural law as human reason, only to follow

it by a

profound statement of the diversity of cultures:
Law in general is human reason, to the
extent that it governs all the peoples of the
earth.
The political and civil laws of each
nation ought to be only particular cases of
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the application of human reason
Laws ought to be so appropriate to the
people for whom they were made that it would
be highly unlikely that the laws of one nation
could suit another. ^4
The rest of the chapter explains how laws must be tai-

lored to particular circumstances, including a clear

statement of the 'system of relations' that together

constitutes the general spirit:
Laws should be relative to the physical characteristics of the country, to the climate,
whether freezing, burning, or temperate; to
the quality of the terrain, to its location
and extent to the style of life of its inhabitants, whether farmers, hunters, or shepherds; the laws should be relative to the
degree of liberty permitted by the constitution; to the inhabitants' religion, inclinations, riches, number, commerce, mores
(moeurs) and customs (manieres).
Finally,
the laws are related to one another; their
origins are related, as is the intent of the
legislator, and the order of things on which
they were established.
They must be considered from all these points of view.
This is what I shall undertake to do in
I shall examine all these relathis work.
Taken together they comprise what
tionships.
is called the Spirit of the Laws .^^

Two views seem to be competing for preeminence in
the explanation of history, causal explanation and a

more organic explanation of the internal development of

historical events.

The first leads Montesquieu to as-

sume that the physical system of relations embodied in
a matrix of

laws can be known not as historical knowl-
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edge but as a form of technical
knowledge of statecraft
removed from the everyday life
of politics.
We must
remember the distinction between
the laws of creation
and those of stability and
maintenance which he considers crucial to the understanding
of human history.
The
former requires a knowledge and
genius not available to
the majority of men. As we
shall see he lodges this
species of absolute knowledge in
the legislator, no
longer represented by the ancient
lawgiver but by the
form of scientific knowledge of the
political system
itself.
Yet, as it was for Plato and later
for Bacon
and Hobbes (see Chapter Three below)
this knowledge
must be isolated from political life
proper.

Still this technical knowledge of
the system of
laws and causes that comprises the
general spirit does
not fully capture the true being of
historical
events.

Montesquieu's fundamental departure from
empiricist

psychology to develop an organic theory of human
nature
will not allow him to forget that men create
their his-

tory out of their own wills; there is

a

spontaneity and

freedom to human action which causal explanation, no

matter how complex, can never capture.

This aspect of

human history requires that the historian not merely
show what causes are opeative in any particular situation, but also explain how various causes are subsumed
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or repressed by others in the particular action of
any

historical moment.

Montesquieu's analysis of the poli-

tical content of love in the Lett res Persanes provides
one example of this sort of explanation,^^ his expla-

nation for why the Greeks needed music to soften their

military character in order to produce a whole society
is another.

More important than these particular

explanations, as

I

will demonstrate in Chapter Five,

is

Montesquieu's attempt to embody this more organic idea
of historical events in the conception of the 'princi-

ple' of a form of government.
In the end Montesquieu does not adequately recon-

cile these two ideas of the being and explanation of
history, both of which have far reaching implications
for a theory of citizenship.

The first implies a view

of citizenship which is subordinate to an active civil

society into which the state interjects itself only as
the initiator of technical manipulation of natural social

mechanisms.

This view is developed most clearly in the

political economy of the physiocrats and in
phisticated way by

Mam

of political economy.

a more so-

Smith and the Scottish school
It

is also developed in a slight-

ly different way by the ideologues of progress:

Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte.

Turgot,

In John Stuart Mill

these two branches of Montesquieu's view come together
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in the most sophisticated attempt
to formulate a liberal

theory of citizenship.
However, the other side of Montesquieu's
philosophy
of history leads to a different
solution to the problem
of citizenship in the modern state.

Montesquieu's idea

of the principle of the form of government
represents

his most far reaching attempt to synthesize
in a single

system of law the two competing interpretations described above.

The 'principle'

represents the subjective

internalization of the law and its outward manifestation
in society,

embodying

a

psychological argument akin to

Freud's theory of sublimation.

The same argument that

Marshall Berman sees as the logical compliment to

Montesquieu's theory of love in the Lett res Persanes
which

I

,

will develop more fully in my discussion of the

Lett res Persanes in Chapter Four, guides his formulation
of the principle of the form of government.

This dimen-

sion of the life of citizens leads him in De L'Esprit

des Lois to formulate a political theory which retains
a strong civic virtue which is lost

theory.

in earlier liberal

The idea that society cannot function unless

its laws are internalized by its subjects and projected

back into society by those subjects acting in the
'spirit' of the laws provides a foundation for this

second idea of citizenship, most clearly expressed in

61

the dictum that for good
laws to function in a
republic
they must be loved by the
citizens. Out of this side
of Montesquieu's philosophy
of history a theory of
citizenship is developed which links
the individual
directly to political life through
an elaboration of a
radical notion of public life.
After him, this theory
is developed most clearly first
by Rousseau and then in

different ways by Hegel and Marx.

CHAPTER

II

COMMERCE AND THE EUROPEAN STATE SYSTEMTHE CONTEXT OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE MODERN
WORLD

Montesquieu considered himself
world.

^

a

citizen of the

He owed allegiance to particular associa-

tions, the family and the state, but his final
alle-

giance was to humanite.

All men belonged to a single

community that knew no 'national' boundaries.

This

cosmopolitan vision defined the scope of Montesquieu's
theory of citizenship as

it did

eighteenth century Europe.

for many others in

To understand the particular

associations which men enter into in everyday life

it

is necessary to view them in their universal context.

In Montesquieu's view that context was the European

state system with its rules for relatively peaceful

coexistence among states and its commercial system based
upon a 'capitalistic'

cont ractarian ethic which drew

men together in the common pursuit of a true interna-

tional community.

Montesquieu's description of the

European state system meant to probe possibilities for
the realization of a Utopian vision of world peace and

human felicity.

This context impressed upon him the

need for contemporary political theory to supplant the
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classical definitions of problems and solutions.
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the
system

that Montesquieu saw governing the European
system in

the eighteenth century and which established the
setting
of the principles of action of states and citizens.

Europe of the eighteenth century presented statesmen

with a new historic moment, different both from antiquity and from the universalism of the Middle Ages.
Most important, new economic forces coalesced into a
vast commercial system and new political configurations

rendered traditional empire building obsolete as well
as mandated a balance of power.

Montesquieu described a European system which promised the possibility of a peaceful and prosperous community among nations.

Commerce, he believed, would impress

upon European nations the benefits of international

felicity and law.

Empire based upon the Roman model of

political expansion could only have harmful effects.
In the newly discovered lands of America and in the East

expansion had to be based upon economic not political
goals.

Universal Monarchy must be banished from inter-

national politics.

This was the aim of Montesquieu's

description of the European system; to show European
rulers the imperative of encouraging commerce together

with the pernicious consequences of Universal Monarchy.
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I.

~

Commerce:

The International Marketpl ace

The historical develop ment of European
Commerce

.

In Montesquieu's view commerce did
not develop steadily

since antiquity.

Trade first flourished in the Greek

world under the rule of the Athenian Empire.

Situated

by the sea it was natural for the Athenians
to develop

their economy on a mercantile basis.

Their wealth de-

rived from their trade and their power from their
ability to protect that trade and to colonize areas
for eco-

nomic advantage.

The Athenians,

says Montesquieu, were

successful as a 'world' power because they expanded not
merely for the sake of the glory of conquest but for the
sake of commercial advantage.

opposite.

Roman policy was exactly

Lacking the commercial spirit of the Atheni-

ans they gloried in pure conquest.

They sought colonies

not in order to establish firm trading partnerships but

in order to exact tribute."^

Hence, the creation of

secure trading networks gave way in the Roman experience
to concrete political and military domination.

With the

decline of Athens and the rise of Rome commerce receded
from the center stage of world events.

It was no won-

der, then, that when the Germanic tribes overran the

Western Empire commerce was nearly obliterated. 4
Oriented primarily toward agriculture and hunting these
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tribes had not developed the
prerequisites for a flourishing of commerce.
Isolated from one another,
knowing
little of the arts or of craftsmanship,
they perceived
little need for peaceful intercourse
with others in
order to exchange different goods. ^
it would take
several centuries for trade routes to
reopen and for

trade to increase in volume.

When the Roman Empire

split the East did continue to trade,
but most of this
was turned eastward to Asia and remained
isolated from
the rest of Europe.
The modern world of the eighteenth century
was very

different.

Commerce penetrated the fabric of life far

mo re than it did that of the ancient world.

There was

mo re of it and it took on an expanded importance
for all
of society.

All nations were involved and a greater

variety of goods were traded.

The more powerful nations

in Europe were those most involved in commerce not those

with the greatest armies.

Montesquieu argued that the revival of trade in
Europe owed much to certain key technological inventions.

"The compass," he claimed,

verse."

It

"opened the uni-

facilitated broader knowledge of Asia

and Africa and led to the discovery of America.

The

expansion of the space in which trade could easily take
place put

a

greater premium on larger-scale enterprises
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than the Italian city-states had
revived and controlled
during the Renaissance. Hence, this
extension of the
focus of trade to the New World and the
expansion of its
volume gave the larger states of Central
and Northern
Europe, which had easy outlets to the
Atlantic ocean and

greater resources to increase trade, a strong
competitive advantage.
The supplanting of the Italian citystates was crucial for the development of the
European

commercial system.
The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope meant that

the western and northern states of Europe could trade

with the Levant directly, bypassing Italy.

The center

of trade shifted to the larger powers of the north.

"Italy was no longer the center of the commercial

world." 7

cessory."

Rather, it had become "no more than an ac-

First the Portuguese then the Dutch became

masters of trade to the Indies.

The opening of the New

World in the Americas was even more important.

The

Portuguese and the Spanish began the rush to colonize
the New World, but everyone followed.
The Spanish effort to colonize the New World and
its eventual failure were crucial to the development of

the European system.

Initially at least the Spanish

were most successful; but their eventual failure demonstrated clearly how the structure of international re-
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lations had been altered by
their initial expansion.
Spanish failed, in Montesquieu's
view, because
they followed the Roman model
too closely concentrating
too much on political empire
and not enough
on trade.
By emphasizing political
colonization they did not rec-

ognize that the most fruitful
implication of the discovery of the New World was its
economic wealth and commercial potential not the possibilities
for political domination.
The aim of colonization could no
longer be to
conquer peoples, as it had been for
the Romans, but to

control land in order to exploit its
economic resources.
The Spanish at first regarded discovered
lands
as objects of conquest; people
more refined
than them regarded them as objects of
commerce, directing their energies toward
that.
Several peoples were led by such wisdom,
that
they gave empire to trading companies
who,
governing the extended states only for trade,
have made a great accessory power, without
embarrassing the principle state.
Of course the Spanish did not ignore the
wealth of

the colonies.

They sought the wealth of precious metals

available in the New World but they were inattentive to
its possible effects on their domestic economy.

Their

emphasis on military power and their corollary concern
for importing ever greater quantities of precious metals
led them to create new technologies in order to exploit

the mines more efficiently, or at least in greater vol-
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umes.

But failing to understand the
effects the in-

creased volume of gold and silver
would have on the
value of goods in the European market
they glutted the
market, thereby cheapening the metals
they went to great
expense to import.
Since they did not develop any corollary production of commodities to
encourage either
trade or consumption, Montesquieu argues,
the enhanced
volume of precious metals reduced their
value enough to

impoverish the Spaniards rather than to enrich
them.^
Furthermore, their emphasis on political and
military

domination of the natives led them to brutalize them
in
order to exploit the mines.
This made the natives
more

hostile, creating greater problems of political control
as well as causing dissention in civilized opinion
in

Europe
The Spanish did nothing to develop their economy

sufficiently in order to absorb the volume of precious

metals they imported.

Although Spain could not circu-

late its new wealth, other European nations took the

opportunity to increase their own wealth and power at
the expense of Spain.

The Dutch and the English put

the increased wealth to work, establishing banks and
forms of credit in order to expand trade networks

throughout the world.

England was unique and potenti-

ally uniquely successful because

it

had a tradition of
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subordinating political interests
to economic interests.
In this respect England
joined with Athens
forming an exact counter to Rome
and Spain both of which
subordinated economic interests to
political interests;
the modern world belonged to
England, not
to Spain.

The discovery of the Americas
along with the opening up of unknown parts of Asia
and Africa dramatically
altered the basis of international
power and the nature
of imperialism.
The Roman model had to give way to
the

Athenian model.

The Spanish failed to recognize that

power in the new international system was
based upon the
continual exchange of goods, not on military
force.

In

the modern world there are limits to
the efficacy of
political expansion. Montesquieu argued that
traditional imperialism and colonialism were
ineffective because

increasing economic expansion encouraged the
spread of
forms of influence that superseded political
domination.
In this context,

Montesquieu argued, Spain's emphasis

on political expansion left the economic fruits of

their conquests in the grasp of the commercial powers
of England and Holland.

To understand the immense im-

portance of this situation for Montesquieu's theory we
need to look at the economics that lay behind the Spanish form of conquest and that which Montesquieu argued

should lay behind real commercial power.
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2.

The economics of the European

s^y

^t^r..

The Spanish

concern for political domination was
coupled with a mercantilist view of wealth and power. They
considered the
quantity of precious metals directly
proportional to the
amount of political power.

But according to Montesquieu

this view failed to understand the nature of
money.
The increased trade could not be financed by
increasing

quantities of gold and silver, partly due to the inflationary impact of Spain's policy and partly due to
the

impracticality of the metals as a medium of exchange.

According to Montesquieu the new commercial system required new forms of credit and paper money.

In the new

system wealth required abstract signs which could represent both the value which the community of merchants

considered it to have and which could represent the long
term contracts necessary to facilitate and encourage the
financing of risky commercial ventures.

The mercantil-

ist equation of wealth and power could fulfill neither

of these.

Montesquieu saw the need for

a new theory of

money and value which understood that wealth was created
by the process of exchange and the intercourse among

mere hant s
In Montesquieu's theory of money and exchange,

which appears in Book XXII of De L'Esprit des Lois

,

the

prince establishes only the 'positive' value of money.
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essentially how much its value
was in relation to the
other coins of that state's
currency.
But more important than this money has a
value relative to the currencies of other states.
This relative value is
subject
to fluctuations and is governed
by the many factors that
converge in the international
marketplace:
The monies of each state have,
moreover, a
relative value;' in the sense that
they are
compared with the monies of other
countries;
It IS this relative value
that exchange establishes.
It depends much on the
positive value.
It IS fixed by the most
general opinion
or merchants, and cannot be by
order of the
prince, because it is continually changing,
and depends on a thousand c ircumst
ances 12
.

One state generally serves as the
leader in establishing
the relative value of money.
Holland, whose banks and

merchants controlled more trade than any other
state in
the early eighteenth century, set the
standard which all
European merchants followed.
The prosperity of the state,

in Montesquieu's view,

is determined by the quantity of international
trade and

by a balance between the amount of money and the total

value of commodities in the market.

The value of money

remains stable only when it is mirrored by an equal
level of commodities.

"Money is a sign which represents

the value of all merchandise."

The state is pros-

perous only when there is an equilibrium established
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between money and the commodities
which make up its
value; in other words, that
sufficient money

exists (and

only that amount) to purchase the
commodities that exist
and vice-versa. 1^ This restricted
but did not vitiate
the use of credit. Montesquieu
feared the impact of inflation and particularly the wild
speculation of the
sort of John Law's system.
He wanted to limit credit
and paper money to an actual amount
of commodities
(these could be projected to be delivered
in the ful-

fillment of contract at a later time).

Money had to be

freed from the confines of the precious metals
but
should not be freed from the goods it represents
in the
sense of the commodities it could be exchanged
for.

The preeminence of exchange in the market
means

that the individual European economies have become

mutually dependent.

States play different roles in the

international economy.

Some produce goods to fill the

needs of other states while some, like Holland, act as

bankers and middlemen to facilitate exchange.

The cru-

cial fact of the new system is that exchange is an im-

perative.

Economically,

states cannot be isolated from

one another without risking being dwarfed by more eco-

nomically active states, as Spain was dwarfed by the

physically smaller states of England and Holland. '^
The fact that European nations share their economic
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destinies has more than just
economic consequences.
"Now, the commerce of the
Indies is not that

of Spain

but of all of Europe.

Montesquieu believed that

this mutual economic dependence
implied a need for all
states to actively protect trade.
The international
community creates a community of the
nations in Europe.
The bonds of economic necessity
created by commerce

have to extend to social and political
bonds as well.
In contrast to the isolation of
the times before the

expansion of commerce, Montesquieu describes
the modern
condition of Europe as united:
Currently, the universe is composed almost
solely of one nation, wherein each people
knows what it has too much of and what it
lacks and searches to attain the means to
receive it; gold and silver are drawn from
throughout the earth. These metals being
transported throughout, each people communicates with them and there is not a single
nation whose capital in gold or in silver
does not increase each year, although at
different speeds and levels in different
states -^^
.

The international market could not be limited merely to

facilitating an efficient trade network but had to generate its own ethical foundation as well.

Founded on

the moral logic of the mutuality of contracts the com-

mercial ethic had to penetrate the political and social
lives of individual states.

Rulers had to recognize the
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beneficial effects of commerce on
moeurs and manieres.
By doing this, Montesquieu
believed that the diverse
interests of independent states could
help develop
a

peaceful universe.

His conception of the universal

benefits of commerce led him to impress
upon merchants
and intellectuals a consciousness
of universal citizenship, which he himself felt.
Let us now look more
deeply at what Montesquieu considered these
universal
benefits to be.
3.

The universal benefits of commerce

distinguished two sorts of commerce:
economy and the commerce of luxury."^®
latter, he argues,

.

Montesquieu

the commerce of

Whereas the

is most appropriate to monarchies

the former is more appropriate to republics

"'^
.

In a

commerce based upon luxury merchants seek grand projects
with the aim of "procuring to the nation which promotes
it

all that which serves its pride, delights and fanta-

sies."

Unlike the commerce of economy, the commerce of

luxury seeks large short term gains emphasizing spending
and downplaying savings.

physical signs:

The symbols of success are

quantities of gold; ornamental dress;

opulent consumption, etc.

.

.

.

This economy of grand

style was clearly appopriate and necessary to court life

where action was motivated by honor and the purpose of
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rewards was to distinguish the
worth of men from that
of others.
The mind of the merchant dealing
in luxuries
is susceptable to charlatan
schemes such as John Law's
system-the promise of a great increase
in wealth was
irresistable and the more outrageous
Law's promised rate
of return, the more enticing the
deal became. The result,

of course,

was to ruin some of France's most
tra-

ditional families of wealth and even to
challenge the
basic principles of the monarchy itself.
The commerce of economy operates on a very
different logic.

The economic rationality appropriate to
it

is that of the capitalist free market.

Merchants begin

with little and through moderate increases in profit

grow wealthy.

But the merchant must always be content

with small short term gains, even occasional losses,
in

order to increase profits in the long run.

merce leads to another,
L'

"

"One com-

he claims in Book Twenty of De

Esprit des Lois on the nature of commerce,

"the small

to the middling, the middling to the great, and the one

who has had so much a desire of gaining little, puts

himself in the position of gaining much."

The capital-

ist merchant is more efficient than his counterpart who

deals in luxury.

He must be cautious,

always concerned

with saving for prudent investments with an eye toward
long range profit.
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The benefits of the commerce
of economy far outweigh those of the commerce of
luxuries. The former

encourages an international system
by seeking trade
Wherever it is profitable, in the
process expanding the
horizons of any particular nation.
The capitalist merchant is able to exploit the unlimited
potentials of
world trade whereas the merchant
dealing in luxuries
limits himself only to trade which
leads to immediate
wealth.
The commerce of luxury survives only
when a
society can absorb a non-productive class,
a privileged
class of nobility. So long as workers and
merchants
produce a surplus to support this nobility the
stability
of the state is secured.
Workers and merchants
must be

kept from acquiring independent means, for
this removes

their incentive to work well, bringing about
general
ruin in the state.

The capitalist merchant is in less

danger of becoming wealthy enough to discourage continual work.

The spirit of his rule does not encourage

conspicuous signs of wealth, but rather
poverty.

a

judicious

When the proper laws are adopted, such as

those limiting inheritances, merchants and craftsmen are
induced to work continually.

Montesquieu's law that the

rationality of continual small investments can lead to

maximum profits ensures that capitalist merchants will
spread their commerce wherever they can, always seeking
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new opportunities for investment
and trade.
The priority of work in Montesquieu's
economic

theory derives from his theory of
human nature. As I
discussed in Chapter One above, the
essence of human
nature for Montesquieu is a natural
balance between man
and his world~a natural moderation
and appropriateness
of subject and object.
The activity which creates the
essential harmony is work.
"Nature is just towards
men,

..21

rewarding him in proportion to his efforts.

The more one works the greater the benefits
nature pro-

vides.

So long as man's natural efforts are encouraged

he and nature will prosper.

this natural inclination.

The government must follow
It must

not remove those

natural incentives to work, or else work itself will be

destroyed along with the wealth of the state.

But

neither should the state leave men free in the 'pure'
market; for work and wealth, as for all social goods,

contain moral imperatives to moderation.

Both the ex-

tremes of riches and poverty which the market has the

potential to create, and the tyranny of despotism which
leaves no room for natural human endeavors to grow, have
the same pernicious and unnatural effect

— to

destroy

the supremacy of work as the preeminent natural human

activity 22
.

.

The commerce of economy has social as well as eco-
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nomic benefits, both domestic
and international.
Within
states the work ethic implied by
capitalist commerce
produces, if not the virtuous
citizens of ancient republics, citizens who are absorbed
in activities which increase the wealth of the state while
minimizing social
conflict.
As I mentioned above, capitalist
accumulation
with respect to individuals must have
clear limits for
it

can only be self -perpetuating so long
as merchants

do not become so wealthy as to create
a desire and need
for luxuries to distinguish themselves
from their fellow merchants.

The market must not be allowed to create

extremes of wealth and poverty for this causes
tension
and insecurity in the state.
In order to stress this
point Montesquieu distinguishes two types of
poverty,

poverty produced by despotism and poverty produced
by a
scarcity of commodities. The latter is completely
beneficial whereas the former is utterly pernicious.

Suc-

cessful commerce requires the security of private property.

Merchants must be sure that they will be able to

enjoy their profits if they are to risk their capital
in order to increase it.

Despotism leads to a perni-

cious poverty because merchants are not encouraged to
work, whereas the lack of commodities combined with the

security of private property encourages a spirit of

accumulation in merchants who are certain that their
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gains will not be arbitrarily
confiscated ^3
.

in a despotism,

governments

it

then,

Trade

stagnates, whereas under moderate

flourishes.

The commerce of economy has other
domestic benefits
as well.
The ethic of moderate accumulation
of the merchant creates a social life which limits
conflict to

manageable proportions.
2

At the head of Book XX,

Chapter

on the nature of commerce, Montesquieu
proclaims the

overwhelming goodness of commerce:
Commerce undermines destructive prejudices,
and it is almost a general rule that wherever
there are softened moeurs, there is commerce;
and wherever there is commerce there are
softened moeurs.
Thus it is not so astonishing that our
moeurs are less ferocious than they used to
be.
Commerce has brought about the acquaintance with the moeurs of all nations, causing
them to penetrate throughout the world: we
have compared them with each other, and this
has resulted in great benefits.
The benefits of Montesquieu's conception of a work

ethic extend beyond individual states.

The spirit of

commerce limits the warlike nature of man.
quieu's idealism, however, is limited.
is not

Montes-

Social conflict

eliminated, but he believed that commercial so-

cial relations would encourage the formal adjudication
of rival claims

(at

least among merchants and between

them and the state). 24

The ethic of contracts, that
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commercial relations can only take place

if

both parties

accept the fundamental rule of performing
contracts
made,

implies a formal-legal procedure.

Merchants seek

gain according to their own self-interest.

Yet they

recognize the necessity of the mutuality of their con-

dition—that the self-interests
also legitimate.

It

of other merchants are

is illustrative to counterpose

Montesquieu's conception of the international situation
to the Hobbesian model of a state of war which was ac-

cepted by many of Montesquieu's contemporaries.

In

Hobbes the ethical logic of contract tends to undermine
the realism of his state of nature as a state of war.
He must somehow produce out of the state of nature in-

dividuals capable of recognizing the logic of contract
as a foundation of civil society.

to contradict several of Hobbes

's

This seems, however,
most important assump-

tions about the natural condition of men.

It

also con-

tradicts his conclusion that ethical life does not have
any foundation other than the positive will and power
of the sovereign.

Clearly, the ethic of contract es-

tablishes far stronger social and moral bonds, as

Montesquieu recognizes, than the sovereign's power ever
could.

The implications for international politics is

even more crucial.

Within

a system of

states based upon

self-interest and a permanent state of war, which Hobbes
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and other contemporaries believed
was an adequate de-

scription of international politics,
existed a preestab
lished ethical system based upon
the sanctity of contracts. As Montesquieu realized,
this ethical system
could explain far more of the development
of the international system than could the pure
power politics view
of the Hobbesians.^^
Domestically, the commerce of economy provides
the
possibilities for a stable republic. However,
this is
not a pure republic.

In republics based upon virtCi con

flicts are resolved organically in the processes
of

everyday public action.

Self-interest is understood to

depend on the public good.

But in commercial republics

based upon capitalist commerce and work, self-interest,
not the public good must form the basis for resolving

conflicts.

Commercial republics must give up the or-

ganic virtu of classical republics and replace
the work ethic of the commerce of economy.

it

with

In the con-

text of Montesquieu's realism this is a minor problem.
He felt that the geopolitical situation of physically

large states and the expansion of the world commerce

already rendered classical republics obsolete.

This

was the major point of his general history of commerce

which

I

described at the beginning of the chapter.

Un-

der modern conditions the capitalist commercial ethic
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could replace the virtu of
classical republics, just as
the federative republic could
replace the small selfcontained republic of antiquity.
The moeurs of capitalist commerce do not encourage
the self-sacrifice
'

•

of

authentic republican virtu, but they
do encourage fairness in dealings with others even
if that fairness is
primarily formal.
Internationally, capitalist commerce has
even
greater benefits than it does domestically.
it provides
an ethical basis, a 'cosmopolitan ethic,'
out of which
a peaceful universe can emerge.

Within the international commercial system amity
and peace,

not war, must reign.

The mutual dependence

of states requires a consciousness that
Europe's shared

destiny is in increased dependence.
are inconsistent with war.

must be predictable.

Contractual ethics

Relations among merchants

Merchants in England who have

contracted to buy wine in Bordeaux must be sure that
nothing will interfere with the fulfillment of the

agreement.

War cannot be allowed to disrupt the free

flow of goods and states must be encouraged to protect
the property of merchants and neither encourage nor

practice piracy, common in the eighteenth century.

The

creation of the armies necessary for war drains valuable
resources which could be utilized better by merchants.
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and thus, as

I

will show below, Montesquieu believed

that no amount of military power could render a
state

more secure.

In short, the mutuality of the interna-

tional system requires peace:
The natural effect of commerce is to bring
peace.
Two nations which trade together render themselves reciprocally dependent: if one
has an interest in buying the other has interest in selling, and all unions are founded on
mutual needs. 26
Not only the economic benefits from international

commerce but also the social benefits incline towards
peace.
'is

"The history of commerce," Montesquieu claims,

that of the communication of peoples."

Intel-

lectuals play a crucial role in the commercial system.
The international travelers such as Usbek and Rica in

the fictional Lettres Persanes

,

as well as Montesquieu

himself, must have a secure place in the international

community spreading knowledge and developing man's universal Reason.

As Raphael did in Thomas More

'

s

Utopia

,

and the more reflective authors of the travel journals
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reasserted,

the intellectual traveler has the task of spreading the

knowledge of all cultures on the globe to all others.

Montesquieu's comparative method was rooted in the positive value of this universal human community.

It

was

84

method not only as scientific
tool but as moral imperative.
By comparing different
cultures one could learn
the defects of one's own and
cement a universal brotherhood based upon reason and
knowledge.

Francis Bacon's

New Atlantis had made the same
point.

Montesquieu's

theory of the benefits of international
commerce raised
the Utopian notions of More, Bacon
and others to
the

self-conscious level of scientific theory.

By implant-

ing the Utopian vision of an
international community

within an economic analysis of commerce and
a method of
comparing all the laws and practices of all
known states
in order to draw out the best laws and
political maxims,

Montesquieu produced

a

powerful argument for a peaceful

world order to which liberal advocates of
capitalism

have often returned without recognizing, until
recently

28
,

the rather complex development Montesquieu had

already given to it.
II.
International Justice and Law;
The Politics of International Citizenship

The international commercial system requires a

political parallel.

Montesquieu is clear that tradi-

tional imperialism, called by the eighteenth century
"universal monarchy,
tics.

It was

"

had no future in European poli-

incompatible with the cosmopolitan ethic

85

Which had been developing among
merchants and which the
spread of commerce required.
Yet Montesquieu was not
blind to a certain force in the
doctrine of raison
d'etat.
States, especially monarchies,
did act on an
interpretation of national interest based
upon the assumptions of an international state
of war.

In the

current international system naked
power did confront
naked power.
But the international commercial
system
implied a compatible political system, and
Montesquieu
sought to free the interpretation of the
state's interest from the notion of raw power and
replace it with

one of mutuality.

His political theory of the state

system is no less bounded by the laws of
historical

development and the actual historical development
of
Europe than is his theory of commerce.

In short,

he

argues for international political relations wherein
the interests of states are mediated through an inter-

national balance of power and are governed by maxims of

international law derived from universal principles of
just ice

1.

The critique of universal monarchy

.

Montesquieu

declares in the opening of "Reflexions Sur la Monarchie
Uni verselle,

"

published with the "Considerations Sur Les

Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Decadence,
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in 1734, that universal monarchy
is impossible in con-

temporary Europe.
Lois,

Here as well as in De L'Esprit
de.

especially in Books IX and

X,

Montesquieu develops

three arguments against universal
monarchy:

geopolitical, and legal-moral.

economic,

Woven together into a

single argument, these three amount to
a complete rejection of the project of universal monarchy,
based upon
power politics.
In its place Montesquieu urges the

general recognition that modern Europe forms
a single
community governed by necessary and generally
accepted
rules of action.

In the

"Reflexions" Montesquieu argues

that "today all civilized nations are,

members of a great Republic.

if

I

may say it,

Riches make for power;

there not being today any nation which has advantages
that a richer power may not be able almost always to

have" (p. 21).

The growth of commerce has meant a rel-

ative equality among the nations of Europe.

Montesquieu's first argument against universal
monarchy asserts that the stability of the state is

determined by its geopolitical relation to other states.
As a general rule large states such as monarchies are

more stable than smaller republics.

But stability can-

not be found in unlimited military deploymment and ex-

pansion.

The contemporary European policy of raising

larger and larger numbers of troops only leads to
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greater insecurity.

Contradicted by those prudent maxims Which could be drawn from
history, this policy
ha,
LS

severe consequences for the political
and economic stability of the state. As one nation
expands its military
force others must follow, thereby
nullifying the positive benefits the initial increase might
seem to have
meant for the security of the state.
Furthermore,
as the state expands it requires more
and more troops
in order to protect it, draining the
state's resources

to an ever greater degree.

The spirit of conquest cre-

ates the desire for honor and luxuries among
the troops,

making it more difficult to keep them under control.
Paradoxically, then, a policy to strengthen power actually results in the ultimate ruin of the state.
The maintenance of armies is detrimental to the

state economically as well as socially and politically.
The ancient practice of pillaging a conquered people in

order to pay an army is no longer sanctioned either by
law or custom.

Modern men recoil in horror at such

barbarian practices. 30

Hence the state must itself

furnish the economic necessities of war.

This strains

the national economy both in manpower and in wealth, in

the eighteenth century French case requiring the in-

crease in already burdensome taxes on the poor.
But the changed nature of modern conquest causes
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deeper problems for the state.

The modern spirit of

conquest, according to Montesquieu,
must be conservation
not destruction.
It must aim to preserve
the conquered
area so that it can be exploited
for the good ot the
conquered as well as thegood of the
conqueror.
Expansion of this sort tends to undermine
the power of the

conquering state, rather than enhance it.

The mainte-

nance of occupying armies requires that
wealth be transferred from the conquering state to the
conquered, im-

poverishing the aggressor and enhancing the ability
of
the victim to raise its defenses and eventually

expell

the enemy. ^1

in Montesquieu's view,

conquest in modern Europe makes

it

the dynamic of

impossible for a

nation to enjoy the fruits of conquest.
The history of European states demonstrates
that

there are natural limits to a state's growth.

The ways

in which the structure of states has changed
histori-

cally is crucial to Montesquieu's argument.

The small

ancient republics were inherently unstable.

In their

world it was possible for a republic to subsist so long
as its power could be put in a balance with other repub-

lics of similar size.

But as

I

made clear at the be-

ginning of this chapter the rise of forms of political

organization based upon greater extension threatened
the security of those republics.
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A new form of republican
government, the federativ.
republic, however, provides a
solution to the dilemma.
In several modern cases-Holland,
Germany and Switzerland-small republics have banded together
into
a singl.

federative republic.

Germany is the weakest because it

is formed by small monarchies
rather than republics.

This causes greater internal dissension.

Federative

states work best as unions of republics
because monarchies, even small ones, establish competing
centers of

political identification, making

it

more difficult for

citizens to form the bonds to the republic necessary
for its subsistence and more difficult for the
individual monarchs to recognize and accept
the general interest of the republic.

The German federation, then, em-

bodies a fundamental contradiction:
The spirit of monarchy is war and aggrandizement; the spirit of republic is peace and
moderation. These two sorts of governments
can exist in a federative republic only by
force 32
.

The idea of a federative republic reflects one of

Montesquieu's most important principles, that war and
peace cannot mix, for their spirits contradict one another.

War cannot be accepted as

a

legitimate act in

international diplomacy except under strict conditions.
The spirit of monarchy is not conducive to the
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union necessary to federative republics.

Monarchies

based upon luxuries do not encourage the
felicity of

moeurs and manieres.

Instead, luxury encourages aggran-

dizement of the state not contentment with a modest
situation.
The spirit of republics, particularly commercial republics, is more consistent with a defensive

orientation to force than is the spirit of monarchy.
When properly composed, federative republics present an
attractive model.

"It enjoys the goodness of the in-

terior government of each, and with regard to externals,
it has by

the force of association, all the advantages

of great monarchies.'

This federation is more than a mere system of

alliances.

Rather, Montesquieu describes it as a

"society of societies.

""^"^

The union is secured

internally by the republican virtu of the individual
republics, or by work if they are commercial republics,
and by a balance of power between them.

If one state

should aspire to supremacy, the others would bind

together against it.

In order to secure the whole the

autonomy of the individual republics, especially in the
35
sphere of foreign policy, must be limited.
.

It

sionist.

.

is clear that such nations should not be expan-

By their nature as associations they must in-
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corporate all conquered areas
into the responsibilities
of the association.
Montesquieu's argument that democ
racies should not conquer other
states holds for federative republics as well.^^
Aggressive democracies,
he argues drawing from his study
of Roman history, have

two possible courses of action,
both equally dangerous.
They may choose to extend citizenship
to the conquered
peoples, but the extension of the number
of citizens beyond that natural number appropriate
to them opens
the

state up to the countless instabilities
which Montesquieu

demonstrates in the "Considerations Sur Les
Causes de la
Grandeur des Romains et de leur Decadence ." "^"^
If
they

choose the alternative course, governing
the conquered
territories directly, they invite the creation
of a

class of magistrates too powerful and too
ill-spirited
to remain within republican rule.
Furthermore,
as

Montesquieu's study of the Roman empire allowed him to
see,

soldiers, particularly generals, do not embody the

spirit appropriate to making peaceful public policies.

War and peace do not mix.
It

is important to stress the precarious nature of

republics, for this insight provides the key to Montes-

quieu's defensive orientation to force.
of De L'Esprit des Lois

,

He opens Book

"Of the Laws in Relation

with Defensive Force," by declaring the natural insecur-
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ity of republics:

"If a republic

is small,

it

is de-

stroyed by a foreign force, if
it is large, it is destroyed by an interior vice."
Federative republics
solve these difficulties only
when they renounce offensive force.
If they have armies, the
state must be
carefully insulated from them, ensuring
that they cannot
usurp power (a major failing of the
Roman republic)
and

armies must not be used to expand the
state beyond its
natural limits.
The same principle also applies
to

monarchies
No less than republics, monarchies should
limit

their expansion.

aggrandizement.

The spirit of monarchy encourages
Its commercial practices based upon

pursuit of luxury and its principle, honor, seem to
imply that imperial expansion is natural to them.

Gen-

erals can best distinguish themselves by conquest, and

monarchs are constantly looking to expansion to enhance
the grandeur of their power.

But even for monarchies

continued expansion only leads to ruin.

These limits

are reached in several ways.
The fundamental defense of the state rests upon its

ability to deploy troops along its borders quickly and
efficiently.

The larger the state becomes the more dif-

ficult the maxim becomes to enforce.

becomes too large

it

If a

monarchy

will have trouble defending its
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borders.

As in republics, Montesquieu
concludes, mili-

tary policy in a monarchy should
emphasize defensive not
offensive force:
The true power of a prince does
not consist
so much in the facility to conquer
as in the
difficulty that one would have in attacking
It
and, if I dare say it, in the
immutability
of this condition.
But the expansion of
states demonstrates to others new sides
from
which it can be attacked. 39
r

Monarchies require greater extension than do
republics,
but their extension cannot go beyond natural
limits

established by the population and wealth of the state.
If

it

is too small it can be conquered by larger states,

but if it is too large it will be unable to
defend it-

self completely.

Seams will necessarily open in its

defenses, and enemies will quickly perceive its vulner-

ability and exploit it.

Monarchies, then, should not

conquer beyond their 'natural limits.'

"Prudence de-

mands that she (monarchy) stop herself as soon as she

possesses those limits. "^^
For monarchies, as well as for republics, the ex-

ternal threats are compounded by even greater threats
from within.

The dynamic of conquest in the case of

monarchies threatens the state with erosion due to "interior vice."

Political conquest, driven by the luxury

of the state,

leads to the creation of decadent centers
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of

luxury-particularly in the capital
city.

As did

many of his contemporaries,
Montesquieu associated
cities in a monarchy, particularly
a single capital
city, with luxury, and the rural
countryside with a
more simple and natural lifestyle.
The more a monarchy
conquers, the more polarized the
relation between city
and country becomes.
The result is to impoverish
the countryside.

Wealth in the form of basic necessi-

ties is drained off from the provinces
in order to maintain the troops necessary for either defense
or further
conquest. Wealth in the form of greater and
greater

luxury swells the city.

The draining of resources must

surely result in destroying the internal domestic
commerce,

so crucial to rural producers.

Montesquieu, the

wine producer from Bordeaux, clearly diagnosed the
dan-

gers of expansion for the rural economy.

His critique

of conquering monarchies calls from him some of his
most

vivid imagery:

Such is the necessary state of a conquering
monarchy; a frightful luxury within the capital, misery within the far away provinces,
and abundance in the extremities.
It is the
same as with our planet
fire at the center,
plush green at the surface, and an arid, frigid, and sterile earth between.
7

The prudent monarchy, attentive to domestic and inter-

national pressures, must thus know when and how to limit
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expansion.

Expansion is as dangerous to states
economically
as it is politically.

By establishing new criteria
for

measuring the wealth of the state commerce
establishes
a balance of power among the nations
of Europe.
in

keeping with his moral theory of natural
moderation,

Montesquieu claims,
limits."

"Prosperity itself sets its own

And for the European states to prosper

they must embody this fundamental maxim in their
policies.
The international commercial system is centered in

Europe.

"Europe at present," Montesquieu claims,

"does

all the commerce and all the navigation of the universe." 44 Within Europe the distribution of power is

determined by the extent that nations partake of this
trade.

Economic power thus sets new requirements for

foreign policy.

If

states seek to increase their power,

conquest must be subordinated to economic development.

Government ally they must encourage their citizens to
enter trade and to develop an interest in the smooth
flow of goods.

In the eighteenth century war caused

great havoc in international credit markets and wars
for control of trade disrupted the free flow of goods.

Together with the instabilities in the nature of the

international market (natural disasters, crop failures.
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etc.

.

.)

government policies based upon military

aggrandizement, Montesquieu believed, actually
reduced
the power of the state. Over the long run
military
force is ineffective; security can only be
assured by a
strong commerce whether based on capitalism or on
the

acquisition of luxuries.

The thrust of Montesquieu's

argument is that the modern commercial system determines

wealth in a much more flexible way than mercantilist
supporters of the idea of universal monarchy thought.
Prosperity and the good of the state derive from the

advantageous participation of the citizens in commerce,
not merely from the quantity of gold and silver that

the state is able to control.

Political conquest must

be secondary to economic movement.
2.

Defensive force and international law

.

Throughout

European history, military conquest has played a far
less important role than is customarily thought.

Mon-

tesquieu's theory of the laws of history led him to recognize that the fundamental changes that have affected
the course of European history have not been military.
"If histories are examined," he states in the

ions,"

(p.

21)

"Reflex-

"they will show that wars have not been

responsible for the great changes that have taken place
in Europe during the past

four-hundred years."

Consis-
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tent with his theory of history,
Montesquieu argued
that "civil dispositions" cause
European states to
change. Revolutionary changes are
changes in moeurs
and manieres, not in political
domination. Certainly,

politics can affect these.
of the last

changes.

The traditional diplomacy

several centuries had made important

"Marriages, successions, treaties and edicts"

have made some difference.

But in the end even these

have been less important than changes in 'civil
disposition.'

And it is commerce that has brought about the

most important revolution in moeurs and manieres.

When Montesquieu turns to
force in Book X of De

L'

a

discussion of offensive

Esprit des Lois he completes his

theory of the modern European state system.

The inter-

national community created by commerce has its political

compliment in the prudent orientation to defensive
force and in international law and morality.

Although

Montesquieu allows the use of offensive force under

certain conditions these must be clearly determined by
international law.

"Offensive force," he argues,

"is

ruled by the 'droit des gens' which is the political
law of nations considered in their relations to one

another." 45

Any use of offensive force,

indeed any

use of force, must have both utilitarian and moral
j

ust i f icat ions
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Under particular conditions
'necessity can justify
war.
But here Montesquieu's
emphasis on defense becomes
primary.
Clearly, a state has a right
to respond when
attacked.
indeed, following Grotius, he
goes even further, accepting a state's right
to initiate a preemptive
war, drawing the parallel, as
Grotius had done, between
private and public war.^^ Just as
individuals have a
right of self-defense, so does a
state:
In the case of natural defense,
I have
to kill because my life is my own, as a right
the life
of the one who attacks me is his own:
a state
makes war the same way, because its
conservation IS just as all other conservation. 47

Montesquieu does make one crucial addition to
Grotius'
principles, that the spirit of war must be
'conserva-

tion.

'

A state has no right to make war in order
to

expand unless this is necessary for the conservation
of

the state.

Consequently, if offensive war is undertaken strict
rules for the treatment of the citizens of other states
must be followed.

The rule of conservation must apply

to both the conqueror and the conquered.

In this case,

Montesquieu's thesis relies on the abstract concept of
state sovereignty as logically equivalent to a free in-

dividual.

Arguing that conquering states have no right

to destroy either the population or the social fabric
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(moeurs, mani^res and customs)
o£ a conquered state,

Montesquieu asserts that "society

is the

union o£ .en.

not the men, the citizen
may perish but the man
remain." 48 The society of the
conquered state is not

to be dissolved by conquest
and the conquering state
must respect its social and
political customs.
It

is crucial to recognize the
combination of right

and necessity in Montesquieu's
theory of war and conquest.
The laws of international conduct
follow Montes-

quieu's view of dynamic laws of history;
they have both
moral and utilitiarian force.
The Spanish treatment
of the natives in America is the
exception which proves

the rule.

Concerned more with political conquest than

commercial expansion, the Spaniards disregarded
the
spirit of conservation.
They enslaved the native populations and slaughtered them when they thought
it
best

served their purpose.

Morally indefensible, this policy

also led to the decline of Spanish power with relation
to other European states.
of their behavior made it

The injustices and imprudence

impossible for them to enjoy

the fruits of conquest

Montesquieu states clearly that the Spanish case
is not an isolated one and that

general principle.

it

represents

a

more

Monarchies especially are prone to

violate the prudent principles of conquest.

A monarch's
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advisers must be careful to
follow correct principles
rather than seek the glory of
the prince.
Glory, he

asserts,

"is a passion,

not a legitimate right.

International right and morality
must constitute part
of the definition of the
raison d'etat.
states must
make war only when necessary (i.e.,
only when the 'conservation' of the state is threatened)
and then according to strict principles of
justice.
The consequences
of failing to follow the principles
of law and morality
which Montesquieu articulates here will
lead

to the most

devastating results:
The right of war derives, then, from
necessity and rigid justice.
If those who advise
princes do not hold themselves to this all
is
lost; and when (the right of war) is
founded
on arbitrary principles of glory, convenience
Ibienseance) or utility, waves of blood will
inundate the earth. 52

Although not as widely accepted and practiced as

Montesquieu thought necessary, the rise of general respect for international law in modern Europe had pro-

duced a more peaceful and less cruel system than did
the practices of the ancients.

The emphasis on defen-

sive force and the strict rules regarding the use of

offensive force cement

a

truly international community

in which commerce can flourish.

Modern reason,

reli-

gion, philosophy and moeurs, Montesquieu asserts, limit
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the brutality of

'the perpetual state of
war."

it

is

worth repeating that for
Montesquieu, Hobbes characterization of international relations
does not adequately capture the experience
of the new European
system.
To interpret this system in
Hobbesian
'

terms is to set

the stage morally and intellectually
for immense cruelties and injustices, as well as
for the ruin of the
state.

Montesquieu's principles also extend beyond
Europe
to include the territories of the
New World.
However,

there are important differences.

While dismissing cruel

treatment of natives as unjust and imprudent,
Montesquieu
does not outlaw either colonialism or slavery,
so long

as they follow from the spirit of conservation.
If used properly,

conquest of primitive nations

can be universally beneficial.

It

can bring more re-

fined moeurs to cruel and unenlightened nations and

prosperity to the European economy.

Conquered states,

Montesquieu argues, are almost always in

a state of

disarray, so that the conquest can actually benefit them
by providing a security that did not exist.

If

the

conquering state has the best interest of the conquered
in mind the conquest can be justified,

so long as the

conqueror preserves the customs and moeurs of the nation
to the greatest extent possible.

55

The mistake made
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by the Spanish in Mexico was that
they attempted only
to exploit and to dominate the native
population. Had
they used their conquest in order to
teach the Mexicans

the true tenets of religion and morality,

leaving them

their own customs, both the Spanish and the
Mexicans
would have drawn great benefits.
In short, Montesquieu
allows colonial conquest so long as the conquering
na-

tion accepts the responsibilities which conquest
entails.

Montesquieu strains his principles in order to give
a limited defense of slavery under particular condi-

tions.

The legitimate right of domination includes a

right of slavery only when it is necessary to the return
of the subject people to order through the imbuement

in them of more gentle moeurs.

period of slavery must be short.

Even in this case the
For example, Montes-

quieu justifies the enslavement of some Romans by the

Germanic tribes after the fall of the western empire on

the grounds that they had become so warlike that they
had to be reeducated in more civilized moeurs and

manieres.

In general,

colonial policy only

slavery is justified as a

if the would be slaves were incap-

able of establishing a stable order and the alternative
would be chaos and mass destruction.

Montesquieu's allowance for

a right of conquest

is
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rooted in an idea of progress which leads to
the univer-

sality of the European system.

On one level he agrees

with Bacon that the spread of science and knowledge

constitutes new possibilities for the happiness of mankind.

Technology leads to improved commerce and the

subsequent spread of knowledge of different peoples.
The increase in the range of knowledge in turn encour-

ages a softening of moeurs which makes moderate government possible.

The development of new modes of scien-

tific inquiry broadens man's knowledge of the physical

universe and man's relation to it, leading to more
rational forms of social organization.

The peaceful

world order that commerce and international law make

possible is the result of historical development according to rational laws.

By the eighteenth century it was

possible for this European centered system to spread
throughout the globe.

If the end of conquest and even

slavery was to bring distant peoples into the fold of

this European system then it would have been justified.
But on another level, Montesquieu did not draw the

optimistic conclusions which Bacon's eighteenth century
followers were prone to draw.

He was not optimistic

about the prospects of the new system.

There was no

determinism in Montesquieu's view, no eschatological
vision.

Commerce and international law establish the
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preconditions for
world order.

a

peaceful and universally beneficial

However, men had to put it into practice.

Montesquieu was

'

Utopian' only in the sense that he saw

that if men acted according to true principles, history

provided the possibility of a happy future, at least
for a time.

But he was not a visionary.

The possibil-

ity of a pacific world order resulted from the scientific understanding of history,

from understanding his-

torical facts through the lens of proper principles.
Furthermore, there was considerable variety in Montesquieu's vision.

he did not have a single vision regard-

ing the constitutions of all states.

He only sought a

world in which all states and individuals would develop

their particular potentialities in peaceful harmony with
others.
a

Under particular conditions he could be either

monarchist or a republican, depending upon what form

of government best fit particular nations and so long

as they recognized a sense of universal citizenship

which would allow them to recognize and want to preserve
the particularlity of others.
III.

Conclusion;

The State System and Citizenship

Montesquieu's study of the European state system
led him to recognize the need for new modes of political

action in the modern state.

Most important, the modern
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state system required commerce, therefore demanding
the

development of moeurs, manieres and laws which would
encourage it.

For Montesquieu, political space has ex-

panded internally as well as externally.

Politics in

the modern world must encompass more of the human mind,
the soul, than ever before.

Unlike in the classical

world the modern political subject has a spirit which

makes itself known to the world through the social in-

teraction of individuals.

The modern idea of citizen-

ship has become politically problematic, whereas it was
not for the classical Greeks.

There have been few attempts to understand Montes-

quieu's theory of the European system.

His theory of

the benefits of commerce have recently drawn renewed

attention,
O.

specifically from Thomas Pangle and Albert

Hirschman. 58

But neither attempts to connect

Montesquieu's political economy, as he himself does, to
the international political community.

Albert Sorel on

the other hand discusses Montesquieu's acceptance of
the principles of Machiavellian power politics without
59
discussing the importance of the commercial system.
In the previous chapter and in the present one

I

have developed Montesquieu's own view of the general
structure of the world in which the contemporary citizen
acts.

Permeated by moral and physical causes this view
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acts both as a description of
man's current situation
and as a program for a valuable
future.
Man in society
has a history which must be
properly conceptualized,
understood and studied if peoples
are to be known, and

their particular possibilities for
the future charted
out.
History is always history of a
specific context
and has nothing to do with abstract
theories

of a state

of nature.

The social world Montesquieu sees
is a

European dominated one.
sidered it

This is not to say that he con-

'the best of all possible worlds.'

to his mind,

its being was an historical fact.

Rather,
The an-

cient political solutions to political and moral
dilemmas so revered by scholars, including
Montesquieu himself, had limited application.

The classical world

which they represented was as removed from
modern con-

ditions as was the image of Socrates choosing to die
by
poison rather than betray the laws of Athens was from
the image of the modern courtier.

Classical political

philosophy provides Montesquieu with powerful stimuli
to reflection about contemporary politics, but not so-

lutions to its problems.

Modern Europe exhibited a greatly expanded political space, both geographically and phenomenologically

Geographically, Europe had become the center of a com-

munity which stretched throughout the globe, bringing
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distant cultures and peoples
into its orbit.
As did
many eighteenth century French
intellectuals Montesquieu
often showed considerable respect
for the value of distant cultures.
At the same time, however,
he tended to
uphold as universal principles
drawn from the specifically European experience. He
would not go so far as
Diderot's "Supplement to Bougainville's
'Voyage'" which
prefers the supremacy of the simple
life of nature
to

the complex world of European laws and
mores.

Rather,

Montesquieu retains faith in the traditional
VJestern
mind and in the growth of modern science
to solve the

enigmas that the modern world presented.

Phenomenologically, political space expanded to
include all facets of life.

In classical thought poli-

tical space defined the forum in which citizens
debated
the public good and in the late middle ages politics

came to be seen as a struggle between the universality
of the Church and the particularity of secular authority.

In this case political space could be defined only

negatively as that space left aside by the Church.
ever,

in the early modern state political space was

broadened to include all social relationships.
ism,

How-

Calvin-

by organizing Protestantism into a politically

self-conscious movement, politicized even the most private sphere of personal faith.

Early liberal thought
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attempted to disentangle the
private from the public by
defining a sphere in which the
individual qua individual
could be freed from the constraints
of the power of the
collectivity.
This is the subject of the
next chapter.
Montesquieu accepted the phenomenolog
ical expansi on
of political space and sought
to examine the specific
ways in which persona] and social
life had become politicized.
Politics involves a broader range of
relationships in the modern state than it did
in the ancient
polis.
The modern subject confronts networks
of relations in which he must act. Moeurs, manieres,
traditions, and laws all constain his action.
Together,
these networks of relations form a nation's
'esprit

general.'

'Monarchy,'

resent networks of

'republic' and

'despotism'

rep-

laws— necessary relations' which
'

have their own dynamic, their own spirit.

They call on

men to act so as to preserve them, to bring out
their
best by developing their inner logic.

Montesquieu

sought to discover this inner logic and to report its

requirements.
The spread of Europe was nowhere more clear than
in the development of technology.

Montesquieu's judg-

ment about the value of modern technology in the new

world was not simple, as the debate between Rhedi and

Usbek about the value of Western technology in Letters
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CV and CVI of the Lettres Persan..
niakes clear.
Rhedi opens his attack on
technology by telling
Usbek, "... I am not so sure
that the profit drawn
from them [the arts and sciences]
can make reparation
to men for the bad use made of
them daily. "^^

gues first that the change in military
technology has
made war more devastating. The
invention of mortar
shells renders all cities vulnerable,
no matter how well
fortified.
This results in the need for a greater
number of regular troops, which act to oppress
the people
as much as to defend them.

He concludes that "since the

invention of gunpowder, there is no impregnable city,

which is to say, Usbek, that there is no asylum on earth
against violence and injustice."

After mentioning the

pernicious effects of chemistry, Rhedi goes on to attack
the value of colonialism.

The compass has brought more

harm to Europe than good; but perhaps more devastating
is its effect on the natives in the New World:

But
this invention has been ruinous for
the countries that have been discovered. Entire nations have been destroyed, and men who
have escaped death have been reduced to such
crude servitude that the story of it makes
Moslems shiver.
.

.

.

Usbek replies in the following letter that there
are two ways to read history.

Gunpowder has indeed
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Changed combat, but the change
is really for the
better.
Wars are shorter than they were
formerly, and since
troops do not any longer directly
engage those of the
enemy, battles are less bloody.
As for the future invention of cruel weapons, Usbek
assures Rhedi that they
would be renounced by Princes and
outlawed by international law.
"Princes have no interest in conquering
by
such means.
They have to be on the lookout
for additional subjects, not territory ."
Usbek then shifts the grounds of the
argument showing that the invention of the arts and
sciences has reinforced the work ethic and the capitalist
market, even
in a commerce based on luxury, bringing about
supreme

benefits to all mankind.
concludes,

"Softness and idleness," he

"are incompatible with the arts."

Certainly

the result of the arts has been luxury, but this has

benefitted rather than harmed French society.

In Paris,

all are encouraged to work in order not to be surpassed
in wealth by their neighbors.

This wards off the su-

preme danger of laziness and channels individual ambition into productive work which benefits the entire
society.

Usbek goes so far as to conclude,

"that to

keep a prince powerful, his subjects must live in pleasure.

He must work to secure all manner of superfluity

for them, devoting to this as much attention as he turns

Ill

to the necessities of life."^"^
In the Lettres Persanes the
argument between the
costs and benefits of technology
is left unresolved, but

the importance of posing the
issue as Montesquieu does
cannot be underestimated.
it raises the more
general

question of the ultimate value of
the modern world over
the ancient, a question of profound
importance for other
eighteenth century thinkers, especially
Rousseau, and

which taunts the radicals of the
French Revolution.
Although Usbek's position finds its way
into De

^ modified form,

it

L'

Esprit

is nevertheless clear

that there is nothing certain about
the value of the

domination of modern European culture.

If

Montesquieu

never waivered in his belief that Europe could
lead the
world into an age of prosperity and justice by
following
the principles laid down in De

L'

Esprit des Lois he nev-

ertheless had little faith that European rulers would
actually follow them.

Montesquieu's theory of history sought to explain
the determinative character of history while preserving
an active and effective sphere for the human will.

In

order to do this he drew on an empiricism which lead him
to accept the

'facts' of the past as well as in a ra-

tionalism that postulated order and rationality in historical movement.

The modern world presented men with
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an historically determined
situation which constrained
them but which also opened up
possibilities for creati ve
action.
For Montesquieu, free will was
as much a
f act
as the balance of power or the
extension of commerce.
'

Individuals owe allegiance not merely
to their
particular states but to humanite in
general.
Their
particular citizenship must be informed
by a consciousness of world citizenship which derives
from the practice of commerce and international law
and morality
in

the state system.

In this context men owe allegiance

to universal principles of justice which
can be said to
be natural,

and which can be understood in the tradi-

tional language of rationalist natural law.

But the

main focus of citizenship is still with respect
to particular states and forms of government; it is this
the-

ory which Part II of the dissertation will be
concerned
with.

Montesquieu's citizen is an autonomous self acting
in a world which constrains his free action.

first two chapters

I

In the

have developed what we might call

Montesquieu's general theory of the constraints on man's
action

— the

definition of man as a moral creature, the

notions of historical law and causation, and the Euro-

pean system that these historical laws have produced.
In the next chapter my focus shifts to the conceptuali-
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nation of the political subject.

m

it

I

.ean to ex-

Plore the terms and the logic
or language within which
thinkers in the early modern state
captured the experience of the political subject.
From there I will move
to Montesquieu's theory of the
citizen-a theory which
attempts to show how the constraints
of the social and
physical world and the autonomous agency
of the political subject interpenetrate.

CHAPTER

III

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND CITIZENSHIPTHE ROOTS OF LIBERAL THEORY

—

Politica l knowledge and citizenship

citizenship requires

a

.

A theory of

theory of political knowledge.

Theorists must have adequate means to describe the
ways
in which the political subject could and should act
in

political life

—a

knowledge of political self.

This

knowledge is necessary in order to know the nature of
legitimate actions and the consequences of acting contrary to established norms.

Further, the citizen re-

quires a knowledge of how his everyday life is political; how it is influenced and constituted by public

meanings and decisions.

Without reference to a theory

of political knowledge there could be no coherent con-

ception of the citizen, for there would be no way of
delimiting and describing the public roles which individuals adopt or the way in which their personalities
are constituted by public life.

The purpose of this

chapter is to establish the contours of the early liberal theory of the political subject and their implica-

tions for a theory of citizenship.
The central question of a theory of political
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knowledge is how does political thought inform
political
action?

The ancients formulated the question in terms

of the relation between practical and theoretical
wis-

dom; more modern formulations involve the relation be-

tween theory and practice, or between science and tradition.
The concept of political knowledge can be organized

roughly by two broad categories:

the problem of poli-

tical space, and the relation of knowledge to power.
The former involves the perspective from which we view

how people participate in political life.

In the early

theory of the modern state the problem of political
space seeks answers to two questions:

What knowledge

is necessary to govern and what knowledge must the cit-

izen possess in order to function as citizen?

Most

often in the political theory of the early modern state
the first was answered by a theory of the legislator and

the second by a theory of political obligation.

The

knowledge of rule and the knowledge of obedience constitute and organize the early modern theory of political

knowledge.

In this chapter

I

will argue that the early

liberal theory which culminates in what

I

call the "ab-

solutist theory of political knowledge" in Bacon and
Hobbes,

rigidly separates the knowledge of rulership

from the knowledge of the citizen.
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The second category of the
theory of political
knowledge, the relation between
knowledge and power,
concerns more directly the
relation of political thought
and political practice.
The central question here
is
what knowledge is to be considered
political? Of course
this presupposes the more fundamental
question of how
the social dimension of knowledge
is to be organized.
Is the ruler to be a philosopher,
or is he to be informed by scientists whose direct
involvement in decision

making is circumscribed by their lack
of executive
power? The theory of the early modern
state tended
toward the latter.
I will argue that the tendency
of
early liberal theory was to lodge
political knowledge
outside of the space of political action,
and I will
conclude that on both the level of the legislator
and
the citizen, political knowledge was not
fundamentally

political
There are two essential elements in the theories
will describe.

I

First, during the sixteenth century

there was a shift in the perspective of theory; the con-

ception of political space broadened from the Prince to
the citizenry.

Machiavelli exhibited a concern for and

penetrating insight into the relation between the citizen and the state with which all of the theorists

describe were aware.

I

However, his concern was the art
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Of government, and he
was not fundamentally
concerned
with the question of
obligation. This problem
was left

to the era of religious
wars on the continent
and to the
civil wars in England.
Hobbes s first attempt to
formulate a comprehensive view of
politics is De Give in
Which the reader "shall find
briefly described the
duties of men; first, as men;
then as subjects; lastly,
as Christians. "1 For Hobbes
the central concern was
the relation between citizens
and rulers within political space.
He and his followers through
the eighteenth
century filled this space on the
basis of a strict dichotomy between the knowledge appropriate
to rule and
the knowledge appropriate to
citizenship. This led to
a conception of the legislator
"not as the agent
'

of a

divine idea but as

a man of

golden opportunity. "2

intelligence blessed with a

He stood above citizens because

he had the capacity to be rational-to
recognize, control and manipulate fate.
This leads us to the second element in
the early

theory of political knowledge.

As rational knowledge

seemed appropriate to the legislator, passion
and will

provided the basis of the citizen's action.

Men cannot

be trusted to act rationally; their passions dictate

behavior.

The ordinary citizen is pure will, acting

rationally only under the compulsion of necessity.

The
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theory of the social contract
based upon an episte.ological separation between ruler
and ruled introduces

into
the modern notion of the citizen
the problem of political creativity in such a way
as to declare its importance but to attempt to minimize
its effect.
According
to contract theory men can be
politically creative only
once, when nature forces them to
recognize that
the re-

nunciation of right is the only adequate
defense of
their personal safety. ^ Man's passions
compel him to
one initial act of political creation
which renders all
further such acts as illegitimate.

In this context the

language of 'interests' attempts to give
the citizen,
still a creature of will in the face of the
politics of
reason,

a more active role in political life.

The importance of the separation of the
citizen and

the ruler is that it separates political knowledge
from
the practical knowledge of action.

Political knowledge

becomes the technical application of scientific principles.

This is possible only if the practical knowledge

of action can be wholly absorbed outside of politics,
in introspection, the study of the self in order to

establish a foundation of knowledge, and in activity
within a non-political civil society wherein interests
can be pursued and produce a minimum of conflict.

This

chapter will explain the structure of this separation
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in the early modern
state on both the levels
of the

preoccupation with self and
introspection and the distinction between public and
private which leads to the
formation of a non-political
public sphere.^ i will
first counterpose Aristotle's
paradigm of citizenship
to that of Jean Bodin.
When viewed
from the point of

view Of Classical politics
Bodin
radical foundations.

's

theory rests upon

Rather than defining the
citizen

in terms of activity in
politics, Bodin defines the
citizen in terms of the opposition
of public life to
private life.

will then move to Montaigne's
theory of the self
and particularly to the
fundamental claim of the Essays
that all true knowledge must
be directed towards action
and that the knowledge which
is most important
I

is in-

trospection-knowledge of the internal self.
Montaigne to oppose political action

This lead.

to this private

introspective knowledge, asserting that
the only true
action of the citizen is unreflective
obedience. Finally, I will turn to the absolute
separation of political knowledge and citizenship in Bacon's
and Hobbes
theory of politics as a rational science
based upon

objective principles, and the action of 'citizens'

(or

more properly individuals) as based upon passion
and

self-interest.

For Bacon and Hobbes politics becomes a
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technical science and the action of
citizens is removed
from politics.
I«
From Aristotle to Bodin;
The Opposition of Public and Private

1.

Social differe ntiation and the function of
the citi -

zen.

Individuals act in different social contexts;

they relate to others in a variety of ways.

In their

concrete existence, ignoring the possibility of

a state

of nature, they relate to others as members
of families,

as producers and laborers,

and as ethical beings in 'so-

ciety' and as legal beings in the

'state.'

individual can only be understood as part of

The concret e
a

nexus of

social relations, each part free in itself but at the
same time dependent upon relations of domination and

subjection from the social organism as

a

whole.

In

short, the understanding of the individual requires

knowledge of the differentiation of action in particular
social and historical settings.

Herein lies the central focus of the traditional
theory of citizenship.

Understanding the political

responsibilities of the individual requires knowledge
of how one grows into public

life.

How is a citizen to

be educated to function adequately in his public role?

Aristotle sets the stage for this theory of

a

dif-
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ferentiated polity.
politv

^

He ^
distinguishes two principles
•

-;

Of differentiation:

'growth

and

nature

.

Growth involves the historical
development of life within
social
corporations. The primacy of
the family leads directly
to village life and then
to the polis, the final
stage
Which represents the culmination
of temporal association
for the individual.
Yet in the second order
of differentiation, nature, the polls
is the primary sphere
of
individual action.
terms of 'nature' the order
of
primacy is reversed from that
order dictated by moral
growth.^ The polls is the crown
of man's existence;
he cannot complete his inner
nature without political
action.
In this sense the polls is prior
to man. Men
create it but without it they do not
exist
•

.

m

as men; just

as,

"if the whole body be destroyed,
there will not be

a foot or a hand."^

in two senses.

it

The polls is an end of man's life
is the final temporal stage of
his

concrete growth, and it is the purpose
toward which his
nature directs his action.
All individuals participate in the state,
although
at different levels of goodness and
actions.

Likewise,

the differences among men allow for different
political

institutions.^

Individuals participate in two senses,

moral and functional.

The end of the state is "the best

and highest life possible" and each participates to
the

122

extent ^that he can act in
the •perfect practice of
goodness.
By viewing the state
as requiring certain
functions, individuals are
differentiated into cl.-asses
It requires farmers,
craftsmen, soldiers, property-owners, priests and legislators
Individuals,
then,

.

play different roles in the
state according to their
natural capabilities and
occupations.' But only some

can be citizens.
Class differentiation, according
to Aristotle, is
natural. The primary division
within the family is
among slaves, women and men-there
are natural slaves
and there are natural masters.
A person's proper function can only be attained through proper
forms of rule.
The necessary classes are mirrored
by the structure of
the inner nature of the species.
Inside men and women

there is a natural hierarchy.

The soul ought to rule

the body, and the rational element of the
soul ought to
rule the appet it i ve
On this basis strict criteria
.

for a natural class division emerge.

Slaves are those

who are incapable of autonomous rational action;
presum-

ably they could not survive adequately in the world
if
left to themselves.

Incapable of autonomous rational

action, the slave is not irrational, but he is capable

only of apprehending rationality in others.
For women the case is somewhat different:

"The
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relation of the .ale to the
fe.ale is permanently
that
in Which the statesman
[temporarily] stands to his
fellow-citizens
in other words, men
rule women naturally as the statesman
rules his equals (i.e.,
citizens) with the difference
that for citizens, the
positions must at some time be
reversed.
The citizen is one
Who rules and is ruled by
equals in turn, sharing
deliberative and judicial decisions.
Although women are
.

not

accorded the possibility of
rule, they are differentiated from slaves by their
rational capability and by
their functions; they are not
property as slaves are.
Women have the capacity for
rational reflection but it
is

'inconclusive.

They are rational but they are

not suited to be citizens.

Aristotle never discloses what he
means by 'inconclusive, '^^ but it is of great importance
to his theory of citizenship. At the end of
Book

I

(Chapter xiii,

section 16) Aristotle calls women "a
half of the free
population." Yet, they are not citizens.
He has given
clues as to the reason, but no argument.
The argument
we can surmise would rest upon the
goodness appropriate
to women's functions in the household;
paralleling his

argument that the slave's function in the household

derives from the nature of their soul, and that the
goodness appropriate to their characters derives from
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their particular functions as "servants
in the sphere
of action."
Whatever argument he may have presented,
women are ambiguous equals of men—they
are capable of
partaking in the essentials of 'goodness,'

but they are

not citizens.
But women are not the only ones barred
from citi-

zenship.

The fundamental distinction established
in

Book VII, Chapter ix is that full citizens,
whose life
is dedicated to the pursuit of goodness, must
have lit-

tle to do with production:

Upon these principles it clearly follows that
a state with an ideal constitution
a state
which has for its members men who are absolutely just, and not men who are merely just
in relation to some particular standard cannot have its citizens living the life of
mechanics or shopkeepers, which is ignoble
and inimical to goodness.
Nor can it have
them engaged in farming:
leisure is a necessity, both for growth in goodness and for the
pursuit of political acti vit ies 15

—

—

.

Their only place in the economy is as property owners,
the class which has the greatest stake in the proper

functioning of the polity, and the leisure necessary to

clear reflection on public issues.

Citizens should be

thoroughly political, devoting their public lives to
either military service, deliberations regarding justice, or to the priesthood.
"All things derive their essential character from
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their function.

This is likewise true of
the citizen.
After rejecting purely formal
criteria such as
residence and the right to sue
in courts as adequate to
describe the citizen. Aristotle
settles on his famous
functional definition:

considerations; and our fi?
rlr^t^^i
nal definitions
will accordingly be:
(1) 'he
who envoys the right of sharing
in delibera-

Per?^?%'Led
or
or:n?ixld1'%\"'-°"'r
unfixed] attains thereby the status
of a
citizen of his state,' and (2) 'a
state,
in
Its simplest terms, is a body
of such persons
adequate in number for achieving a
ficient existence. 17 (m, i, 12) self-suf'

The paradigmatic case for the
citizen is a democracy,

wherein he participates actively and
regularly.

Citi-

zenship is available in other constitutions
but it is
more problematic, there being less time
for individual

participation in the state.
is a citizen,

cal.

In so far as an individual

his life is thoroughly public and politi-

Citizenship involves deliberation about and an

application of the good of the state, the public good,
embodied in the ideal of self-sufficiency.
The self-sufficient polls is one which is both

materially and morally independent and complete:
while it (the polls) grows for the sake
of mere life [and is so far, and at that
stage, still short of full self-sufficiency].
.

.

.
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it exists

[when once it is fully
grown! for

fuVs^^?!su%l?c1eit"3!lS-^

-

The public good cannot in
any sense be a sum of the
parts of the state, although
they are essential to it.
It must be determined in
a "public space," an
intellectual and physical forum determined
by the constitution
and constituted by meanings
and discourse available to
all citizens.
Indeed, that space must be
thoroughly
public, containing no private
associations at all. A
more formal theory based upon the
'rights' which individuals possess within the state would
define citizenship in terms of private needs and
claims. Where one
lives, that one has been wronged
in a business transaction, are essentially private
criteria, just as the
economic production of farmers and
craftsmen is always
bound up with the private interests
of a paricular corporation. The criteria of citizenship must
be such as

to create a class aloof from private
interest, able to
partake in purely rational discourse about the
public
good.

Only the individual whose life is thoroughly

public and political can perform this function.

Aristotle draws a radical conclusion from his

thoroughly public view of citizenship:

the good citizen

cannot be identified with the good man.^^

in the pre-
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vious chapter (III,

iii) Aristotle had established
that the

identity of a state, what gives it
a coherent character derives from the constitution.
It follows that the good man,
who 'is a man so called in virtue of
a single absolute excellence," does not describe the good
citizen, who serves
the sole end of "safety in the working
of their association; and this association consists of the
constitu20
tion."
Even in the ideal polis the good man is not

equivalent to the good citizen.

Deliberation and judicial

judgment require various sorts of tasks, and the
good citizen is the one who can perform the necessary
task.

The

criteria of the good citizen must derive from the state
itself,

not from either his private life or from his
general

participation in universal virtue:

"the excellence of be-

ing a good citizen must belong to all citizens
indifferently,

because that is the condition necessary for the state

being the best state

.

.

Aristotle's functional definition of citizenship allows him to preserve a purely public space within which the

only admissible action is that directed to preservation of
that space.
such as

It

is pure in that neither private criteria,

'interests,' nor a universal Platonic

any relevance.

'Good'

have

The public good describes the preservation

of the public space in which citizens can freely debate and

implement public choices.

As we turn now to the modern
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notion of the citizen, we find that
this fundamental orientation has shifted in two fundamental
ways.

^

Bodin and the modern notion of the
citizen

.

First,

the criteria of citizenship have
been universalized to
include not only women, but the individual
qua individual.
All those who participate in public
authority,

either owing obligations towards

it

or contributing to

its well-being now are accorded certain
rights as citi-

zens (although to different degrees for
different

groups).

The revival of Roman law in the thirteenth

century, culminating in Renaissance jurisprudence,
opened up

citizenship to new classes and potentially to all
classes.
In this respect the most important
result of

the universalization of citizenship was
that economic

action became a legitimate sphere of action for the
citizen.

The political ascendancy of the bourgeoisie

required a doctrine of citizenship which recognized
the

legitimacy of economic activity within the boundaries
of citizenship.

The individual who acts in such a way

that he enriches the wealth of the society must be con-

sidered as good a citizen as those who serve in public
of f ice

This leads to the second major change in the theory
of citizenship:

the redrawing of the lines between pub-
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lie and private life and
the tendency for the
former to
be described in language
more suited to the latter,
par-

ticularly utilizing the language
of interest and selfinterest, ^2 while at the same
time theorists posed
them as antithetical spheres
of action.
The universalization of the criteria of
citizenship tended to elevate
formal criteria over the
requirements of public
action,

providing individuals with protection
from the state for
their persons and property, while
being removed from
public responsibilities.
The cost of the uni versalizat ion
of the criteria
of citizenship was that it made it
impossible to define

public space purely on its own terms as
Aristotle had
done.
The social differentiation had new sets
of boundaries; civil society, the world of morality
and economic action took on a legitimacy it
never had in the Greek
polis.
Furthermore, a 'public' space arose governed not
a

by the public good or by universal religious
principles,

but by

'social' interaction described best by the un-

translatable team of French words,
eres.'

'moeurs'

and

'mani-

Politics became increasingly submerged beneath

a surface of social appearances

(as evidenced by the

court life in the period of the early modern state which

grew up based primarily upon appearances
cial graces and politeness).

— fashions,

so-
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In political thought the
shift came early in the

bourgeoisie's rise to power.

m

the fifteen-seventies

Jean Bodin had already defined
the public realm in terms
of its opposition to private
interests:
But besides sovereign power
there must
also be something enjoyed in common
the public domain, a public treasury,such as
buildings used by the whole community, the
the
roads, walls, squares, churches,
and markets,
as well as the usages, laws,
customs, courts,
penalties, and rewards which are either
common or of public concern. There isshared
no
commonwealth where there is no common interest
For nothing could properly be regarded
as public if there were nothing at
all to distinguish it from what was private. Nothing
can be thought of as shared in common, except
by contrast with what is privately owned
We see therefore that commonwealths were
ordained of God to the end that men should render to the community that which is required
in the public interest, and to each individual
that which is proper to him. 23

m
.

.

.

.

.

.

By entering the public realm the head of the
household

does not enter into a higher order of association which

morally encompasses the household; rather he enters

a

realm of power relations by renouncing the private in-

terest in order "to treat of those things which are of
common interest." 24
For Bodin, the individual who is destined to be-

come a citizen moves directly from the household into
his role as citizen:
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When the head of the family
leaves h>.o
household over which he
presides and
with other heads of fami?ies1n
o?der'?o"tre.^
of those things which
are of cSmmon interest
"
and b:::^;3
an eouaTanS associate
a'
with the rest.
He set<5
concerns to attend to public
affairs''
^^^ses to be a master
Sn^ becomes
i
and
a citizen, and a citizen
may be
defined as a free subject
dependent on the
authority of another."

V^^^

There is no intermediary, such
as village life for
Aristotle, between private and
public life.
Even while
these two spheres can be distinguished
from one another,
they are both regulated by the
same form of action.
Indeed, while mastership is based
upon paternalistic
power and authority, and citizenship
is based upon mutual obligation, the fundamental
root and focus of action is the same: both public and
private space are
determined by power.
In the private space described
by
the family the father rules over his
wife, children and
slaves unchecked, whereas in public his
interests and

desires are bounded by those of others.

Sovereignty,

Bodin's major determinant of public space,
is defined
as

'that absolute and perpetual power. '^^

The space

in which Bodin's citizen acts is radically
different

from Aristotle's.

Bodin describes the public realm in

a new language governed by assumptions about power

rather than about the public good or the good life.

In
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fact, Bodin defines citizenship in
direct response to

Aristotle.
In Bodin* s view the ancients were
incorrect to de-

fine the commonwealth "as a society of men
gathered to-

gether for the good and happy

life.''^"^

This defini-

tion 'falls short' by omitting the principle parts
of a

commonwealth:

"the family,

which is of common concern."

sovereign power, and that
We might note that this

is exactly what Aristotle intended to do in order
to

define public space wholly according to its own nature.
On the other hand, the definition 'goes beyond the mark'
by positing 'happiness' as essential to the state.

The

end of the state is internal justice and survival in a

world of other states.

Happiness and the pursuit of the

good life jeopardize rather than reinforce the state's

welfare.

If

happiness were essential to the state "the

good life would depend on the wind always blowing fair."
The state no longer provides the space in which the in-

dividual can be fulfilled and hence truly happy.
Rather,

it

protects the proper ordering of life.

The

highest good for men "springs from the union of action
and contemplation."

The end of the state is to secure

material goods and economic well being providing the
leisure for individual contemplation, rather than that
sphere in which contemplation has its fullest meaning.
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The ideal of individual life for
Bodin requires removal
of oneself from politics.
Action is primarily economic
action and it is political only in a
technical and negative sense. Action consists in
"mundane activities
such as the administration of justice,
the defence of
the subject, the provision of the
necessary means of

subsistence."

Once the state secures these, individuals

are free to pursue the higher good of
contemplation.
For Bodin contemplation is 'the final end'
of the state,
but he means this as last in a temporal chain
of activ-

ities.

It

is essentially a final

'good'

which the state

must secure:
The same principles hold good for the
well-ordered commonwealth.
It is ordained to
the contemplative virtues as its final end,
and those things which are least in order of
dignity come first in order of necessity.
Those material things necessary to the sustenance and defence of the subject must first
be secured. 28

The spiritual and moral results of contemplation are

clearly secondary to the role of the state as maintaining outward order.

Later theorists of the modern state

will remove those results completely from the state,

relegating them to a private life within civil society.
Bodin criticizes Aristotle further for defining
the citizen in terms of his participation in the state.
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Rather, he urges a uni versalization of
citizenship (ex-

cluding slaves) within a public space based
upon mutual
obligations.
His criticism is worth quoting at
length:

It is a very grave error to suppose
that
no one is a citizen unless he is eligible for
public office, and has a voice in the popular
estates, either in a judicial or deliberative
capacity. This is Aristotle's view
Plutarch improved on this description when he
said that citizenship implied a right to share
in the rights and privileges of a city-state,
implying that he meant such a share as accorded with the standing of each, nobles, commoners, women, and children too, according to the
differences of age, sex, and condition
It must however be emphasized that it is not
the rights and privileges which he enjoys
which makes a man a citizen, but the mutual
obligation between subject and sovereign, by
which, in return for the faith and obedience
rendered to him, the sovereign must do justice
and give council, assistance, encouragement,
and protection to the subject. 29
.

.

.

.

.

-

.

The state has become more like a private partner in a

contract than a sphere of action in which men realize

their nature.

The economic metaphor does not emerge as

the grounding of a theory of political obligation in

Bodin but the fundamental assumptions of the later theory do.

The citizen is anyone who owes obedience to the

state in order to receive in return "justice
cil,

.

.

assistance, encouragement, and protection."

.

counThe

public is now a realm of 'interests' not of goodness.

Mature social contract theory makes explicit the shift
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that Bodin's critique of Aristotle implies:

both public

and private life are governed by the
same language of

'interests.'

But interest implies particularity; for

an act to be in someone's interest
to that of others.

it

must be opposed

On the contrary 'public'

implies

universality, a community that transcends its
particular
parts.

A fundamental antinomy plagues Bodin's theory

of citizenship as it establishes the contours of
debate

in the modern state; the public is defined in terms of
its opposition to the private, yet the very notion of

public implies universality and harmony.

It

is this

antinomy which Montesquieu's conceptualization of
1'

esprit general attempts to solve by arguing for an

interpretation of law which can successfully mediate

particular interests and the universality of the public
good
II.
Montaigne; The Self and
the Supremacy of Private Life

a sound intellect will refuse to judge
men simply by their outward actions; we must
probe the inside and discover what springs set
men in motion. But since this is an arduous
and hazardous undertaking, I wish fewer people
would meddle with it.
("Of Drunkenness," II,
.

1,

1.

.

.

p.

244)

A grammar of practical action

.

No one has captured

the everyday life of the modern subject better than
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Montaigne.

His

Essa^

of practical action:

comprise,

so to speak,

a

grammar

the rules of every day life
on

Which people act in ways that often
seem the most irrational.
His major themes, life
is learning to die,

skepticism with regard to intellectual
wisdom and the
complexity of the subconscious motivations
of human
action describe a view of persons as
autonomous agents,
the knowledge necessary and proper to
them is introspection.
V/hether good for him or not, and
Montaigne thinks
that in most cases the freedom of the self
only leads to

foolishness and depraved morals, the legitimacy of
particular actions must be judged from the point
of
view

of individual actors.

chapter

I

In the following section of this

want to present a picture of Montaigne's no-

tion of the subject and the implications he
draws for

politics.

Judgments about good and evil are relative to par-

ticular individuals and their circumstances.

Montaigne

marvels at the instances when people act other than they
should.

Men should never commit suicide, or so we are

told both by traditional Christian morality and the

secular platitude that men should and will avoid pain.
Yet in practice, Montaigne argues,

seems true.

neither of these

Men endure pain for what they perceive as

higher purposes, and they commit suicide willfully when
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life no longer poses a meaningful
alternative.
"That
the Taste of Good and Evil
Depends in Large Part on the
Opinion We Have of T^em" (I. 14)
Montaigne describes the

m

motivations which lead men to suicide.
justifiable Montaigne never questions.

That they are
He relates

the reactions of Jews ordered
expelled from Castile.
Sold into slavery by the King of
Portugal, the first
shipload of exiles were treated so
ruthlessly by sailors that the others resolved to remain
in Portugal
as

slaves.

Continued efforts to convert the Jews to
Chris-

tianity failed.

The Jews remained firm in their convic-

tions and beliefs.

When the crown finally ordered that

all the children under fourteen be taken away
by the

state and raised as Christians, they committed
suicide,

even killing their children to thwart the crown's
designs.

leaders,

Montaigne concludes,

"How often have not only

says Cicero, but even whole armies rushed to

certain death?"

(p.

36).

Moral judgments can only be

examined in light of the meaning particular individuals

give to their actions, not on the basis of abstract
rules

Knowledge then for Montaigne must be practical
knowledge, directed towards action.

Rather than separ-

ate theory and practice, knowledge must merge them.
"Of

In

Pedantry" Montaigne decries the scholastic emphasis
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on the quantity of Knowledge.

Learning to the. .eans a

purely external acquaintance
with the thoughts of others
and a causuistry which
has no relevance to action.
He
describes their notion of
knowledge as that of a .an
who, needing fire, seeks
it at his neighbor's,
but

"having found a big fire there,
should stop there and
warm himself, forgetting to
carry any back home." He

continues by an analogy to food:

"What good does it do

us to have our belly full
of meat if it is not digested,
if it is not transformed
into us, if it does not make
us bigger and stronger?"^!
Judgment, not learning,

should be the focus of knowledge,
and judgment requires
digestion. We must process it and
reflect on it according to our needs.
Knowledge is related to action, to
goodness.
Principles of good and evil mean nothing
unless men have internalized them so
they can be translated immediately into action.
For Montaigne it is

clearly this internal action that is of
uppermost concern:
"... in truth it is a fact that learning is
less valuable than judgment

...

Any other knowledge

is harmful to a man who has not the
knowledge of good-

ness

2.

.

'32

Int rospection as the basis of knowledge .

knowledge men must look into the soul:

For tru(

"The soul may
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be shaped into all varieties of
forms,

and molds to

itself and to its every condition
the feelings of the
body and all other accidents.
Therefore we must study
and look into it, and awaken in it its
all-powerful
springs. "^^ The locus of the good and the
useful is

now inside man; it is not to be found
in learning or in
scripture.
This internal knowledge is difficult,
too

difficult for most men to pursue, hence the
quotation

which opens my discussion.

Inside the mind is a complex

of often contradictory motives and drives:

are nothing but a patchwork."^"*

"Our actions

By conceiving the

mind and action as a system of interacting motives and

drives Montaigne opened

a

new form of inquiry.

A "sci-

entific" understanding of human action and thought was
now possible,

indeed necessary if an absolute skepticism

regarding the knowledge of human action and hence rational and moral judgment about it was to be avoided.

A century later Locke could analyze thought into sensations deriving from external objects, and Descartes

could devise a method which stripped the mind of all

knowledge except that of itself in order to establish
the validity of the propositions the mind accepted as
true.

35

Both sought to disentangle the complex inter-

actions of drives inside the mind, the 'new world' opened up by Montaigne's probing of the self.

The following
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passage from "Of the Inconsistency
of our Actions" could
be an underlying belief of
many liberal psychologies:
If I speak of myself in
different ways, that
IS because I look at myself
in different

m

wa^s.
in me by some

"^^^

til.r
twist and
some fashion
i have nothina
to say about myself absolutely,
simply,
solidly, without confusion and
without mix^ire?
^"-ure,
or
in one word. (p. 242)
.

.

.

This dilemma of the self that
Montaigne bequeaths
to the liberal theory of the
subject leads to an inquiry
about a different form of knowledge
than previous inquiry.
Montaigne is more concerned with understanding

opinion than truth for truth cannot, in
his view, be
disentangled from the circumstances and the

ideas of the

men who fashion it.

"So in the study that

I

am making

of our behavior and motives,"
Montaigne asserts in the

"Power of the Imagination," "fabulous
testimonies, provided they are possible, serve like true
ones."^^

Truth is less relevant to action, to what counts
as

having meaning for individual human beings, than
opinion.

Opinion clearly governs more of man's behavior,

both for good and ill, than truth:

"Opinion is a power-

ful performer, bold and immoderate. "^^

essay,

In the famous

"Apology for Raymond Sebond," Montaigne attacks

the erudite knowledge that takes men away from the ade-

quate pursuit of everyday life.

It

removes them from
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all concern for the body,
destroying the necessary connection between body and mind^^
3^^,,^^^
nection between theory and
practice, .oral judgment and
action.
The scholastics made moral
judgments independently of the particular
circumstances of action. They
set out rules for the value
of 'good' and the pure absence of pain without regard for
the value they have in
actual life situations.
Exercising his flare for paradox, Montaigne reverses their
judgments:
"Evil is in
its turn a good to man.

Neither is pain always some-

thing for him to flee nor pleasure
always for him to
pursue." 39 But Montaigne asserts his
principle of
the self nowhere more clearly than
in the "C"^° edition of "That to Philosophize is to
Learn to Die":
"Life is neither good nor evil in itself:

it

is the

scene of good and evil according as you
give them
room.""^!

Applied to a view of the subject, this po-

sition has radical implications.

Unshackled to the bonds of Christian morality the
self requires other forms of control.

I

have already

shown that the locus of individual action and moral

judgment for Montaigne is the individual self and that

consequently true knowledge is not that which yields
abstract general principles but that which aids everyday

action and judgment.

Furthermore, the epi stemological
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reference point of this knowledge
is the internal mind,
the generation and movement of
ideas within the mind.
Just as this opens up a new
direction for scientific
inquiry into the subject, it demands
a new view of moral
virtue.
Montaigne responds to this need by
describing
virtue as self-control, as command over
the complex motivations and contradictions of the self.
This notion
of virtue is a combination of the
Platonic notion of

rational control over the various faculties
of the mind,
and the Machiavellian notion of virtu as
the drive and
the ability to overcome fortuna.

Virtue for Montaigne is not then the Christian notion of performing good actions on the basis
of a rightly ordered conscience.

It

is the more active and pri-

vate pursuit of mastery of the contradictions embedded
in the soul.

over time.

The will must forge consistency of action

Pain and evil must be accepted as sometimes

necessary but always with temperance and control.

Virtue has become in Montaigne's hands a primarily private act of will, determined by self -reflect ion and
self -judgment

.

This can be illustrated in Montaigne's

view of habit and custom.
Habit and custom, the major formative influences
on the person, are most often enemies rather than aids

to virtue.

"Habituation puts to sleep the eye of our
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judgment," Montaigne asserts in "Of Custom,
and not
Easily Changing an Accepted Law. "^^ Habit
and custom
tend to wear down our rationality, and
moral training

requires training of the heart, of the passions
rather

than the imbuing of rational or religious principles.
"Children must be carefully taught to hate vices so
that they will shun them not only in their actions
but

above all in their hearts, so that the very thought of
them may be odious, whatever mask they wear.""^"^

Habit

and custom can encourage moral behavior only if carefully controlled by the individual conscience.

sists in the development of conscience,

Virtue con-

in a self-re-

flection which can be put into practice as self-control:
"In all things and all places my own eyes are enough to

keep me in line; there are none that watch me so carefully, none that

I

respect more."^^

Virtue is not merely the intellectual ordering of
the soul but must be reflected in the everyday control
of practical action.

Extending Machiavelli

'

s

notion of

political virtu into the private sphere Montaigne seems
to describe virtue as an overcoming of circumstances.
In this respect it directly contradicts the complacency

of the classical Platonic model.

going immediacy of

a

Rather than the easy-

naturally well adjusted soul, vir-

tue requires struggle.

Cunning and reason are the forms
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of knowledge necessary for
virtue.

Virtue never merely

comes to men, or is born with
them; it is never comfortably seated within a person.
Rather, it is constantly
mobile, always in need of being
reinforced by guiding
action.
Virtue "demands a rough and thorny
road."^^
Machiavelli's virtC, the political
imperative of the
Prince to transcend fortuna, is
transferred and generalized as the virtue of the self.
Christian morality has
been replaced as the end of individual
action by a stoic
sense of worldly struggle.
But we must be careful not to ignore
the synthesis

between the classical Platonic notion of the well
ordered

soul and the Machiavellian imperative to overcome

fortune.

Montaigne considers virtue, as all other char-

acteristics of human action, psychologically complex.

Montaigne wants to avoid the danger inherent in the

Machiavellian virtu that
J
and
repression. 47
.

it

too easily justifies cruelty

.

Virtue must be instilled in the

self so that it not only avoids evil but also produces

good.

The outward appearance of virtue is often falsely

taken as virtue.

"Firmness in dangers (if firmness

it

should be called), contempt for death, endurance in misfortunes, can come to men, and are often formed in them,

through not conceiving them as they are."

Virtue

requires prudent judgment based upon practical knowledge
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of particular circumstances.

What seems to be virtuous

and manly action on the
outside may actually be a reckless cruelty based upon false
"
judgment:
.
when we
.

.

judge a particular action we
must consider many circumstances and the whole man who
performed it, before we

give it a name."'*^

The signs of virtue must not be

merely accidental and fortuitous,
but rather they must
represent the inner being of the person.
Also,
it

not merely

'rational' action.

is

Rather the grandest level

of virtue arises from an
internalization of self-con-

sciousness—a recognition deep within the soul
of the
propriety and moderation of judgments and
the seemingly
natural ability to be in complete control
over one's
actions.
Two models of the virtuous man compete
for

Montaigne's favor, Cato and Socrates.

The latter, most

of the time but not always, comes out
ahead.

^

Private action and society

in life is lodged in the self.

.

What is most important
in the essay "Of Soli-

tude" Montaigne makes clear that mere physical escape

does not alleviate burdens and suffering.

Public life,

whether in politics or commerce, merely creates

a

fa-

cade; the real anxieties and traumas of life occur

underneath, in the soul:

"Furthermore, by getting rid

of the court and the marketplace we do not get rid of
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the principle worries of our
life

.

.

.

ambition, ava-

rice,

irresolution, fear, and lust do not
leave us when
we change our country-^O
(pp. 175-6).
Even the family
does not provide release, for "there
is scarcely less
trouble in governing a family than in
governing an entire state ..."
Escape, it would seem
is not

possible for the origin and carrier of our
torment is
our self

:

Wherefore it is not enough to have gotten away
from the crowd, it is not enough to move;
we
must get away from the gregarious instincts
that are inside us, we must sequester ourselves and repossess ourselves. 52
Nowhere is the primacy of the self and its opposition
to
public life stated with such conviction as in this essay
"The soul cannot escape from itself

.

.

.

therefore we

must bring it back and withdraw it into itself"
176)

.

(p.

Only self-control, not in the superficial sense

of removal from dependence on the external public world,

but as complete dependence purely on ourselves is neces-

sary:

"...

let us win from ourselves the power to

live really alone and to live that way at our ease" (p.
177)

.

Along with Rousseau, Montaigne could have been

Emile's tutor.

Real solitude is best enjoyed in isola-

tion, but it must be no less available "in the midst of

cities and the courts of kings."

It

is a condition of
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mind-of self-control.

The properly constituted soul

is the one which "can keep
itself company."

We must be careful not to read
Montaigne as arguing
for an isolated self, like some
later liberal theorists.
The self always exists in a society
with others."
Indeed,

if the self were not

formed in part by its ac-

cidental surroundings self-control would
not be problematic.
Furthermore, society (but not politics)
offers
the ideal form of action for the self
—friendship.

Friendship is a condition separate from all
others
with a moral priority over them. Montaigne
distinguishes friendship from family ties, for those
are
based upon law and natural obligation.

Real friendship

rather, must be based upon our free will:

"and our

free will has no product more properly its own
than

affection and friendship."^"*
is distinct from love,

Furthermore, friendship

for love is too impetuous,

frantic desire for what flees from us."^^

"a

Friendship

rather is an immediate extension of self and merging

with another
scribes it.

— "a

harmony of wills" as Montaigne de-

Friendship is the only free relationship,

completely unconstrained except by mutual affection.
But the union of souls which characterizes ideal

friendship applies to one other only.

It

form of social action but it is limited.

is the ideal

Most associa-
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tions with others are more casual, less
intense, but
certainly as necessary. Ordinary social
action takes
place with common people.
In his actions in
society,

Montaigne asserts that he seeks above all comfort.

in

society one deals most often with "plain people"
of
"humble and vulgar souls" (although these souls "are

often as well-regulated as the subtler ones").^^
This requires an ability to act in a plurality of ways;
to act in a way that we think of as

'social' and that

Montesquieu will later describe as characteristic of
"I'homme de

1

'

esprit

.

"

It

is worth quoting Montaigne's

description of this plurality of action at some length:
I would admire a soul with different levels,
which could both be tense and relax, which
would be well off wherever fortune might take
it, which could chat with a neighbor about
his building, his hunting, and his lawsuit,
and keep up an enjoyable conversation with a
carpenter and a gardener. I envy those who
know how to be familiar with the humblest of
their retinue and carry on a conversation
with their own servants.

Montaigne follows this with the implication that in
society all are equal because they are men. 58
As much as possible Montaigne wants to purge soci-

ety of power.

Relations among men are best when uncon-

strained by artificial relations of domination and subjection:

"The least strained and most natural ways of
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the soul are the most beautiful;
the best occupations
are the least forced."
Although Montaigne's ideal
friendship for Etienne de la
Boetie is the best possible
type of social relationship,
what characterizes all valuable social relationships is
their non-political character-that they pruge all elements of
power. Hence men
must be cautious as to the extent
they enter society.
Except in the case of ideal friendship
one must selfconsciously distance oneself from others.
Isolation
and retreat are not possible:
"There is nothing to
which nature seems to have inclined us
more than to
society. 59 Common friendships of a lesser
moral
quality than the ideal must be entered
into "bridle in
hand, with prudence and precaution. " ^°
Therefore, men
should both follow society but reserve
themselves from
'

it.

They should follow its customs and fashions
but

"the wise man should withdraw his soul
within, out of

the crowd, and keep it in freedom and power to
judge

things freely.

There is an 'inside' and an 'out-

side' to men which must be kept counterposed to
one

another.

This is the essence of the struggle that de-

fines virtue as self-control.

The self must at one time

live in society, yet be continuously cautious and self-

conscious of its actions.
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4.

The isolation of politics:

action of citizens.

o b edience as the proper

The benefits of social interaction

can be enjoyed in society but not in
politics.
essay,

"of the Inequality that

In the

is Between Us" Montaigne

speaks of a 'private citizen' to distinguish
ordinary

persons from kings.

This private citizen has noth-

ing at all to do with politics, he is
comfortable in a

society purged of power and has no place in a
public
realm which self-consciously debates and determines
the

public good.

Indeed, Montaigne is skeptical if this

sort of public life can exist.

Government is a neces-

sary evil and citizens, insofar as they relate to it at
all, do so as obedient subjects,

recognizing only the

necessity of obedience.
In direct contrast to society, political life is

isolated.

Those who wield political power have no ad-

vantages that "men of moderate fortune" do not have, but
they do have many disadvantages.

They know no friend-

ship; their subjects generally follow them out of obli-

gation and custom.

Even if truly loved by the populace,

the elevation of the monarch removes him from the joys
of everyday life.
a dilemma

—good

Similar to Plato, Montaigne conceives

men will not enter politics.

Plato be-

lieved that philosophers had to be convinced, as he was,
that public service alone was the supreme virtue.
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Montaigne no longer had faith that that
was so.
Montaigne private life offers too many

For

rewards, and

public life too few.

Engagement in politics is merely

an obligation, never a joy.

To reinforce this point

Montaigne relates the story of Diocletian.

Having re-

tired from public life to pursue the ease and
comfort
of private existence he was urged by citizens
to return

to public rule.

In response he lamented:

"You would

not ask this of me if you had seen the beautiful
rows
of trees that

I

fine melons

have sown."^"^

I

myself have planted at home, and the
Ease and contentment of

self are the ends of life and politics is powerless to

affect them.

Politics offers no rewards of its own to

make it worthy of pursuit for the self and in fact it
tends to negate the supreme value of private life.^^
This leads Montaigne to conclude that the action

which defines the citizen is obedience.

Montaigne's

defense of La Boetie in "Of Friendship" is rooted in the
ideal of the citizen as obedient to the laws (p. 144).
He states this maxim in several other places but no more

powerfully than in "Our Feelings Reach Out Beyond Us"
(I,

3).

In this essay Montaigne makes a crucial dis-

tinction betv^een private judgment and public justice.
"We owe subjection and obedience equally to all kings
,

.

.

.

"

but we owe esteem and affection only to virtuous
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ones.

Our private judgment must
express our "true feelings" but that judgment has no
implications for our public obedience.
We must obey even if we recognize
the
king as a tyrant.
Let us make this concession to
the political
order: to suffer them patiently
if they are
unworthy, to conceal their vices, to
abet them

by commending their indifferent
actions
their authority needs our support. But, if
our
dealings over, it is not right to deny
to justice and to our liberty the expression
of our
true feelings, and especially to deny
good
subjects the glory of having reverently and
faithfully served a master whose imperfections
were so well known to them, and thus to deprive posteriety of such a useful example. 65

Citizens provide "useful examples" in two senses.

The

first is in absolute obedience and the second is
by ex-

pression of a private judgment which provides posterity,
"public judgment," with the sentiments and knowledge to

condemn an unjust Prince after his death.
termines the true worth of a king.
ments,

History de-

Men's private judg-

required by the charge to men to seek truth with-

in themselves, has no application to political action.

This leads Montaigne to adopt a thoroughgoing and

unflinching conservatism.

He uses the metaphor of the

"body politic" to assert that laws should rarely if ever

be changed

It

is very doubtful whether there can be such
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changing an accepted law,
as there is harm rn
^ government is
like
likeTst^
a structure'""r^"^
of different
parts joined

^
''''
nf whatever
of
sort it be,

This is followed by an invective
against innovation in
politics. ^7 Politics, unless it
serves to preserve
tradition, is a poisoned pursuit.
The self must recoil
from it.
The subject, in order to be a
good man, must
retreat into private life, just as
Bodin declared that
politics as a public pursuit had no meaning
unless counterposed to a private life. For Montaigne,
the eminent
domain of private life is not the family,
as for Bodin,

but the internal mind,

the soul.

The self emerges in

the Essays as an end whose grandest
moment is its isolation and solitary judgment. As a
citizen, the self has
no place:

tion."

"Private reason has only a private jurisdicHis obligation is obedience not because
of

direct benefits but because alternative courses
would

produce worse results.

Political action by private

citizens in any form loses its legitimacy.

Montaigne

does not envision any positive political expression
of
self as Montesquieu and liberal theorists do.

The only man with the right to act creatively in

politics is the brilliant leader, the great man who has
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the Character and knowledge
"not only how to command
according to the laws, but how
to command the laws themselves."^^ Political knowledge
is an innate genius
to understand circumstances and
to manipulate men to the
public purpose. Montaigne's born
leader is not very
different from Machiavelli s Prince.
What is different
is Montaigne's desire to root
this transcendent leadership in a theory of self; the felt
need to justify the
removal of citizens from politics.
Later theorists, as
we will see, felt the need as even
more of an imperative.
'

Montaigne considers that men act most often
from
self-interest rather than from public spirit.
But he

regrets the passing of the republican moment,
the moment
of public spirit.

His conclusion that men should remove

themselves from politics is more a result of his
belief
in their inability to free themselves from
their private

interests and the penetration of private interests into

politics— that princes are really

no different from pri-

vate persons except for the few virtuous leaders.

The

private self is preeminent to the detriment of politics.
Montaigne, unlike later liberals, has little faith in

the value of this situation for politics.

He does not

have a theory of private property rooted in natural
right which for seventeenth century English republicans
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and for Locke,

legitimates the supremacy of
private over

public action (this is not by
any means to argue that he
should have).
Like his longing to be a part
of a meaningful dialogue with classical
philosophy, there is a
hint of regret in Montaigne, as
there will be later in
Montesquieu, at the passing of the
classical republicanism wherein private and public
interests were reconciled
in the immediacy of public
action.
Now, the preeminence
of the self and self-interest
establishes barriers to
the immediate reconciliation of
public and private

spheres— in the modern state they are

in constant oppo-

sition, mediated by a civil society which
is public but
not political.
It is the logic of this three
tiered

notion of action which liberal theory will
be concerned
to work out through to the end of the
eighteenth century.
In the end, the loser, as Sheldon Wolin
argues,

will be the political.
III.

Bacon and Hobbes
The Opposition
Between the Knowledge of Citizens and Rulers
;

Bodin's definition of the citizen in terms of the

opposition of public and private life and Montaigne's
notion of self-knowledge as that knowledge appropriate
to individual action establish crucial presuppositions
of the liberal theory of citizenship.

In the concluding
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section of this chapter

I

will show how the final pre-

supposition, the opposition of the
knowledge of the citizen and the knowledge of the ruler,
develops in the
work of Francis Bacon and Thomas
Hobbes.
I have called
their theory the 'absolutist' theory
of political knowledge. 70

^

Baconj

nature.

practical knowledge and the control of

Although he was not explicitly concerned with

political theory it would be impossible to
underestimate
Francis Bacon's contribution to the early theory
of the
modern state. He is less important for any specific

proposals (although many of these were finally adopted
by theorists and governments at various times) than
for

his being the first to clearly introduce the crucial

assumptions and orientation of the most popular attempt
to solve the enigma of political knowledge.

Perhaps Bacon's most well known contribution to

modern epistemology is his attempt to redraw the boun-

daries of knowledge and to reorient scientific method.
For our purposes the first is of greatest importance.

Knowledge for Bacon must be practical; its proper end
is the improvement of human life.

To seek knowledge

for any other purpose only leads to confusion. 71

In

the "Preface" to The Great Instauration Bacon states
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his purpose clearly:

general admonition
consider what are the true
l^r^t
ends ofi I
knowledge, and that they
either for pleasure of the mind, seek it not
or for protit, or fame, or power, or any
of these inferior things; but for the benefit
and use of
^^^^ perfect and govern it in
to^all'.

Ll^nt

chfrity?72''^^''

Bacon's work never loses sight of this
practical goal,
as we see it echoed in the New Atlantis
The guiding
purpose of Salomon's House is "the knowledge
of causes
and secret notions of things;, and the
enlarging of the
bounds of human empire, to the affecting of
all things
.

possible.

""^^

The listing of the achievements of

Salomon's House which follows makes

it

clear that Bacon

had a clear vision that improvement meant
prolonging
life,

improving health, and making life more comfort-

able. 74

The goal of science was to make life pleas-

ant, and no other end would suffice as a guide to knowl-

edge

.

Bacon's logic of induction reinforced this practical orientation to knowledge.

Previous philosophy was

caught in metaphysical webs of its own making.

The

deductive logic of syllogism created knowledge about
propositions not about things;

it

represents mere play-

ing with words and discourse about arguments.

In this
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self-created process philosophy has
left truth behind
For the end which this science
of mine
proposes is the invention not of
arguments
but of arts; not of things in
accordance with
""^^ °' principles themselves;
not
of nriS Kf'
^""^ °^ designations and
^f™^
5°"^
intention
?i
IS ^^f^"''^
different, so accordingly is the effect;
the effect of the one being to
overcome an
opponent
argument, of the other to command
nature
action. '6

m

m

The traditional deductive logic of
the schools more
often confuses than clarifies, creating
dilemmas where
they do not exist. More important, it
presumes a confusion of two types of invention, those
inventions of
the mind, like language, which establish
'tokens' or
"marks' of things, and those inventions which
allow us

to utilize and manipulate things.

deductive logic, is not science.

"^"^

Logic, meaning

In the

Mvancement of

Learning Bacon draws a crucial distinction between the
"Arts and Sciences" and "Speech and Arguments."^®

and Science must draw their meaning from nature.

Art

They

must start from things and then move, by steady progression, to "those axioms and general truths which will

lead to practical invent ion.

"

In the beginning we

emerse ourselves in nature so that in the end we can

manipulate it,

"superinducing that nature upon any

variety of matter

.

.

,
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Bacon's peculiar religious
interpretation of the
knowledge of nature is important as
the strategy which
later liberals could use to counter
the Augustinian
moral rule that man's presumption
in the knowledge of
God and his works is the root of
evil.
Bacon accepts
that men cannot have knowledge of
the inner workings of
nature, for that would be nothing less
than knowledge
of God himself.
In the Advancement of Learning Bacon

pronounced one of the limitations of knowledge
"that we
do not presume by the contemplation of nature
to attain
to the mysteries of God."^^

But this does not close

off nature as a subject of knowledge.

God's will and

the essence of nature (which Bacon seems to equate)
must
be accepted by faith, but nature in its positive mani-

festation must not.

Nature as it appears to us and its

inner workings are two separate things, with separate

implications for human knowledge.
Bacon then draws two important conclusions about
our knowledge of nature:

that that knowledge is legi-

timate if pursued correctly and that it is imperative
to do so.

Bacon roots the first conclusion in the no-

tion of language as a sign.

We can know nature through

language because through it we have names which distin-

guish various objects from one another.
gave us language for this purpose.

In fact,

God

Language, as God's
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gift,

iniplies a further sort of
knowledge of nature.

It provides a system of
names for objects of nature
so

that men can use them for
their own purposes. Our
knowledge of nature is legitimate
insofar as it derives
from the names we give nature's
objects and the use we
put them to.
Language tells us nothing about
the 'inside'

of those objects; to seek that
knowledge is to go

beyond man's ability, to cross the
line between legitimate knowledge and presumption.

Having established the legitimate
boundaries of
knowledge. Bacon moved to his more
fundamental claimthat since God gave us a language to
describe nature,
then he also created the imperative
to utilize that
knowledge which derives from it for our
benefit.
In the

passage from the Advancement of Learning
quoted above.
Bacon emphasizes two other limitations
on knowledge:
"that we do not so place our felicity in
knowledge, as
we forget our mortality

.

.

.

that we make application

of our knowledge to give ourselves repose and
content-

ment, and not distaste or repining

..."

To correctly

follow God's commandments and the moral implications of
the fall does not require the restriction of all knowl-

edge of nature, as many contemporaries of Bacon thought.

Adam's fall represented human presumption in that he
sought to penetrate inside moral truth.

To determine
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for himself the essence of Good
and Evil was Adam's
fault, not his desire to utilize
nature.
Hence,

man accepts the precepts of good
and evil
as God commands them nature does
not close but opens
if

up

to him a vast facility to further
the comfort of his
life and the earthly good of men.
The central paradox
of Bacon's view of the relation of
man to
nature, so

central in the development of modern science,
follows
from the severance of the 'outside' of
nature which can
be captured in the names we give to objects
and the
'inside' of nature which only God knows and
which man

can never know.

In Bacon's phrase:

"Nature to be com-

manded must be obeyed."
Since God gave us a certain sort of knowledge of

nature he must have meant for us to use it.

Knowledge,

as we saw above, must be directed toward action, toward

furthering man's well being.

Nature then becomes a

storehouse of goods for men to use.

But unable to know

the inner workings of nature, men must seek an external

description of the relationships within nature which
allow us to make use of it.
tion.

'

This knowledge is

'causa-

We can understand what happens in nature in

terms of what causes particular events, not their first
cause.
'that'

We can never know 'why' something happens only
it

happens and that it recurs in regular patterns
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which we can reproduce.

We can enter nature, so to

speak, in order to control it.

We must follow the pat-

terns that we can see established
(we ccnn never know
why or how they are established)
and reproduce them directed towards human purposes. Viewed
in this context
Bacon's paradox makes sense. Only by
obeying
what we

find given in

nature—patterns

of interactions of ob-

jects which can be described in the language
of cause
and effect— can we manipulate it for our
own purposes.
But since the tools which men have to
command nature

were given them by God, by utilizing them as God
must
have intended (he would not have given them if he
did
not mean for them to be used) we actually
perfect na-

ture.

The circle is complete:

we obey nature in order

to command it, and by commanding it we make nature
into
what it was intended to be.
2.

The conjunction of knowledge and power;

as public science

.

politics

Within politics this view of knowl-

edge takes on a peculiar character; its political im-

plications are 'absolutist.'

First of all, knowledge

must be social and public in character.

The image of

the contemplative philosopher gives way to the community
of scientists endowed with the rights to govern; science

becomes arbiter of the public good.

This is the ideal
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of Salomon's House in which
judgment should no longer
be based upon the authority of
the masters but on the
reason of men. 82 The authority of
Plato, Aristotle

and other great thinkers must be
respected but followed
only in so far as current reason and
method allow. The

boundaries of science must be unlimited;
knowledge exists as a complete unity in which all
men can partake.
"All partitions of knowledge [must] be
accepted rather
for lines and veins, than for sections and
separations;
and that the continuance and entireness
of knowledge be

preserved.

83

In this vision of a total science all

men, whatever their natural gifts, have a part to
play.

The conjunction and ultimate unity of knowledge and

power is the most important feature of the absolutist
view of political knowledge.

As Bacon makes clear in

the "Plan" of The Great Instauration the unity of

knowledge and power develops directly out of his view
of nature:

For man is but the servant and interpreter of
nature: what he does and what he knows is
only what he has observed of nature's order
in fact or in thought; beyond this he knows
nothing and can do nothing. For the chain of
causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken, nor can nature be commanded except by
being obeyed. And so those twin objects,
human knowledge and human power, do really
meet in one; and it is from ignorance of
causes that operation fails.^^
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It follows from this that the
best political order is

one in which knowledge and power
merge.

The first book

Advancement of Learning presents this
argument
more persuasively than anywhere else in
Bacon's works.
Bacon first argues that the record of
history bears
out that the best governments are those
which have combined knowledge with leadership. He makes
two negative
arguments; first against those who claim that the
pursuit of philosophy leads to military weakness,
citing

Alexander and Ceasar as primary examples,®^ and second
showing that historically, knowledge prevails over ig-

norance in 'matter of policy and government.'®^

He

concludes this argument by showing, contrary to received
opinion, that learned men are citizens more prone to act
for the public good.

ft

7

His claim that knowledge in-

duces duty towards government better than ignorance is
illustrative of his argument in general:
Again, for that other conceit that learning should undermine the reverence of laws and

government, it is assuredly a mere depravation
and calumny without all shadow of truth.
For
to say that a blind custom of obedience should
be a surer obligation than duty thought and
understood, it is to affirm that a blind man
may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man
can by a light. And it is without all controversy that learning doth make the minds of men
gently, generous, maniable, and pliant to government whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous:
and the evidence
of time doth clear this assertion, considering
;
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that the most barbarous,

rude,

Ir-oZTr^ c'hLVe^rla-^--

-

and unlearned
tumults, ^seli.

That learning produces the
best governments is

further made clear in the survey
of princes and of the
political and military virtues of
knowledge near the end
of Book 1.89
^^g^^^ ^^^^
^ similar basis as his
followers who ground civil society in
a social contract.
Knowledge and political power must be
conjoined because
shorn of all political and religious
control men are
"full of savage and unreclaimed desires,
of profit, of
lust, of revenge.
The virtuous consequences
of

knowledge— law, religion and morality —alone can
control
men's passions.

History bears witness to this truth.

In this section of the argument Bacon returns
to his

earlier argument that knowledge is necessary to military
success, extending the discussion of Alexander and Ceasar.

Book

I

concludes with a discussion of how knowl-

edge is necessary to moral and private virtue. ^2
3.

Hobbes

;

the knowledge of the citizen and the knowl -

edge of the ruler

.

Whereas Bacon did not reflect ex-

pressly on the knowledge necessary to the citizen.
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Hobbes did, making several important
contributions to
the absolutist theory of political
knowledge.
Hobbes

's

notion of the political subject is illus-

trative of his theory of the political
knowledge of the
citizen. Hobbes claims that, "we make a
commonwealth
by the act of our submission" and there
is "no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some
act of his
93
own."
Clearly, men retain a certain power over
II

their lives even in civil society; they can never
relinquish their right to self-preservation.

Moreover, and

perhaps more important, the act of alienation which the
contract represents rests upon a crucial presupposition

which implies the continuous respect for the autonomous
subjectivity of other individuals.

For Hobbes, no con-

tract is valid if one of the parties can legitimately

assume that the other will not perform the promised action. 94

The Hobbesian contract, we must always bear

in mind,

binds individuals to each other not to the sov-

ereign.

The implication of this for Hobbes is that, in

essence, the knowledge appropriate to citizens has no

corollary in the knowledge appropriate to rulers.
First, we must examine this act of political creation a
bit further.
In the act of alienation,
in a distorted form,

subjectivity remains but

for an individual's subjectivity
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is not obliterated but
transferred.

The individual

gives his right to act and create
his life freely to the
sovereign.
The sovereign is in a sense a
super-subject,
endowed with the subjectivity of the
citizens which make
it up.
Hobbes makes clear in many places
that the
rules

which cement social life are not
enforced by a stored
system of moral judgments or truth but
by the power of
the will of the sovereign.
Indeed, the rules have no
meaning except what the sovereign, by act of
creative
will, gives them.^^

Individuals are impelled into society by their
will
not their reason.
Men value civil society "not for
its

own sake, but that we may receive some honor or profit
from it." 96

To know what society is does not require

reason, but the experiencing of the misery of the state
of nature.

Only when man's will is impressed will he

choose to enter the civil society:
Therefore I deny not that men (even nature
compelling) desire to come together. But
civil societies are not mere meetings, but
bonds, to the making whereof faith and compacts are necessary; the virtue whereof to
children and fools, and the profit whereof to
those who have not yet tasted the miseries
which accompany its defects, is altogether
unknown
The knowledge necessary for an individual to act as a

good citizen is the knowledge of his own self-interest.
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The self consists of appetites
(the will is but 'the
last appetite in deliberat ing
^8 senses and
endeavours. 99 Reason, insofar as the
action of citizens is
concerned, is the discovery of the
best means to his
self-preservation, which remains the sole
final purpose
of his action even in civil society.
All possible ends
of the will, according to Hobbes,
can be reduced to the
,

'

)

drive for power:
The passions that most of all cause the
difference of wit, knowledge, and of honor.
All which may be reduced to the first, that
IS, desire of power.
For riches, knowledge,

and honor, are but several sorts of power. 100

The knowledge necessary to rule, however,

is not

the calculation of means to satisfy desires but of
the

means for all other individuals to satisfy those desires
that will lead to civil peace.

Government is fundamen-

tally the legitiamte and necessary manipulation and re-

pression of the will of individuals:
For he that is kept in by punishments laid
before him, so as he dares not let loose the
reins to his will in all things, is not oppressed by servitude, but is governed and
sustained ^01
.

This sort of rule requires a knowledge of individuals
as objects.

The knowledge of the sovereign must be a

political science.

Science, for Hobbes,

is on a dif-
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ferent plane than will; it is
dependent not on appetites
and desires but on language,
the artificial creation
which allows men to talk to and
about one another.
Hobbes describes science as "a
knowledge of all the

consequences of names appertaining to
the subject in
102
hand."
As it was for Bacon it is a knowledge
of
the causal sequences which allow
us any knowledge of
nature at all.
Herein lies Hobbes

's

major contribution to the

absolutist theory of political knowledge:

the tendency

to polarize the knowledge appropriate to
the citizen
and that appropriate to the ruler.

The former is the

product of the individual citizen's will and the
only
form of rationality appropriate to him is the
instru-

mental calculation of his own interest.

However, the

knowledge of the ruler is political science which requires a broader rationality which can determine what

particular ends will best serve the public good.

Hobbes

asserts that individuals call 'good' and 'evil' those
objects which are desirable or hateful.

In civil soci-

ety the determination belongs to the sovereign or a

judge who must arbitrate conflicts.

Clearly, the crea-

tion of a public rule is far more complex than an individual's knowledge of his own desires and requires more

than mere calculation of subjective interests.
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This characterization of the
relation of the political
knowledge of the citizen and that
of the ruler remains
the primary configuration until
the last quarter of the
eighteenth century.
4.

Conclus ion;

the dilemma of the absolutist th^nr-y

of political knowledge.

The aboslutist theory of poli-

tical knowledge is involved in a fundamental
paradox:
that the knowledge most fundamental to
the well being
of political life is not

narrow sense.

'political' except in the most

For Bacon the problem comes out on an

epistemological level.

By presupposing that the goal

of knowledge is a unified body of practical
knowledge

and that this body of knowledge alone can produce a
se-

cure life for the body politic, then how does he account
for the fact that men do not readily accept this and why

has so little progress been made toward the goal?

Part

of Bacon's answer is that the method of previous science

has led knowledge astray, an that adoption of the inductive method will hasten the arrival of New Atlantis.
Yet there is a deeper reason which he incorporates in

his famous doctrine of the 'idols' or fallacies of the

sciences.

What is important for our purpose in Bacon's

doctrine is that the idols are interwoven with human
nature.

Progress in science is difficult because men
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necessarily fall into characterist

c

errors:

it must be confessed
that It IS not possible to
tLt°?t'^t^'
divorce ourselves
from these fallacies and false
appearances
inseparable from'^^ur nature
InlT"^^]^^^
and condition of life; so
yet never the less
the causation of them doth
extremelv import
the true conduct of human
judgment .104

But if these are necessary to
human nature an interesting paradox arises.
The aboslute unity of human
knowl-

edge is the goal, but human nature
renders the goal
unattainable.
The paradox takes on political
significance when
we link it to the Hobbesian polarization
of the knowledge of the citizen and the knowledge
of rulership.
It
is natural for men to act according
to their passions

and appetites, but the only solution to
the conflicts

which make up politics is for a ruler (be he a
king,

aristocratic council, or democratic body) to act on
the

basis of an antithetical form of knowledge which must
nullify human nature.
Finally, politics and ethics (that is,
the sciences of just and unjust, of equity
and inequity) can be demonstrated a priori;
because we ourselves make the principles that
is, the causes of justice (namely laws and
covenants) whereby it is known that justice
and equity, and their opposites injustice and
inequity, are.
For before covenants and laws
were drawn up, neither justice nor injustice,
neither public good nor public evil, was na-

—

—
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beasts!l05^

"'^'^

""^^^

Hobbes does not say, nor do

I

^^^^ it was among

think he could, how the

state of nature could produce a
man (moreover a body of
men) capable of consistently acting
on the basis of a
knowledge knowable a priori which
negates his own
nature
The absolutist theory of political
knowledge is

based upon a conception of human nature
which leads men
to perpetual conflict.
Politics, then, would seem to
be natural to it. Yet, the knowledge which
this theory

assigns to rulership allows no conflict.

Political dis-

course is merely demonstration of correct
scientific
principles and political action their strict application. But this is engineering not politics.

CHAPTER

IV

THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF SELFCITIZENSHIP IN THE LETTRES PERSANES
The truth of the independent
consciousness is
accordingly the servile consciousness of
the
bondsman.
This, it is true, appears at first
outside of itself and not as the truth
of
self-consciuousness. But just as lordship
showed that its essential nature is the
reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude
in Its consummation will really turn
into the
opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will
withdraw into itself and be transformed into
a truly independent consciousness.
(Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit trans, by A.V.
Miller, p. 117, #193)
,

Lettres Persanes is a book of questions,

a

series of experiments to define intellectual
horizons.
Just as the early eighteenth century French
experimented

with new forms of bureaucratic organization, the polysnodie,

and new economic structures, John Law's System,

Montesquieu experiemented with new intellectual perspectives on society and the state.

The death of Louis XIV

and the ensuing Regency created a comfortable climate
for experimentation of all sorts.

the challenge enthusiastically.

Montesquieu embraced
In the Lett res Persanes

he sought to do for social theory what Montaigne's Essays

had done for the theory of the self
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:

to map out the
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problems and contours of investigation,
and to raise new
questions and meaningful critiques,
even if they were
not followed by answers.

The medium itself had to be
experimental, stretching the limits of existing literary
forms.
Certainly,

Montesquieu had models and sources.

Fenelon

'

Telemague

s

Chardin's Journals and previous epistolary
novels echo
throughout the Lett res Persanes
Yet in both
form and

.

content the work captured the spirit of the
age better

than anyone had done previously.

Montesquieu voiced

criticisms of politics and society that made up

a vital

part of the eighteenth century French self -interpretation.

The work abounds in progressive politics
and

morals from enlightened views on punishment to
deist

conceptions of God and the universe.
more than isolated reflections.

Yet the work is

As has often been

noted, the epistolary form gave Montesquieu a freedom

to criticize without commitment, to criticize established authorities and practices while incurring little gov-

ernment censure and persecution.

His Persians could say

things with impunity about France, both directly and indirectly, that Frenchmen could not.

In this too, Mon-

tesquieu excelled his literary predecessors.
But the Lettres Persanes does contain a sustained

argument.

The story it tells has meaning in itself.

,
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Usbek and the others are not merely
mouthpieces, but
characters in a novel. They live and
act in a fictional
world which does not merely represent
but explores reality.
The reality it explores is that of
the self
and

freedom, and it concludes by declaring
their intimate
and necessary connection.
I.

Vision.

Posing the Problem of Citizenship
The motif of the work is vision.

Usbek and

Rica leave Persia in order to broaden their
insight, to
learn 'the hard way' by experiencing new worlds and
seeing from different perspectives

.

Increased knowledge

requires immediacy and completeness of vision.

The more

the travelers see the easier their acquisition of
knowl-

edge becomes.

"Every moment," the first eunuch writes

to a slave traveling with Usbek,

to see.

"brings you new things

All that you are seeing diverts you and makes

you pass the time without feeling it."^

In distinc-

tion to the openness and vitality of the Western way of
life,

life.

Persia's deepest cruelty is the covertness of its
Despotic power presides over and enforces the

complete enclosure of life.

Under despotic rule women

must be covered by veils and clothing over their entire

bodies, and for others to glance on them, even innocently,

IS punished with death.

3

The seraglio, the symbol
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of the despotic way of life,

is dark.

The first eunuch

declares himself caged in, he can see
nothing.
The
realities of Persian life, as the selves
of those
individuals who participate in it, are
repressed.

They

are hidden from view and can break out
into the light
only through violence, especially
self-destruction.
But for those who have left the seraglio
in search
of wisdom and knowledge all becomes light.

Rica can

only marvel at the clarity and transparency of
French
life:

Dissimulation, that art so practiced and so
necessary among us, is unknown here. Everything speakes out; everything is visible;
everything is audible. The heart shows itself
as clearly as the face.
In their customs, in
their virtue, even in vice, something akin to
naivete is always visible.
It

is not

insignificant that Rica discovers the most

virtuous and clearsighted men in a blind man's hostle.^
His blind guide leads him through winding streets to the

furthest quarter of Paris without the slightest hesitation.

Vision is more than merely sensual,

it

represents

the power of the human soul.

Usbek and Rhedi also describe their encounters with

Western life in terms of vision.

Usbek describes his

first visit to a Christian city as 'a grand spectacle.'

Like the best theater, this spectacle penetrates deep
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into the soul.

"For there exists, even in the
most in-

significant of details, something singular
that
and cannot express."^

Rhedi,

Usbek

'

s

I

feel

young nephew who

has left Persia to seek knowledge responds
similarly to
his first visit to the west.
By burying himself in observation and study, his eyes are opened and
his vision

clarified:

"In short,

am beginning to come out from

I

behind the clouds that covered my eyes in the land
of
my birth. "^

Increased vision perfects the soul;

the emergence and growth of the self.

Montesquieu establishes
of citizenship:

a

it

represents

Through fiction

central theme of his theory

citizenship requires the free political

expression of the self.

He is less concerned with the

formal criteria of citizenship than with the necessity
and legitimacy of individual political action.

The fic-

tional setting is crucial to Montesquieu's overall conception.

In the ficticious despotism, models of authen-

tic action must be culled from beneath the deceptive

cover of custom and practice.

The dialectic of oppres-

sion and freedom, of master and slave, describes poli-

tical action in a despotism.

From the plight of citi-

zens under despotism Montesquieu learns that

a

theory

of citizenship must take account of a series of inerad-

icable tensions and paradoxes;

it

must explore the inner
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motives of political action.
The Lett res Persanes begins to do
this by depicting

the various modes of the development
of self -consciousness.

Usbek and Rica undergo journeys leading
to intel-

lectual self-consciousness while Roxane and
Zelis journey toward political self -consciousness.
Within the

seraglio Usbek
dom.

'

s

wives journey from oppression to free-

The despotic way of life leaves open only a nega-

tive solution to the dilemma of the citizen— political

self-expression in

a

despotism is self-destruction.

The Lett res Persanes prepares for De L' Esprit des

by posing questions, leaving to the latter to de-

velop specific answers.

But the earlier work already

draws the contours of the map.
later theory is set.

The language of the

The inner life of the individual,

a central component of the later concept of 1' esprit,

looms as Montesquieu's central concern.

It

is not

enough for him to accept Aristotle's view of the citizen as one who legitimately participates in meaningful

public decisions.

He is more centrally concerned with

how, why and in what ways political action is possible

for individual citizens.

In this orientation to citi-

zenship Montesquieu is not alone.

The vision of the

citizen in the modern state, one dimension of which he
begins to develop in the Lettres Persanes

,

either con-
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sciously or subconsciously guided thinking
about the
citizen in the eighteenth, nineteenth and
well into the

twentieth century.

^

The myth of the Troglodytes

.

In Letter X Mirza

poses the first question of the theory of citizenship:
"whether men were happy through the pleasures and satis-

factions of the senses or through the practice of VI rtue?"

This manner of posing the dilemma seems to

have had a long history beginning with Plato and criti-

cally reopened by seventeenth century epi stemology

.

But

the differences between the ancient and modern formulations were crucial.

Whereas the ancients sought a unity

of mind, the modern mind was most puzzled by the opposi-

tions.

Aristotle and Plato both recognized that virtues

and pleasure could not be separated.

Book II of Aris-

totle's Nicomachean Ethics declares that "every study
both of virtue and of politics must deal with pleasures
and pains,

for if a man has the right attitude to them,

he will be good; if the wrong attitude, he will be

bad."

Aristotle cautions against a utilitarian in-

terpretation of virtue as calculation of amounts or degrees of pleasure or pain.
doing;

.

.

.

Man must know what he is

he must choose to act the way he does, and

he must choose it for its own sake; and

.

.

.

the act
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must spring from a firm and unchangeable
character

Aristotle would not have understood the
sense of Mirza's
question. Mirza's use of 'or' is exclusive
rather than
inclusive, intended to establish the logical
isolation
of the two possible solutions.

Aristotle's view of the

relation between pleasure or appetites and virtue,
on
the other hand, denies the dichotomy.
Virtue,
for

Aristotle, in the fullest sense of virtuous intention
and action represents the greatest pleasure.

Men are

happy because of the pleasure of being virtuous
Reflecting seventeenth century sensationalism,

Mirza's question implies a choice between exclusive

alternatives— sensual pleasure or virtue.

Usbek

'

s

myth

of the Troglodytes answers by reinterpreting the ques-

tion.

With the Troglodytes, virtue is clearly victori-

ous and man's innate sense of justice counters the util-

itarian and hedonistic implications of sensationalist
psychology.

In Usbek

'

s

myth virtue once again includes

pleasure, the dichotomy dissolves.

solution is not Aristotle's.

However, Montesquieu's

He wants to recapture the

necessary connection between virtue and desire but in a
way appropriate to the conditions of the modern state.

Montesquieu does this by introducing the idea of what
we have come to call

'interests.'

The action of the

Troglodyte citizen is animated by neither sensual plea-
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sure nor virtue exclusively, but by
'interest,' a con-

ceptualization which distills the complex motivations
of political action in the modern state
to a single set
of descriptions.
At first the myth of the Troglodytes follows
a

trend in seventeenth century political theory towards

replacing a contemplation of the proper relations of

justice as a grounding principle of political society

with a speculative history of natural man.

Initially

the very mode of argument counters the Aristotelian synthesis.

Its purpose is to present a plausible picture of

the development of political society out of the material

origins of primitive man.

Implied by the 'state of na-

ture' as a mode of argument is that virtue can have no

origin other than individual sensual pleasure

.

''"^

In-

deed, Montesquieu was conscious that the Greek mode of

argument had to be replaced:
To carry out what you have required of me, I
did not think it proper to use much abstract
reasoning.
There are certain truths that it
is not enough to impress by rational conviction, they must be felt.
Such are the verities of ethics.
Perhaps this bit of history
will touch you more than some subtle philosophy . ^ ^

'Subtle philosophy' was too abstract to provide adequate

explanation of the origin of social life.

In the fic-
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tional context of the Lett res Persanes
Montesquieu gives
a speculative account drawn from the
accounts of
the

newly discovered areas of the world in travel
journals,
a popular literary form in early
eighteenth century

France.

When Montesquieu turns to political philosophy

De L'Esp rit des Lois speculative history will give

way to scientific history.

Yet the use of the

of the Troglodytes serves a dual purpose,

when we fully recognize that

it

'myth*

especially

is implanted in a work

of fiction.

Its first use is to answer Mirza in such a way that

the dichotomy between pleasure and virtue dissolves.
The myth clearly defends justice and virtue, not by con-

tradicting pleasure but by incorporating it.

The Trog-

lodytes are clearly not happy until their 'republican'

period when virtue and justice alone give immediate

pleasure:
Above all they made them feel that the welfare
of the individual is always to be found in the
common good, and that to want to stray from it
is to seek destruction; they taught them that
virtue is not something that should cost us
effort, that it is not to be considered a
painful exercise; and that justice to others
is like charity to ourselves.

Although Montesquieu's solution bridges the gap between
pleasure and virtue, it is not the solution of Plato and
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Aristotle.

The bridge is different.

The recognition of

goodness and the pleasure of virtue is
more immediate.
It

is felt,

not thought.

The bridge is the same as the

innate sensation and joy that Usbek, Rica
and even the
slave Jaron feel but cannot express at gaining
knowledge
of new worlds.
It is that inner moral sense that
in

the pre-social natural state differentiates the
beastiality of the earlier Troglodytes from the virtuous
and

happy republican Troglodytes; and throughout the Lett res
Persanes that innate nature unites, in itself, pleasure,

justice and virtue, constantly struggling for self-conscious expression.

In the primitive world without kings,

virtue reigns uncontested.
by customs not laws.

The early Troglodytes live

But social complexity and economic

expansion put pressure on virtue, jeopardizing the rule
of custom.

"O Troglodytes," the old man,

come their unwilling king, proclaims,

beginning to weigh upon you.

about to be-

"Your virtue is

In the present state of

affairs, with no chief, you must be virtuous in spite
of yourselves

"'"^
.

As for Rousseau later in the cen-

tury, political society is the negation of natural so-

ciety, and synthesis can only result from bringing that

natural moral feeling, unconscious in the pre-social
state, to free,

self-conscious expression.

of the Lettres Persanes

,

as we shall see,

The story

explores this
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dialectic, not through philosophy, but
through fiction.
While denying that the problem of
political action
can be adequately set forth by posing
a dichotomy between sensual pleasure and virtue, the
myth of the

Troglodytes neither returns to the classical
solution
nor adopts the abstract solution of
seventeenth century
contract theory.
Indeed, its second purpose is
to ex-

pose the real character of the social contract

. -"-^

Here the fictional quality of the Lett res Persanes
and the myth of the Troglodytes is crucial to the argu-

ment.

The very form of the work expresses Montesquieu's

argument.

The idea of contract, when tied to rational-

ist foundations in a state of nature, can have no philo-

sophical import

— it

is a fiction,

and fiction can teach,

raise questions, and even pose answers in the form of

mental experiments, but it cannot make philosophical
arguments. '^

Commentators"''^ have shown that Montes-

quieu was conscious of the Lettres Persanes as fiction,
indeed as stretching the parameters of literary form.
It

is certainly at least as plausible to suspect that

he was as conscious of the difference between this work
and philosophy.
In his later work,

as he matured intellectually,

the gap continually grew wider.

To his mind, the state

of nature is most powerful as fiction.

The fiction of
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the Troglodytes can teach moral truth;
it can help to
bring natural moral sense to consciousness
by presenting
a model which stretches the imagination
and challenges
the preconceptions of the reader, but it
cannot estab-

lish philosophical truth.

Clearly, the historical sense

of the Troglodyte myth surpasses previous
accounts of

the state of nature by HoTDbes and Locke; just as Rous-

seau's Discourse on Inequality will surpass the history
of the Troglodytes as a plausible analytic view of the
origins of society. 20 Yet the natural state of the

Troglodytes does not, indeed cannot, establish principles from which the proper conditions of real politics
can be deduced.

Only a scientific understanding of real

history can do that.

But that is the subject of another

book, a very different type of book.

It

can never be

the purpose of fiction.

3.

The idea of

'interest.'

There was, then, a real

historical importance to the Lett res Persanes
ment of the theory of citizenship.

's

state-

The terms of debate

shifted and Montesquieu's formulation, certainly in part

due to his influence, won out as the eighteenth century
progressed.

The work of earlier thought like that of

Bodin, Montaigne,

Bacon and Hobbes traced in the last

chapter, isolated private action from public action.
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declaring that a proper notion of political
action had
to be based upon possible modes of
private action.

The

concept of 'interest' could bridge the gap
between private and public action by giving private action
a legitimate public face.

Political action could now be de-

scribed in terms of the private interests of individuals.

We must examine Montesquieu's view of interests

more closely.
To Montesquieu the dichotomy between passion and

virtue could not adequately describe the life of the
citizen.

Political by its nature that life necessarily

involves both.

The citizen must perform his public

duties passionately.

His whole individual self, not

merely his reason or his passion, must involve itself
in collective action directed toward the common good.

Neither passion devoid of virtue nor virtue devoid of

passion could accomplish this.

The language of

'inter-

est' popular in both moral theory and international

politics in the seventeenth century gave Montesquieu
the new language he needed.
Recent studies have shown that initial formulations
of

'interest'

in the seventeenth and early eighteenth

centuries did not have the narrow economic implications
that it took on in later liberal theory.

21

In fact,

broadly interpreted, the concept was particularly well
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suited for the synthetic role Montesquieu
wanted it to
play. As Albert O. Hirshman describes it:

When the term "interest" in the sense of concerns, aspirations, and advantage gained currency in Western Europe during the late sixteenth century, its meaning was by no means
limited to the material aspects of a person's
welfare; rather, it comprised the totality of
human aspirations, but denoted an element of
reflection and calculation with respect to
the manner in which these aspirations were to
be pur sued. 2
"Interest" joined in a single term an individual's passions, desires and purposes, together with a calculation
of proper and effective means.

But the Montesquieu of the Lettres Persanes was not

completely a partisan of 'interest,' although he recognized that it was necessary to accept the legitimacy of

the self-interests of particular individuals.

In his

view it too often remained linked to selfishness.

In-

terest was self-interest as opposed to justice and the

common good.

"Men are capable of doing injustice be-

cause it is to their own interest to do so,
in Letter LXXXIII.

23

"

he asserts

He goes on to express one of

the central facets of the new concept of interests, that
they derive not from mere desire or whim, but from reasoned calculation:

"It

is always by reference to them-

selves that they act; no man is evil gratuitously.
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There must be some determined reason; that
reason is
always a selfish one." Society, as Montesquieu
sees it
is overloaded with particular interests.

The more com-

plex a society is, the greater the number of
possible

identifications become available to citizens.

This re-

sults in a dynamic that clearly threatens the smooth

functioning of the state:
Since they [particular individuals] are living together in society, their interests are
so mixed and confused, there are so many different kinds of interests, that a third party
is necessary to disentangle what the selfish
desires of the interested parties try to obscure 24
.

But his criticism did not blind him to the utility,
in fact, to the necessity of the concept of interest.

With this complex social organization (he is particularly but not exclusively concerned with economic complex-

ity) the modern state requires recognition of a plur-

ality of motives behind individual political behavior.
He concludes that the purely virtuous man was one of the

luxuries which society could not afford, he was too un-

productive. 25

To Montesquieu, as to many of his con-

temporaries, it was a fact that man acted according to
self-interest, motivated primarily by desires and a

technical reason which, in good Hobbesian form, could
inform them of the most efficient means to the desired
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end.

A theory of political action had to
accept this;
recourse to ideals of virtuous action were
at best

ir-

relevant and at worst, and most often,
deceptions which,
served particular selfish purposes.
The last sections of the myth

o-f

the Troglodytes,

wherein they choose a king, and the unpublished conclusion where they rise to social prosperity, represent
the

transformation of the language of citizenship.

Montes-

quieu does not describe the action of the citizen in
terms of the public
'interest.'

'good'

but in terms of the public

The fundamental opposition shifts from be-

ing between passions and virtue to being between self-

interest and the public interest, the latter containing
the same Hobbesian mixture of desire and technical reason as the former.
est,

It

is in this sphere that

'inter-

for Montesquieu, takes on a more exclusively eco-

'

nomic meaning. 27
In Letter XIV, the last part of the Troglodyte myth

which Montesquieu published as part of the Lettres Per sanes

,

the newly chosen king penetrates the motivation

of the Troglodytes for choosing a king:

"You prefer to be subjects of a prince and
obey his laws, for they are less restrictive
than your customs. You know that from now on,
you can satisfy your ambition, acquire riches,
and languish in soft luxury, and that so long
as you avoid falling into great crimes, you
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will have no need of virtue. "28
This lament penetrates not only the
self-deception of
the Troglodytes but the historical necessity
of the fall

from virtue.

The increase in size and wealth of the

Troglodyte community necessitates the change from the
simple virtuous republic to monarchy.

above (Chapter

As

I

have shown

the change in the size and scope of

2)

governments is a fact of modern European history for
Montesquieu.

As

I

will show in the next chapter, his

analysis of the cycle of the forms of government in De
L'Esprit des Lois demonstrates its theoretical importance.
But as J. Robert Loy has shown Montesquieu was not

content with this pessimistic conclusion in the published version of the history of the Troglodytes,^^ just

as he was not content with the plight of modern European

history as caught by necessity in a monarchical form of
government.

In both cases he sought a way out and in

both cases economic interests provided hope.

Economic

expansion can lead either to prosperity and a virtuous
society or to moral depravity.

After several generations of rulers the Troglodytes

convened the nation and decided "to establish commerce
and the arts."

30

The newly chosen king raises the
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first objection,

restating the original king's lament:

"Would you now prefer riches to your virtue?"

The an-

swer given by one of the Troglodytes foreshadows
the

theory of De L'Espri t des Lois

,

proclaiming that through

proper education, led by the virtuous action of the
king,

riches will not be dangerous:
"My lord ... we are happy.
We work on excellent soil. May I dare say it? It is you
alone who will decide whether riches will be
dangerous for your people or not ..."

The new king's reply synthesizes passion and virtue in

terms of the merging of private interest (now given an
economic meaning) with the public interest:
"We have two things to do:
to deflate and
bring to naught avarice, and equally, prodigality.
Every man must be accountable to the
state for the administration of his possessions.
And may the coward who will lower himself to the point of robbing himself of an
honest subsistence-^-'- be punished no less
severely than the man who runs through the
patrimony of his children. Each citizen must
be a fair dispenser of his own wealth, just
as he would be of the wealth of another "
[my
emphasis
.

A new language has been drawn in which the dilemma of
the citizen can be described and debated.

The primary

tension is between private interests and the public interest.

Private interest must be made compatible with

the public interest; the motivations of particular in-
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dividuals must yield benefits to all.

virtue and pas-

sion, combined in the different
interests of individuals

and of the collectivity, together draw
the map of ten-

sions which describes the life of the citizen:
If you seek to distinguish yourselves
only by
your wealth (which is nothing in itself) I
shall have to distinguish myself by the same
methods in order not to remain in a poverty
you would scorn. Thus I should have to overwhelm you with taxes, and you would use a
great part of your subsistence in keeping up
the pomp and glitter that would serve to make
me respectable.
At present I find all my
wealth within myself, but then, you would
have to wear yourself out to make me rich,
and these riches, of which you make so much,
would give you no pleasure for they would all
flow into my treasury. O Troglodytes
we
can be united by a lovely tie: if you are
virtuous, I shall be; if I am virtuous, you
will be.
1

II.

1.

Paris and Persia;

Rica and Usbek

:

The Quest for Knowledge

the modern 'savant.'

In different

ways Rica and Usbek demonstrate the role of reason in

the development of self -consciousness

.

Both set out to

increase the range and depth of their knowledge.

Curi-

osity, observation and reflection guide their discovery.

Their quest becomes a passion, determining and consuming

their lives.

Usbek, the older and more reserved,

for both of them:

Those who like to learn are never idle.

Al-

speaks
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though I am occupied with no important affair,
I am nonetheless continually busy.
I spend my
life examining.
In the evening, I write what
I have noticed, seen, or heard during the day.
Everything interests me; everything astonishes
me.
I am like a child whose still sensitive
organs are keenly struck by the most insignificant objects.
Indeed, they are children in a storm of stimulation,

guided by a somewhat nai've faith that truth will issue
in the end.

Persistent reflection and freedom from

prejudice are alone necessary.
Yet the naivete takes its toll.

Rica, at once more

daring and free, remains somewhat superficial.
puzzled but offers few solutions.

He is

He enters French life

more fully than does Usbek, adopting its dress and some
But his criticisms, when not mere won-

of its manners.

der and amazement, are more impetuous than carefully
reasoned.

He is,

considers him.

33

indeed, the 'free spirit' that Usbek

A "lively wit and natural gaiety"

make him more apt to be comfortable in Parisian society,

wherein the 'free spirit' is the prototype of

the successful mnan.

Usbek is, on the other hand, more stern and reflective.

Carefully reasoned questions and arguments, along

with moral declarations, make up the bulk of his letters.
ist.

He is the demanding theoretician and stern moralIn short,

Usbek and Rica represent two sides of
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the modern "savant"— the phi losophe—
the intellectual
ideal of the age of enlightenment.

something is still missing.

theorizing remains naive.

But for Montesquieu

Even Usbek

'

s

sophisticated

He has a tragic flaw,

tradiction deep in his character.

a con-

No matter how sophis-

ticated his reason his sentiments destroy him.

His en-

lightened views crumble in the face of his traditional
way of life.

ment.

Despotism is incompatible with enlighten-

His enlightened views isolate him from Persian

life and the life of the seraglio, which he cannot
leave, holds him there.

2.

Usbek;

the master in search of the world

.

Usbek

'

drive for knowledge is genuine although the initial
motives for his departure from Persia were political
rather than intellectual.

At the Persian court Usbek

had represented virtue to the king, making enemies,

including the king, rather than admirers.

despotism are incompatible.

Virtue and

At first Usbek used study

as a pretext for isolating himself from his enemies,

and only in this process of learning did he develop the

drive for knowledge:

"I

pretended to possess a great

devotion to learning and by dint of pretense, such devotion actually came to me." 35

After threats from

his enemies the philosopher's cloak provided a pretext
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for exile.

Throughout all of his travels, however,

Usbek remains part of the Persian way of life; there
are important ways in which he never leaves it.

The

tension between the genuine search for knowledge and
exile from a beloved and preferred way of life con-

stantly tears away at Usbek.
His concerns are aristocratic.

Most of his reflec-

tive letters deal with religion, court politics, aristocratic political morals and abstract political theory.
Early in his travels, Usbek is reluctant to question and

even an intellectual break from his traditional way of
life is difficult.

Indeed, his questioning begins with

the desperate desire to reaffirm the most traditional
aspect of his social life

— religion:

cannot, divine mullah, calm my impatience.
I have
could not possibly awaith thy reply.
feel
that
I
I must trace them down.
doubts.
into
the
back
guide
it
my reason is straying;
spring
me,
enlighten
and
Come
straight path.
With the divine pen, blast, as with
of light.
thunder, the problems I am about to propose to
Make me ashamed of myself, cause me to
thee.
blush at the question I shall put to thee. 36
I
I

Usbek

's

reason has indeed begun to wander.

through XVIII, spurred by Usbek

'

s

Letters XVI

religious doubts, set

up the tensions of his initial intellectual conscious-

ness.

Why, he asks the mullah, does God prohibit eating

certain meats?

Are not the dietary laws really reflec-
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tions of our own sensual likes and dislikes?

Do not

these religious precepts really derive
from the senses?
Usbek wants a convincing answer not wanting
to believe
the heathen, worldly philosophy.

desperate; his doubts are real.
to break through.

Yet, his pleas are

His nature is beginning

The more he questions, the more he

allows his doubts about past and present to become conscious, the more his reason is perfected.

Living in Paris Usbek

'

s

developing views begin to

isolate him from his intellectual tradition.

He begins

to reflect on events in Paris and on theoretical issues

raised by Western traditions of thought.

Several let-

ters demonstrate that these observations are leading
him to break from his traditional life, to question and

arrive at truth through his own reasoning, not through
the traditions of his past.

Again,

religion holds his

attention first; religious toleration is his first enlightened position.

Christians should not be counted

'infidels' and they warrant tolerance rather than re-

pression.

They do not actively deny the Moslem faith

but rather they are merely ignorant of it.

more like those unfortunate people,

"

"They are

Usbek declares,

"who lived within the shadow of idolatry before the

divine light came to illumine the face of our great Prophet

.

37
"

Christians are actually like Mohammedans,

without the prophet.

Usbek goes on to remark that the

truths reflected in their doctrines, however,
parallel

those of the Koran.

Indeed, this is only the beginning.

His statements supporting religious toleration
grow even

bolder as his experience of Paris widens.
Later, Usbek

'

reflections turn towards politics

s

and criticisms directed at Persia and despotism become

harsher.

His previous hesitant posing of questions

pitting Western ways against those of Persia give way
to open criticism.

Usbek applies the condemnation of

amoral Machiavellian power politics to the despotism of
the sultans:
The unlimited power of our sublime sultans,
which knows no other law than its own, produces no greater number of monsters than that
unworthy sort which hopes to bend to its will
justice, rigidly inflexible though it may
be
In Letter CII the criticism explodes his surface accep-

tance of Persian politics.

In order to describe the

proper monarchy in Europe, Usbek counters the despotism
of Persia.

The Persian monarch's power is too great and

too arbitrary.
whim.

He takes the lives of subjects at his

Nothing is left for the citizen but rebellion.

Foreshadowing Usbek
ual

i

rony

'

s

40

own future, this is more than cas-
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^

Usbekj

the bonds of despotism .

Usbek has left

Persia physically but not emotionally.

Even as he gains

knowledge, learning to question on a broader
and more

sophisticated basis, he remains perpetually
anxious.
He is unable to break from the despotic
way of life.
He cannot accept the absence of his wives
and his as-

sertion of power over them.

He confesses that he is

jealous of his wives but does not love them:
not so much that

I

love them,

and destroyed it by loving.

...

""^^

I

"It

is

anticipated love

Fear and jealousy

keep him tied to the seraglio, no matter how far away
he is either physically or emotionally.

Through his

selfless agents, the eunuchs, he rules as a paternalistic tyrant, at the same time that he develops a philos-

ophy at once more tolerant, humane, and more appropriate
to a free, moderate government.

A contradiction between

reason and passion, enlightenment and despotism, remains
the determinant of Usbek

journey.

'

s

character throughout his

He is caught between the two poles of Troglo-

dyte society.

On the one hand, he is the virtuous cit-

izen who exposes corruption at home and who praises

friendship as the finest form of human felicity.

On

the other, he remains the cruel master who threatens to

destroy life for the slightest disobedience to his rule.
Throughout the book his life remains a contradiction
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one which recurs and animates the
entire book.
is both master and slave.

Usbek

His mind and his reason un-

leash an unfettered spirit and capacity for
reflection;
but his passion and his power enslave him.

Friendship offers the only consolation for the
struggle in Usbek

'

soul.

s

The torment over his wives

leaves him totally isolated; despotic power both isolates and destroys.

incomplete.
his friends.

Usbek

'

As a form of human relation it is
s

only consolation is to confide in

To have company in open dialogue and in-

tellectual exploration
forts Usbek.

— to

know he has comrades

—com-

In contrast, the closed society of the

East with the isolation of its members is a perversion:

This Asiatic sobriety derives from the dearth
of intercourse between people.
They see each
other only when forced to do so by ceremony.
Friendship, that sweet bond of hearts which
creates a gentleness of existence here, is
practically unknown to them. They withdraw
to their houses where they always find a social company awaiting them, so that each family group lives, so to speak, in isolation. ^2

Usbek

'

s

isolation is broken by the intercourse with

strangers in Paris and by the letters he exchanges with
friends.

Ibben's concern for Usbek

'

s

well being and

declaration of friendship as a basis of universal citizenship in Letter LXVIII must be a great comfort.
positive, open side of Usbek

'

s

The

life leads to reflection
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and intellectual Fiuyress.
proaress.

Vt^iYet,

« i»
his„ subconscious
emov.-:

tional life remains closed and
individual.
of the book it overtakes him.

By the end

The real victor in the Lettres
Persane.. is despotism.
In one way or another it destroys
those who make
it, or have made it, a way of
life.
The only solution
is to leave it, as Rica does.
But Rica is young, a new

generation free to experiment with different
ways of
life (as is Usbek

'

s

nephew who decides he must leave

Persia in order to travel).

He immerses himself in

French life, adopts its clothing and its ideals
(often
a radical version of them)

sists Usbek

's

and,

late in the book, re-

pleas to return to Persia.

The combina-

tion of youth and freedom provides some hope of
choosing
one's own way of life.
But Usbek is already tied to a way of life.

bond is tradition
it.

— Usbek

Its

cannot imagine breaking from

As the Troglodyte myth implies, and Montesquieu

will canonize in De L' Esprit des Lois

,

fixed within a particular way of life.

the self becomes
To accept a role

in a particular society, to legitimate a form of rule

through the practice of it, is to lock the self into a
tradition.

There is still freedom.

Usbek goes quite

far towards questioning and rejecting despotism as a

legitimate form of government.

Yet his reason cannot
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undo his earlier emotional development.

him in ways he cannot master.

His past grasps

He can understand and

even in principle control his present
environment, but
he cannot reform his sentiments. And
in the end his
emotional past, the spirit of despotism,
wins.

The

working out of the dialectic of despotism in
the seraglio finally destroys him; it obliterates the
self.

Preoccupied with the final chaos of the seraglio,
Usbek
writes

:

I am living in a barbarous climate, in
the company of everything that vexes me, far
removed from everything that interests me. A
somber sadness seizes on me; I am falling into
a frightful oppression.
It seems to me that
I am destroying myself and no longer find my
own personality except when a dark jealousy
ignites within and gives birth in my soul to
fear, suspicion, hate, and regret.

III.

Citizenship Under Despotism;
The Dialectic of Master and Slave

1.

The descent into the seraglio

.

The dialectic of

master and slave grows more complex as its focus moves
from the aristocracy of Usbek to the underworld of eu-

nuchs and wives.

Their struggle for self-expression,

to wrest power over their own lives away from their
master,

is more difficult,

more violent and more

dest ruct i ve
The dialectic is fully at work in the seraglio.
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All is distorted there.

cealed power.

Concealed power confronts con-

Only a heightened self -awareness and

transparency of vision offers any hope of warding
off
the destructive consequences of the contradictions.
this solution is not available to the characters.

But

Des-

potism only allows one solution— rebellion and death

together with destruction and chaos.
give way to freedom.

If the self

Repression must

is distorted by power

relations it must nevertheless somehow express its freedom.

Political expression of this freedom can go only

in one direction.

Roxane

'

s

rebellion and suicide are

the only possible outlets for the utterly constrained
self.

It

is as

if

the psychic energy bound up in the

self is intensified as it is repressed.
it

is with furor.

When unleashed,

As Rica's depiction of French manners

makes clear, the free self is felicitous and tranquil;
as Zelis's descriptions and Roxane

'

s

actions make clear,

its repression leads to destruction and death.

The only

authentic expression of self in this extreme oppression
is self-destruction.

Roxane

'

s

suicide, although the

culmination of deceit, is noble and virtuous.
deed,

She,

in-

represents the most virtuous member of the sera-

glio; but her virtue is not what Usbek praises.

It

is

not her willing submission to the manners and moeurs of

despotic rule but her rebellion.

Her taking a lover,
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seducing the eunuchs, and committing
suicide are modes
of her self-expression.
Her rebellion against despotic
rule expresses a natural human
virtue.
Given the way
of life in which she is caught,
virtue requires her own
self-destruction. The repression of the
self in the
seraglio is not only cruel it is inhuman.
The cruelty
of the evil Troglodytes echoes
throughout the seraglio:
you have no right to live, for your cruelty
is inhuman.
The eunuch most clearly represents this
inhumanity; he
is the symbol of humanity made inhuman
by man— the es-

sence of despotism.

ll

The eun uchs;

slaves as masters

.

The dialectic

involves the entire cast of characters of the
Lettres
Persanes.

All are both masters and slaves; all are

motivated and eventually destroyed by the contradictions.

Usbek, political master over his wives, remains

their emotional slave.

As his enlightenment renders him

more master of himself, his wives become more masters of
his passions.

The black eunuchs represent the dialectic

more clearly yet in a more complex form than Usbek.

Un-

like their master, they have been raised from the lowest
of slaves to the most despotic of masters.

Indeed, the

cruelty grows as their consciousness of their position
grows.

They are truly caught in the center between
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Usbek and his wives.

Their only possible response
is

absolute Obedience to the former
and absolute mastery
over the latter. Vis-a-vis Usbek,
they resent their

position at the same time that they
relish its power.
Their relation to Usbek 's wives is
similar.

They are

slaves destined to serve the women's
needs and whims.
Yet, they are the enforcers of
tyranny over them. Their

self-interpretation is wracked by contradictions:
are men but they are not

7

they

they are slaves but with the

power to oppress their masters.

They can only express

love through cruelty.
The eunuchs are pure functionaries denatured
both

physically and morally.

They have no self.

Conscious

that their position requires power and cruelty,
Usbek

'

chief black eunuch's teacher can describe himself with
the utmost clarity:

"I am a

women under his guard,

"but

your master and mine, and
granted me over you."

I

slave," he would say to the
I

am slave to a man who is

make use of the power he has

He continues by legitimizing his

rule and in the process denies his own selfhood:
is he

(the master) who punishes you and not

only the arm of the master. "^^

His passions still exist,

for

I

am

His nature has not

actually been removed from him but
ed.

I,

"It

it has

been distort-

indeed they are intensi-

fied because they cannot be satisfied.

Describing his
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initial thoughts after the fateful
operation, the first
eunuch describes his torment:
I hoped to be delivered
from the seizure of
love by my impotence to satisfy it.
Alas for
me.
The effect of passion was snuffed
out in
me without extinguishing the cause,
and far
from being comforted, I found myself
surrounded by objects that provoked my
passion without
cease
The same women whom I was tempted
.
to behold with such tender eyes, I
could look
at only with severity. 45
.

.

The eunuch's self definition is plagued
by contradic-

tions as are all those who live under despotic
regimes.
But the eunuch is compensated for his impotence.

The passion of love intensified by the conditions
of

slavery expresses itself as the power of command
and

punishment.

"I

remember always that

mand them, and it seems to me that

when

I

can still do so."

I

I

was born to com-

become a man again

Now that the chief eunuch has

become old he consoles himself by exercising power, re-

capturing his sense of manhood by punishing.

Yet his

sense of justice and moderation, which Montesquieu con-

siders natural to virtuous action, is gone.

The chief

eunuch wants, indeed needs, to oppress his subjects.
He must somehow express his inner nature, but he cannot

do

it

in natural harmony with others but only through

oppression

—by

making someone else his slave.

The only

consolation he can give to Jaron upon the latter'

s

cas-
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tration is that the satisfactions of
nature now denied
him can be recaptured through command:
"I

thought of

you as having a second birth and taking
leave of
vitude in which you always had to obey,
to

a ser-

enter another

kind of servitude, where you were to command. "^^

The

education of a eunuch must parallel the education
of a
despot.
The description given by the chief black eunuch
of his teacher and his education in Letter
LXIV illus-

trates the development of the eunuch's self -interpreta-

tion

:

It was

under that great teacher that

I learnunder him
that I learned to conform to the maxims of
inflexible government. Under him I studied
the hearts of women; he taught me to take
advantage of their weakness and never to be
surprised at their haughtiness.

ed the difficult art of commanding,

The art of commanding which becomes the sole joy
of the eunuchs is the art of manipulating women as ob-

jects.

Such objectivity and manipulation bring joy and

satisfaction.

V^hile overt sensual pleasure has been

denied to the eunuchs, its loss found compensation in
the psychological pleasure of forcing women to regard

themselves as objects for manipulation.

Furthermore,

the eunuchs are aware of this aspect of their position.

They justify their cruelty by regarding themselves as
the center of human relations; as above both men and
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women, as their real superiors.

Jaron, the young eunuch

about to return to the seraglio to
reinforce the guard,
knows well what he must do:
It seems nature placed women in a
state of
dependence and then withdrew them from it.
Disorder arose between the sexes because their
rights were reciprocal. We (eunuchs) have
entered upon the plane of a new harmony. We
have put between women and ourselves, hate:
and between men and women, love.

Like the chief black eunuch and his teacher, Jaron feels
'a

species of triumph' at the manipulation and oppres-

sion of the women. 47

is the eunuch's true self-

It

interpretation.
The condition of the self in the seraglio, partic-

ularly in the eunuch's position, resembles a psychoanalytic situation.

Deprived of the possibility of sexual

fulfillment by the paternalistic master, Usbek, the eunuchs must seek other forms of sensual pleasure.
bek

'

s

repression of the eunuchs is complete.

are all of you,

"

Us-

"For what

he declares to the first white eunuch,

"if not base tools that

I

can break at my fancy

—you,

who exist only for as long as you know how to obey; you,
who exist in this world only to live under my laws or to

die so soon as
as objects,

I

shall order." 48

He considers them

but as objects which threaten his exclusive

right to his sexual property.

For despite the disclaim-
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ers by all,

including the eunuchs themselves,
that the
eunuchs are not men, they must
in some way express

thei

nature.

Their feelings and passions remain,
although
they cannot be satisfied in normal
ways.
The first

black eunuch hints that his severity
towards the women
is related to his hatred of his
master:
As the crowning stroke to my misery,
I
ever before my eyes a happy man. Duringhad
these
troubled times, I never led a woman to
my master s bed, I never undressed her without
turning to my room with rage in my heart reand
horrible desolation in my soul
.
The same
women whom I was tempted to behold with
such
tender eyes, I could only look at with severity
.

.

.

Those feelings that naturally would have been love

turned to hatred.

Could the joy which the eunuchs feel

at oppressing Usbek s wives be displaced hatred
for the
'

master who has deprived them of humanity?
We must be cautious not to take this interpreta-

tion too far; we must not add our own preoccupation to
the Lett res Persanes .

The language of psychoanalysis

serves as a useful metaphor to describe the complex in-

teractions among the characters of the seraglio.

Yet

Montesquieu clearly saw that no matter how deep the re-

pression of the self, some form of self-expression was
necessary.

Citizenship must harness the power of indi-

vidual self-expression.

Different forms of government
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and ways of life require certain forms
of behavior.
But the stable polity requires that
the behavior be the

authentic expression of the self.

As Montesquieu shows

De L'Esprit des Lois self-expression is
not the same
in all forms of government; human nature
manifests it-

self according to various social forms and customs.

There is no discontinuity in this respect between the

Lettres Persanes and De L'Esprit des Lois

.

The former

states the problem by exploring the most extreme form
of repressive rule

clearest.

—despotism.

Here the dialectic is

Social life requires certain types of per-

sonalities, all authentic expressions of individual
selves

Montesquieu's view differs from Plato's (although
clearly inspired by it) because the self, the 'spirit,'
for Montesquieu,

subjectivity.

involves self -interpretat ion and inter-

Individuals express themselves in partic-

ular ways primarily because of their perceptions of

their relations with others, constituted by the cultural

traditions which they share.

Montesquieu is more con-

cerned than Plato with the possibilities for existence
of particular types of personalities,

rather than with

fully describing and defining the abstract personality
type.

The self of Montesquieu's psychology requires an

engagement with historical circumstance and laws that
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Plato's democratic, timocratic
and oligarchic men do
not.
Plato's men act out of trained
habit, Montesquieu's
out of interpretations of their
interests. Montesquieu
recognizes more fully than Plato the
impossibility
of

escaping the social forms of self-expression.

Hence,

he considers action more at the heart
of the human con-

dition than contemplation.

The development of the dia-

lectic of master and slave in the Lettres
Persanes dem-

onstrates

a

fundamental assumption of Montesquieu's

theory of the citizen:
and self-expression,

the natural drive for freedom

necessarily repressed by social

structures, cannot be destroyed but must be 'sublimated,'

reappearing in different forms of action.
3.

Mas ters and slaves;

the reversal of roles

relation between the eunuchs and Usbek

'

s

.

The

wives demon-

strates most clearly the dialectic of master and slave.

Depending upon the particular situation, each can either
be master or slave.

else in the seraglio,

Even Usbek, so blind to so much

recognizes the complex, dual

relation:
You (eunuchs) command and you obey them (his
wives); you carry out blindly all their desires, and in the same way, you make them
carry out the laws of the harem. You find
your glory in rendering them the lowliest
service; you yield with fear and respect to
their legitimate commands; you serve them
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like a slave of their slaves.
But, by
exchange of authority, you command as an
master
like myself, whenever you fear a
weakening of
the laws of decency and modesty. 50
The relation is one of jockeying for
position.

Both

must manipulate circumstances and each
other to their
own advantage.
"There exists between us something like
an ebb and flow of dominion and submission,"
says the
first eunuch. 51

The eunuchs continually exhort Usbek

for greater power to punish his wives, while the
women

manipulate their husband's passions in order to exact
revenge on the eunuchs.
ful eunuchs

.

.

.

To Usbek

'

s

wives, the

are not men at all."^^

As we have

seen, the eunuchs hate the women just as much.

detested them ever since the moment

I

'fright-

have

"I

was able to con-

sider them objectively," says the first eunuch.

can oppress them with zeal and a 'secret joy.'
there are costs.

He

Yet

Just as the women become masters over

Usbek, they become masters over their eunuchs.

views the other as an object.

Each

Both use their slavery

to assert their mastery.
But the wives' assertion of self is not so tightly

bound to their domain over the eunuchs.

Their master-

ship over them is primarily a defensive game against the

brutality of Usbek

'

s

functionaries.

There is another

form of self-expression possible for them

— active

re-
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bellion against their real master.

Intellectually,

Zelis penetrates the master-slave relation.

But as is

characteristic of the social relations in the Lett
res
Persanes, the real rebellion must come from the
opposite of rebellion, the one least likely to rebel;
from
Roxane, Usbek

'

most virtuous wife.

s

She is exactly op-

posite from what her master believes her to be.

These

two women represent the element of self-expression which
is missing from Usbek and Rica:

sion of passion.

the authentic expres-

The most pervasive theme of the Let -

tres Persanes is that freedom is incomplete without the
freedom to love, and that the freedom to love requires
free, moderate government.

This is the central theme

of the second important myth that Montesquieu includes

in Letter LXVII

— "the

History of Apheride and Astarte."

Their love moves in and out of slavery, continually

struggling against the confines of despotism.
ally,

Eventu-

their sincerity convinces their final master that

their love makes them worthy of freedom.

Without the

passionate expression of self, unsuppressed by artificial political power, human beings are incomplete.
Usbek justifies the oppression of his wives on the

basis of custom and nature.

women from their own nature.

The seraglio protects the

Usbek

'

s

wives are faithful

not because of their nature but because of the force of
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the seraglio.

Zachi

'

s

test of will by seducing a white

eunuch^^ is written off by Usbek as an
aberration.
In Usbek 's mind most of his wives
consider the seraglio
"happy shelter against the attacks
of vice, a sacred
temple where your sex loses its weakness
and becomes
a

invincible despite all the disadvantages of
its nature."
Later on, Usbek consistently defends the
Persian treatment of women against the "brutish impudence"
of the

Parisian women.
Yet the rebellion is more widespread than Usbek

suspects.

The first expression of self by the women in

the seraglio is the disorder described by the chief

black eunuch in Letter LXIV.

Here,

in narcissistic assertions of power.

the women are caught
The wives all de-

mand preference because of their own individual qualities; one more beautiful, one richer, one more loved by

the master.

Their first general expression of hostility

is against themselves,

not their masters.

Characteris-

tically, the only solution envisioned by the eunuch is

punishment, to tighten the web of repression; and Usbek
is only too willing to concede.

must be continuous.

Despotic repression

The self must be caged so that

even partial and momentary escape is not possible.

Any

sign of self-expression must be crushed; any infraction
of the rules must be severely punished.

Only fear, the
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psychological principle of despotic
power, succeeds in
controlling.
Rica,

not Usbek,

recognizes this and foreshadows

the disaster about to overtake the
seraglio.
so he echoes the major themes
of the work.

in doing

The repres-

sion of nature in the Persian treatment
of women distorts them and their relations with
men.
Self-expression is necessary to them, but it is
only available to
them under despotism through fear:

With us their (women) characters are all
the same because they are forced into a mold.
We don't see people as they really are but as
they are forced to be.
In that servitude of
heart and mind there is talk only of fear,
which has but one language, and no talk of
nature which expresses itself in such varied
ways and appears under so many forms
[mv~
emphasis
.

Parisian life has shown him another model where women
are free.

In all ways the veils are lifted.

Only by

leaving Persian life altogether and entering Parisian
life can Rica recognize the true natural equality of men
and women.
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But Usbek cannot leave the seraglio and

he cannot understand Rica's enlightened view of women.
The letters immediately following Rica's describe the

confusion in the seraglio and Usbek

'

s

exhortation to

his wives to beware that their insolence must be puni

shed
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But inside the harem Usbek

become more daring.

'

s

wives continually

In Letter CXLVII the grand
eunuch

informs Usbek that anarchy and open
rebellion reign.
Zelis on a journey to a mosque let
down her veil in
sight of a crowd, and Zachi was caught
in bed with one
of her women slaves.
Men are caught in the seraglio,
and even many eunudhs and other slaves
have been won
over.
Usbek 's only response is to order greater

punishment
The punishment is destined only to drive the
women

to further action.
end.

Earlier, Zelis had foreshadowed the

As early as Letter CXII she began to penetrate
her

master's rule:
Nature, industriously bent on the welfare of men, has not limited herself to giving
desires to them. She wanted us to have our
own and chose that we should be the living
instruments of men's felicity
And yet,
Usbek, you must not imagine that your lot is
happier than mine.
I have enjoyed here a
thousand pleasures unknown to you. My imagination has worked untiringly to make me appreciate them properly.
I have lived, and you
have only languished.
Even in this very prison where you hold
me, I am freer than you.
You could not possibly redouble your concern for guarding me
without my drawing pleasure from your worry.
Your suspicions, your jealousy, and your
heartaches are all so many proofs of your

....

dependency
Later, her final letter penetrates her relation to Usbek
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even further.

The cruelty inflicted on her
cannot take

away her joy at having asserted
her independence and in
the process her master's destruction:
From a thousand leagues distance, you
judge me
guilty.
From a thousand leagues distance, you
are punishing me
It is the tyrant who
offends me, not the man carrying out his tyranny
You can, at your fancy, double your
cruel treatment. My heart has found calm
since it is no longer able to love you. Your
soul has brought its own debasement on itself,
and you are becoming cruel.
Be assured that
you are not happy.
.

.

.

.

Zelis,

not Usbek, has won

—the

slave has freed herself,

and the punishment inflicted on the master is greater

than the cruelty he caused to be inflicted on his
slaves
Yet Zelis' reaction lacks something fundamental.

While accepting her triumph she accepts the relation
with Usbek.

Her pleasure comes from her power to man-

ipulate her husband to her own advantage.

Having

learned to be content with the mutually destructive

relationship she has no wish to change it.
Roxane

'

s

reaction, however, goes further.

Her

actions have a quality which those of other characters
lack

— reflexivity.

As is the case with the other wives

and eunuchs she can only recognize herself through her

master, reflecting a central tenet of Montesquieu's
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theory of man, that men (and women)
can only recognize
themselves through others. Moderation,
which Montesquieu establishes as the general moral
rule, demands
that judgments be made by relating
the self to others.
The dialectic of master and slave in the
seraglio demonstrates the disorder and destruction which
occurs
when moderation is lacking. Rather than
recognizing

their common humanity in others, the characters
in the
seraglio recognize others as either impediments to
their
actions and desires or as tools to satisfy them.

Within

the despotic way of life social relationships are in

essence technocratic

— one's

relationship with another

is determined solely by how that other can be useful
to

your own ends; one remains both master and slave.

Zelis

can penetrate the unnaturalness of this utilitarian perspective on social intercourse but remains in it.

She

remains content that the contradiction in her character

between her submission to and domination of her master
is mutual.

She does not act against it.

Only Roxane

rises above it, recognizing the contradiction as part
of her social situation,

natural self.

leaving her free to assert her

She has indeed abjured Usbek

'

s

(and des-

potism's) laws and asserted the law of nature.
Zelis
Roxane' s.

's

self -assertat ion is less dramatic than

In Usbek 's own eyes his most faithful and
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virtuous wife, Roxane is in fact the
most assertive.
She manipulates the master-slave
relation in order to
assert her freedom and independence.
Her rebellion and

suicide are indeed virtuous, the only truly
virtuous
acts in the seraglio.
She has led the rebellion
and

even more than Zelis has turned the psychology
of des-

potism back on her master.
to natural self-expression.

All along she sought a way
So long as the veils seemed

to cover the situation, so long as her virtue seemed
to
be that prescribed by the customs of despotism,

able to manipulate Usbek
tage.

'

s

she was

jealousy to her own advan-

But this alone does not satisfy her.

Along with

her suicide her final letter declares her freedom and
the struggle of all the women for free self-expression:
How could you have thought that I was naive
enough to imagine that I was put in the world
only to adore your whims? That while you pampered yourself with everything, you should
have the right to mortify all my desires? No!
I might have lived in servitude, but I have
always been free.
I have rewritten your laws
after the laws of nature, and my spirit has
ever sustained itself in independence ....
My language, no doubt, seems new to you.
Could it be that after having overwhelmed you
with sorrow, I should even yet force you to
admire my courage? But it is finished. The
poison consumes me. My strength is leaving
me, the pen falls from my hands.
I feel even
my hatred weaken.
I am dying.

With these lines the Lettres Persanes ends.

Cer-
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tainly, Usbek would not have
understood her new language.
She has given new meaning to the
seraglio; one
closer to a human nature which reflects
the natural aspiration for freedom. But having raised
her virtue to

self-consciousness, she must die, for her
action has
destroyed her master, but not the form of
repression.

Despotism is the real victor.

In it the only self-con-

scious assertion of nature is death.

We can guess that

once Usbek receives Roxane's letter he no longer
thinks
of going back to Persia.

to.

There is nothing to go back

Despotism can only end in self-destruction for both

master and slave.
In terms of the ideals of public action which

Montesquieu develops in De

L'

Esprit des Lois

,

which we

shall discuss in the next chapter, the despotic regime

could have no citizens.

All Montesquieu's work is ani-

mated by the fear that the spirit of despotism will

invade government.

Indeed, careful and complex insti-

tutions, often too complex, are necessary to prevent
its intrusion.

The citizen is caught in a dilemma:

to

assert oneself in such a way as to support political

stability and the public good, while recognizing the

validity of self interest as free according to its own
nature.

The classical categories are not helpful for
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the self can no longer be understood
as a simple function of one's place in society. The
choice cannot be
simply between the private good or the
public good.
The modern citizen must be both
self-interested and

public spirited.

Both of these categories are new with

the rise of the modern state.

Both public and private

action are expressions of the self, and it is the
com-

bination of this expression of self which classical

philosophy did not know.
concepts of

'1

'esprit'

In De L' Esprit des Lois the

and the principle of a form of

government will forge new ground in a theory of citizenship.

The contours of legitimate public action must

be the expression of self within a particular social
and

political setting.

CHAPTER

V

CITIZENSHIP IN MODERATE GOVERNMENTSTHE UNIVERSAL POLITICS OF DE L
ESPRIT PES
'

T.OT...

The Lettres Persanes begins to
probe the nature of
the internal rationality of subjectivity,
attempting to
show that the self strives for freedom and
that subjective action is a product of the dialectical
confronta-

tion of the individual self with the outside
world of
social and political institutions. The
"Considerations
Sur Les Causes de la Grandeur des Remains et de
leur

Decadence," takes on a different dimension of the
problem,

arguing that human history itself, while seeming

to be purely subjective and accidental, likewise has a

rationality to

it

which can be described in terms of

general laws and causes.

However, De L' Esprit des Lois

seeks a universal description of the rationality of the

social world.

But the fictional mode of the Lettres

Persanes which approaches a psychoanalytic perspective
on the rationality of the subject, and the history of

the decline of Rome which explains a method of capturing
the internal dialectic of historical development, uses

specific concrete details to demonstrate that rationality.

De L' Esprit des Lois goes further.
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The subjective dimension of
individuality requires
freedom, as the Lettres Persanes
demonstrates. LikeL'

Esprit des Loi

.

does not ignore this dimen-

sion.

Liberty remains the supreme value of
political
and social life.
But Montesquieu's concept of 1'
esprit
general is complex: indeed too complex,
for it is

plagued by

a fundamental contradiction.

The dialec-

tical rationality of subjectivity described
both in

Montesquieu's moral theory as well as in the Lettres
Persanes tends to give way in De

L'

Esprit des Lois but

its various components are not reconciled.

The concept

of 1' esprit recognizes that subjective action is crucial

to social life; this is the essential notion of
the
'principle' of a government.

But

1

'esprit also contains

a more formal view of political inst i tut ions

two aspects of

1'

These

.

esprit are incompatible and lead to con-

tradictory implications for the theory of citizenship.
The concept of

1'

esprit general describes what

might be called a 'universal politics.'^

It

unifies

under a single term all of the particular elements of
social life.

— its customs,
present — its economic

Not only a nation's past

traditions and laws

— but

also its

structure, current constitution, and class structure

come together into a single system of relations.
are all

'laws'

They

in the sense that their connections are
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regular patterns that can be understood
by an observer.
In view of a theory of citizenship, 1
'esprit general
contains two crucial dimensions, the requisites
of

political action and the institutionalization of
stitution and political organization.

a

con-

Montesquieu de-

fines the first in terms of a political education
nec-

essary to encourage appropriate behavior in citizens,

both in their public and private lives, and in terms of
the concept of the 'principle' of a form of government.
The institutional dimension is described by a complex

system of interconnected relations of particulars, in-

cluding both moral and physical causes, as well as constitutional balance among class interests.

The purpose

of this chapter is to trace these two dimensions of
1'

esprit general, to demonstrate how Montesquieu util-

izes the ideology of the ancient constitution and the

conservative idea of tradition to unify them, and finally to draw the implications for the theory of citizenship.

The conclusion of the dissertation will con-

tinue the discussion of Montesquieu's theory of citizenship in general and will draw some conclusions for a

contemporary theory of citizenship.
I.

1.

L'Esprit as Political Action

The 'principle' of a form of government

.

Chapter
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Two of Book

I

of De L' Esprit des Loi

seems to affi riti
.

the Hobbesian method of arguing from
a state of nature

governed by natural laws which "derive uniquely
from the
constitution of our being" (p. 235). His picture
of

this state of nature seems like the reverse of
Hobbes

Men have no positive laws to hold their ambition
in
check, as in Hobbes

'

s

state of perpetual war; but the

result of this, according to Montesquieu, is mutual

perception of weakness.

But Montesquieu's critique of

Hobbes is deeper; indeed, it is another version of his

critique of rationalist contract theory, similar to the
critique he articulated in the myth of the Troglodytes.

Montesquieu's model of the transition to civil society
appeals to a model of growth based upon the needs and
'sentiments' of men.

Speculative ideas must come to men

after considerable social and historical development.

Each law of nature develops as a plausible consequence
of man's nature.

There is no rigorous deductive logic,

but rather, the inquiry seems guided by a notion of

temporal experience.

It

is more akin to a notion of

political anthropology than to an abstract rationalist
foundation of society.

Montesquieu's view of the psychology of the citizen
is embodied in his theory of the principle of a govern-

ment.

The fundamental purpose of the principle of a
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government is to establish the basis
on which individuals can participate in a public
life which derives its
meaning and legitimacy from the context
of their freedom
to pursue their private interest.
Each government has a principle which
activates

it— which

sets it in motion.

This principle represents

the psychological orientation which individuals
must
have in order for their personal self -understanding
s to
be consistent with the public interest.

Within each

government this principle unites action in civil society
with action in the state.

honor in

a

Virtue in a republic, or

monarchy, makes demands on the political and

social structure which unit them into a general system.

Commerce provides a clear example.
In Book V,

Chapter

9

Montesquieu asserts that "it

is necessary that the laws favor commerce to the utmost

extent that the government can."

Yet it must be forbid-

den to the nobility and reserved to the non-noble population.

If

necessary it must be forced on them.

The

court life of the privileged noble, necessary to monar-

chy and based upon the principle of honor, requires that
the nobility remain free from the obligation to work in

order to pursue the rewards of court life.

The com-

merce which the common people engage in must be controlled with the purpose of creating a surplus in order to
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support the non-productive noble class.

As Montesquieu

puts it, the purpose of commerce in a
monarchy must be
directed "to the end that the subjects may be
able,

without perishing, to satisfy the continually
growing
needs of the prince and his court.

""^

in order to

further this purpose taxes must be kept moderate.

The

laws must balance the needs of the king and the
court

without being so heavy that they discourage the spirit
of work,

either by allowing too great affluence among

commoners or too severe poverty.
In a republic,

more complex effect.

on the other hand, commerce has a
The spirit of commerce tends to-

ward economic expansion and the production of luxuries

which undermines the simple manners required of republican virtue.

Yet when guided by the proper spirit of

moderation and work commerce can be beneficial to
public.

a re-

Montesquieu repeats here the praise of the

commerce of economy which his political economy of the
state system had led him to in earlier essays.
spirit of commerce," he asserts,
of frugality,

"The

"encourages the spirit

of economy, of moderation, of work, of

wisdom, of tranquility, of order and of rule."

Wealth

has no evil effects in a republic so long as it is

directed towards commerce.

commerce is

a means to the

Unlike monarchies wherein

sustenance of an unproductive
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class, in republics commerce is
the supreme end of the
political economy, and all laws should
be directed to
sustain it.
Evil results, in Montesquieu's view,
not

from riches themselves but only "when
the excess of
riches destroys this spirit of commerce."^
if any

semblance of republican virtue is to remain
in modern
republics, the pure principle of republics,
what

Montesquieu calls 'political virtue' must be commingled
with the commercial spirit. At times he even
seems
to

speak as if the spirit of commerce must replace the
spirit of self-sacrifice for the public good which he

calls political virtue:
In order to maintain the spirit of commerce,
is necessary that the principal citizens
do it themselves; that this spirit alone
rules, and may not be crossed (croise) by any
other; that all the laws favor it; that these
same laws, by their provisions, divide fortunes in the same measure that commerce promotes them, thus giving each poor citizen
enough (grande aisance) so that he will be
able to work as the others, while keeping
each rich citizen at a level of such mediocrity that he must work in order to conserve
or to acquire.
it

What the principles of both monarchies and republics share is a certain form:

each must reflect, and

be reflected in, the manners of civil society.

It

must

describe the citizen's action in society far more than
in politics.

But a peculiar situation results for the
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principle of a government, as
chapter.

Vrtiile

I

will show later in this

showing that the action of the citizen

constitutes politics, Montesquieu tends
to argue that
this action (paradoxically) takes place
in a sphere

which is public but not political.

This renders the

actual relation between society and the
political
sphere problematic.^
.

In Montesquieu's eyes the most important
implica-

tion of the principle of a government is that

it

allows

for discussion about the liberty of the citizen in
a way

that does not undermine the security of the state.

The

principle allows Montesquieu to describe how states retain a coherent identity and stability over time by

guiding an explanation of how citizens constitute the
government.

Machiavelli had argued that the orientation

of citizens towards the rule of the Prince was crucial

to the stability of the state.

But he described their

mutual relation purely in terms of antagonism and power.
The citizens checked the ambitions of the Prince as the

Prince sought to manipulate the beliefs of citizens.
Social coherence over time would result from the widespread acceptance of a civil religion.

Indeed, civil

religion provided the sphere within which Machiavelli
argued citizens could recapture a spirit of republican
virtue.

Within a civil religion a common identity
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shared by both the citizens and ruler
could emerge.

In

this sense the 'principle' of a form of
government describes a kind of civil religion, except
giving much

greater emphasis to its origins within the
historical
context of particular nations.

The concept of the

principle of a government allowed Montesquieu to retain

Machiavelli's insight that the self -interpretat ion of
citizens had to constitute political rule while explain
ing more fully the roots of social cohesion.

In short,

the principle demonstrates why legitimacy is crucial to

providing for both stability and social cohesion.
2.

The role of political education

In general,

.

the

principle can be specified for each form of government.
In a particular government the principle derives from

the general nature of the government and is related in-

timately to the general spirit described by the moeurs
and manieres peculiar to that particular society.

Edu-

cation, the major purpose of which Montesquieu describe
as to prepare men to be good citizens,

7

must consis-

tently reproduce the principle in the citizens.

This

education is conceived experient ially since citizens
receive

it

by acting and observing the world.

cation of the citizen according to

a

By edu-

principle of gov-

ernment Montesquieu clearly means not merely narrowly
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political or intellectual education but
emotional and
moral education as well. Our orientation
to others
distinguishes different types of education, producing
different moeurs and manieres within different
types of
governments
.The

moeurs and manieres which derive from education

according to the principle of monarchy exhibit a com-

plexity that those of republics and despotisms do not.
Honor derives from our orientation towards others as

perceived always through ourselves.

All actions are

reflected through our own self-esteem, our own amourpropre.

All components of honor

— nobility

in virtues,

'franchise' in moeurs and politeness in manners

—derive

from turning the self back on itself; from self -absorption, not direct concern for others.

The virtues that one shows (montre) to us
there are always less that which one owes to
others, than that which one owes to oneself:
they are not so much those that call us towards our fellow citizens, as those which
distinguish us from them.^

Education in

a

monarchy is a social education in which

the person learns to identify self as always in competi-

tion with other similar selves for favors and recognition granted by the crown.

It

is not,

indeed cannot,

be political; it is an education for a non-political
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public.

The nobility is the recipient of honors,
not

their creators.

Montesquieu describes its chief concern

as the training of the heart, the grooming
of the pas-

sions. 9

Education in a monarchy takes place in soci-

ety itself,

for only there can the citizens learn how

to distinguish themselves from others.

Education in general is defined by Montesquieu as
"consisting principally in living with others. "'^
Hence, education has a crucial social function for a

monarchy, but it must have little or no role in a des-

potism.

Fear, the principle of despotic states,

quires isolation not amity.

re-

As the Lettres Persanes

continually made clear, despotisms run most smoothly
when people are completely isolated from one another.
Despotic regimes fear the mutual felicity which charac-

terizes moderate regimes.

As the discussion in the last

chapter demonstrates the orientation of selves to others
in a despotism is purely technical, as objects to be

manipulated for one's own purposes.
izens,

if the

In a despotism cit-

participants can actually be called citi-

zens, do not learn to live with others, but are forced,

through the principle of fear, to live against others.
Education is most important in a republic whose

principle is political virtue.

Action which produces

republican virtue is exclusively other-directed,

it

is
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self-renunciation in favor of the public interest.
Citizens must love the state and thereby each

other.

For example, unlike its place in a monarchy
the family

has a major role in republican education.

It must

teach

children those moral rules which will lead them to
identify their private interest with the public interest.
On the death of a comrade in war, the Troglodyte repub-

licans fought with fury to avenge simultaneously the

death of the beloved friend or relative and the attack
on the state. 12

In peace,

sons and neighbors would

rise early in the day in order to complete a neighbor's

work before he awoke.

In the minds of citizens, public

and private duties are thus in principle indistinguish-

able

.

The importance of Book IV of De L'Esprit des Lois
on education cannot be overestimated for Montesquieu's

theory of citizenship.

Education based upon the prin-

ciple of the government produces the subjective spirit
of the society.

By

1

'esprit Montesquieu means the eth-

ical and moral orientation of action.

(The second half

of this chapter will show that he also uses it in a

contradictory sense.)

It

represents the way people must

act in order to be virtuous in a particular society, all

societies having their own particular spirit.

This

spirit governs a society by establishing rules of sev-
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eral types:

rules which guide the making of

laws— all
laws must be appropriate (convenable)
to the spirit; and
rules which guide social action in civil
and political
society— e.g., commercial and moral relationships
among
individuals in everyday life.

in addition,

1'

esprit,

as a conceptualization of these relationships,
makes the

meaning of social institutions and practices
objectively
available.

In other words,

it

provides the basis on

which institutions in a particular society are to be
judged both useful and legitimate.

grounding principles

— the

It

establishes the

universe of moral discourse

which must be subjectively incorporated by each and
every citizen in order for it to be possible to deter-

mine the proper direction of state power and the adequacy of particular laws in a particular society.
3.

Liberty and Montesquieu's analysis of power

.

The

subjective dimension of social life which Montesquieu
uses the concept of the principle to describe culminates
in his notion of liberty.

More than any other notion,

the concept of liberty unifies the principle with the

form of government.

Liberty is necessary in order to

preserve the autonomous interests and aspirations of
individual citizens while providing for the security of
the state as a whole.
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We can now appreciate fully
Montesquieu's idea of
liberty 'for the citizen' ('dans le
citoyen')!^
^

consequence of the principle of

a government.

The con-

cept of the principle implies that citizens
are autono-

mous individuals making their own judgments
on the

basis of perceptions of their particular interests
and

desires.

For Montesquieu, this autonomy must have a

social side— these personal judgments must be based
upon
a socially

constituted self -interpretation.

Citizens'

actions must conform to certain norms and practices

which grow out of their nation's history and culture.
The root of Montesquieu's notion of liberty is the rec-

ognition that the government must respect this intersubjective cultural and social realm.

One of Montesquieu's

central principles, which he holds to as firmly as any
of the philosophes,

erced by the

laws."'"^

is that the mind should not be co-

Neither should the collectivity

infringe on the citizen's physical well being or on the
integrity of his individual person without public jus-

tification.

Hence,

in Montesquieu's eyes the greatest

threat to the liberty of the citizen is that of unfair
or irrational punishment.

It

represents a deceit on

the part of rulers which undermines the int ersubject i ve

bases on which the legitimacy and the stability of the

polity rest.

Criminal punishments then must be careful-
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ly constructed in order to
protect individual integrity,

both physical and intellectual.

The overall interpre-

tive principle of clarity and fairness
in punishment
which guides Montesquieu here has become
the foundation
of theories of punishment in the modern
state:
It is the triumph of liberty, when
the criminal laws derive each punishment from the
peculiar nature of the crime. All arbitrariness is eradicated; punishment does not in the
least derive from the caprice of the legislature, but from its own nature; and this is not
the man who does violence to man. 15

More generally the liberty of the citizen consists
in certain rules of right:

religious toleration; mod-

eration and care in the accusation of crimes; strict
specificity of the crime of lese-majeste
of thought.

;

and freedom

But Montesquieu is careful always to stress

the point of view of the citizen.

Hence, his notion of

liberty also contains a less formal dimension.
he insists,

fact:

Liberty,

is as much a matter of perception as of

"It consists in security,

one has of his security

""'•^
.

or in the opinion that

Mere formal liberty em-

bodied in the constitutional separation of powers is

insufficient to create and describe liberty.
happen,

"

declares Montesquieu, "that the constitution

will be free, and the citizen not
free,

"It can

and the constitution not." 1

— the

citizen can be

The citizen and
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the constitution must be free both 'in
right and in
fact.'

In other words,

liberty depends on adequate

institutional and constitutional protections,
as well
as on the recognition by citizens that they
are

in fact

free.

If either condition is lacking,

solves.

liberty dis-

Liberty requires both what Montesquieu calls

'philosophic liberty' and 'political liberty:'

Philosophic liberty consists in the exercise
of his [citizen's] will, or at least (if it
is necessary to speak of all systems) in the
opinion that the citizen has that he is actu-

ally exercising his will.
Political liberty
consists in the security, or at least in the
opinion that a citizen has of his security. 18

Liberty is a central element of a universal theory in

which right and interest are carefully enmeshed, each
in the other.

The theory of the citizen requires both

a formal theory of citizenship as a theory of rights and

obligations, and a theory of political action that reflects the subjective elements of the person qua person.

One of Montesquieu's central and most famous argu-

ments is that liberty, one of the ends of the constitution, belongs to moderate governments.

essarily has limits and

it

Since power nec-

corrupts those who have it,

the constitutional device necessary to protect liberty
is that

'

le pouvoir arrete le pouvoir.'^^
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Political liberty is found only in moderate
governments.
But it is not always such in
moderate states: it is there only when power
is not abused; but it is an eternal experience
that each man who has acquired power is driven
to abuse it; he uses it until he meets its
limits.
Indeed, even virtue has need of
limits. 20
We must not confuse Montesquieu's argument with Hobbes's

argument that men are by nature driven by an insatiable
thirst for power.

It is crucial to understand how they

are different.

Montesquieu is not arguing that men by nature seek
power, but that power tends to corrupt those who have
it.

This is radically different from Hobbes's argument

that the natural drive for power requires an absolute

sovereign to hold it in check.

Hobbes's absolutist con-

clusions follow from the natural psychology of men

—that

their innate aggressiveness and the necessary struggle
for social survival requires the formation of a politi-

cal power sufficient to repress the drive to assert

power over others.

He defines power in purely instru-

mental terms as the successful manipulation of objects,
saying nothing about its internal dynamic.

Since all

men act on the same power drive, men must address each
other as objects to be manipulated.
self-fulfilling.

If one

The argument is

accepts Hobbes's assumption

about human nature, there is no choice but to act ac-
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cording to it.

Presuming others will act the same
way,

a fundamental point of Hobbes's
theory,
it

anyone denying

would be at a severe, indeed fatal,
disadvantage.

The subject has no choice but to act
according to the

principles of pure power.

Social relations, then, con-

sidered by either individuals or the sovereign,
must be
objects of manipulation.
In the Lettres Persanes
.

Montesquieu argued that this instrumental view of citizens was characteristic of despotism; but as this
chap-

ter will show, this is not true of free governments.

Hobbes's nominalism is the consistent and necessary

outcome of his view of the psychology of power.
Montesquieu's argument about the checking of power
in the state, however,

is of a very different sort.

argument that once men attain power

it

His

corrupts them

describes the dynamic of power, not the psychology of
the men who hold it.

Further,

it

implies a central

distinction that Hobbes's theory denies between power
and authority.

If

power can be corrupt, there must be

limits which define its legitimate use.

Indeed,

for

Montesquieu, power and authority, coupled in the concept
of law,

are the defining concepts of the state.

ternal dynamic of power, which is that

it

The in-

is self-per-

petuating, tending towards a pattern of continual and

unlimited expansion, leads to conflicts with authority,
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the state's principle of legitimacy.

Liberty must then

consist in preserving the balance
between power and authority, defining and protecting the
sphere of legitimate public action from tyranny.
Public space, then,
must incorporate a balance between interest
and right.
By collapsing power and authority in
the absolute
sovereign, Hobbes is caught in a fatal
solipsism.
His

conception of politics dissolves right into
interests,
leaving no room for public discourse about the
public
interest.
In Hobbes' Leviathan the public interest can
be defined only in terms of the private interest of the
sovereign.

The sovereign even creates the language of

debate out of his own will; public meaning is what
the
sovereign chooses.

Men cannot talk to one another with-

out being dependent on the sovereign's will.

Hobbes

'

argument moves from the completely private (natural man)
to the completely public (leviathan), in the process

depriving both categories of meaning.

As Bodin recog-

nized more than half a century before Hobbes, public

space has no meaning if not counterposed to private
space, an insight which Montesquieu revives.

There

is no public interest if there is not private interest

and vice-versa.

Where there is no distinction between

public and private, the modern state becomes
or in Montesquieu's typology a despotism.

a tyranny,

Montesquieu's
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theory of liberty as dependent upon
state power, then,
rejects rather than confirms Hobbes
assumptions ^2
.

'

He is concerned with the internal
dynamic of power and
its institutionalization.
Power does not include the

whole dynamic of human psychology.

Thus, Montesquieu's

doctrine of the checking of powers in the
constitution
(unlike that of the American founders) rejects
the Hob-

bessian characterization as descriptive of human psychology.
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In order to unify politics from the point of view
of the citizen and from the point of view of the state,

the concept of

1'

esprit general must describe how indi-

vidual action can have public meaning.

Montesquieu's

notion of liberty tries to do this by demarcating the

private life of the citizen in which he acts legitimately according to his own perception of his interest with-

in publically prescribed and clearly articulated limits,

from the public life of politics.

L'Esprit general must

somehow unify this private sphere with the public sphere
of politics.

Next

I

will develop Montesquieu's notion

of political space which constitutes the second dimen-

sion of

1'

esprit

—the

which laws emerge.

institutional framework out of
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II.

1.

L'Esprit as Political Sp ace

Liberty and the notion of I'esprit
general

.

L'esprit

general is a nexus of all relations both
physical and
moral:
"Several things govern men: climate;
religion;
laws; maxims of government; examples of
past events;

moeurs; manieres; I'esprit general results

these."

24

f

rom

This spirit characterizes the particular

society, the 'nation,' each distinct from all others

because of a different configuration of such causes.
Oriental nations are governed more by their physical

causes in general and strict political laws; their
moral laws tend to atrophy and their societies remain

unchanged in basic structure for long periods of time.
England, on the other hand, combines felicitous physical

circumstances (on the water, temperate climate) with
judicious legal and intellectual traditions producing a

greater level of freedom than any other nation.
combines

a wide

France

ranging climate (and hence diverse eco-

nomic possibilities) with an abundant population and a
solid constitutional tradition which allows for the

emergence of the best of monarchies.

This relativism

of possible regimes based upon different configurations
of the same basic range

(or

'types'

in more modern lan-

guage) of causes is one of Montesquieu's most important
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arguments, for it alone establishes
the grounding on
which particular polities can be
understood.
To the extent that any one of these
causes
acquires greater force in a nation, the
causes are weakened. Nature and climate other
virtually dominate savages, manieres
the Chinese, laws are the tyrants in govern
Japan,
moeurs once set the tone of life in Sparta,
as did their maxims of government and
ancient
moeurs for the Romans. 25

Certainly there is an implied hierarchy among
various
causes.

Although each society is to be accepted on its

own terms, those in which moral rather than physical

causes predominate are closer to Montesquieu's ideal of
good government, i.e., moderate government.

But general

classification on moral terms is fruitless and misleading.

Moral judgments must be made on the level of par-

ticular societies, determining how closely they approximate moderate governments and what physical and moral

factors are involved in each regime.
Liberty is a yardstick for measuring the extent to

which the circumstances allow the citizens to be free.
"I

would want to discover," Montesquieu says in conclu-

sion to Book XI on liberty in the constitution,

"within

all moderate governments that we are acquainted with,
what is the distribution of the three powers, and to

calculate by

it the

degrees of liberty that each of them
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may enjoy." 26

Liberty of the constitution, institu-

tionalized in the separation and systematic
balance of
powers, is a precondition of moderate
governments which
establishes a basis of judgment of them.
In keeping with his general distinction in
viewing

liberty from the point of view of the citizen and
the

point of view of government,

it

is important that we

keep in mind his distinction between this form of liberty and the liberty of the citizen.

the citizen, as

I

The liberty of

suggested above, requires the spirit

of moderation above all with regard to punishment.

This distinction derives from the dual nature of the

modern political subject
ruled.

— as

simultaneously actor and

Inappropriately severe punishments will delegi-

timize rule, possibly precipitating revolution and certainly causing the government to degenerate into a despotism.

Liberty, then, consists in both a formal con-

stitutional balance of the various powers that make up
the state as well as a spirit of moderation emanating

from the legislation; both are constitutive of Montes-

quieu's notion of liberty. 27

In short,

liberty de-

fines the moral contours of the modern political space.

2.

The forms of government

.

The language of theory has

changed in order to retain the empirical force of the
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forms of government while finding a new way
of describing the moral content of government

.

Forms of gov-

ernment no longer describe the central moral
predicament
of politics as they once did.

Having indicated a neces-

sary relativisation of argument about the forms of
gov-

ernment, Montesquieu must rewrite the moral language of

politics in terms which take into account the historical
development of particular polities.
Chapter Six of Book XI, the famous chapter on the

constitution of England, marks a decisive shift in the
language of modern political theory.

Whether the de-

scription of the English constitution is correct or not,
the importance of the formulation of the argument is
clear.

Having simplified the typology of governments

from those of classical through Renaissance theory,

Montesquieu has hinted that the very mode of argument
must be replaced.

The very nature of the modern state

has come to limit the moral descript i veness of the pre-

vious forms of government.
The primary function of the forms of government in

Montesquieu's new typology is to organize the institutions of society into a coherent framework.

In short,

they provide a general description of the political
space of particular societies.
sense,

Political space, in this

is not merely the physical forum of Greek democ-
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racy, but a more ontological dimension
of politics which

combines the psychological, physical, legal
and moral
orientations of legitimate political actors.

In a re-

public, that space must be opened to all
citizens—all
must have access, at least formally, to state
power.

A

monarchy organizes the state around a single person
according to fixed rules (laws); its political space
is
clearly delimited by the rule of laws which are simply
stated and clearly presented.

citizens.

They must not confuse

Legitimacy in a monarchy is determined by the

clarity of this space, that the monarch acts according
to publically known rules.

Political space is least

bounded, finally, in a despotism.
of limits,

despot.

Its limits, or lack

are set by the power and the will of the

In a sense public space has no meaning at all

in a despotism,

for the distinction betv/een public and

private life, without which public space would have no
meaning, may be dissolved at any moment by despotic
action.

The citizens (if indeed there are any) can

never be sure of the limits of public action and hence

can never be secure in private.
Lett res Persanes

,

The seraglio of the

Montesquieu's fictional picture of the

despotic way of life is thoroughly politicized.
when Usbek
of nature"

'

s

29

Even

wives stand before him in the "simplicity
they do so because of Usbek

'

s

power over
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them, not because of their own choice.

Echoing Montes-

quieu's ideal of justice, public space must be defined
by the public limits on power.

Absolutist monarchy is

more akin to Montesquieu's description of despotism than
of monarchy,
Its.

30

for in the end it knows only private lim-

Although both Bodin's and Hobbes

'

sovereigns

are technically limited by natural law, political pru-

dence, and,

in Bodin's case by the fundamental laws of

the kingdom, there is no public means of debate, no

clear binding rules for the limitation of power which
can be known by citizens.

Constraints on the monarch's

power ought to be obeyed by the monarch (for Hobbes as
well as Bodin) but he also must be free to ignore them.
In a despotism, power is free but citizens not.

In both

republics and monarchies, citizens are free only when

power is not.
In Montesquieu's view the central moral distinction

between different governments is between despotic and
moderate regimes not between the particular forms of
government per se.

In this sense only despotic regimes

have a 'moral,' or more correctly 'immoral,' nature

which is specific to it.

Both monarchies and republics

as forms of government have several legitimate varia-

tions.

The crucial determinants of the legitimacy of

rule are not intrinsic to these forms of government
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themselves, as they were, for example,
for Plato.
Rather, the moral content of governments
is described
by two principles which transcend the
particular forms
of

government— liberty and moderate rule.
The general end of all states is security
over

time. 31

To this end the form of the government is

crucial.

The principles of action must be in accord

with the constitution.
serves the purpose

Each form has a variant which

well— the federative

republic and the

pure monarchy based upon the privileges of intermediary

powers (nobility).

But both of these have a common

characteristic which to Montesquieu is most important

both variants survive because they preserve moderation.
Indeed even these variants will have to be modified

according to the particular circumstances of a nation:
climate, geography, demography, etc.

.

.

.

Hence the

chapter on the English constitution is descriptive of a
remarkable hybrid ("a republic under the cloak of a monarchy")

32

which has had great success over time.

it also has another point as well:

But

to describe an exam-

ple of the internal mechanisms of government, the sep-

aration of powers, which are necessary for stability and
liberty in the modern state, regardless of the form of

government

.

Again we can understand Montesquieu's argu-

me nt more fully by tracing how it is similar and differ-
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ent from the classical Greek
theory.

Montesquieu's use of the language of
the forms of
government has a dual purpose: to
simultaneously answer
Machiavelli's use of the forms of
government as merely
a descriptive formulation of
the rules necessary for the

preservation of the state, as well as Bossuet
proper form of government, absolute monarchy,
from God's will and is his earthly agent.

•

s

that the

derives

Plato's for-

mulation certainly provides an alternative,
including
within each government its moral opposite.
Democracy,

aristocracy and monarchy, for Plato, have no meaning

unless counterposed to their corrupt forms; the failure
to attain the end of security is necessarily
linked to

moral depravity.

Montesquieu's view is similar.

The

failure to achieve security has necessary moral as
well
as political implications.

he argues,

Corruption of a government,

is always precipitated by the corruption of

its principle (Book VIII), just as for Plato the form
of government becomes corrupt following the corruption
of the psychology of the citizen.

The depravity of gov-

ernment must be explained by its own internal dynamic,
as Montesquieu explained the fall of Rome.

Yet the

moral consequences for Montesquieu are different than
they are for Plato.

So long as the government remains

moderate it can freely shift from republic to monarchy
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or to some combination (such
as England) whereby the
legislator corrects for the changes
in the general spirit.
The language of the forms of
government cannot describe adequately the moral shift,
as it could for
Plato.
For that, Montesquieu requires
the more general
ends of government, liberty and
moderat ion,
which

although not absent from ancient republics,
are more
appropriate to the modern state.
Political theory must adopt a new focus in
order
to describe the moral content of the modern
state.

The

moral shift consequent of the decay of governments
is
from a moderate government to a despotism.
"Democracy
and aristocracy are not free states by
their nature,"

Montesquieu insists.

Rather,

"political liberty is

found only within moderate governments."*^^

Plato's

transcendentalism could explain neither the subtlety of
the moral implications of bureaucratic organization

nor

the implications of the complexity of public life in
the

modern state.

Neither could Machiavelli nor Bossuet.

Given the nature of the modern political subject, liberty must become an irrepressible concept in the modern

theory of the state.
archy,

In Montesquieu's account even mon-

in which liberty has not been traditionally ac-

cepted as necessary, must rely on the spirit of liberty,

although developing it only indirectly:
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The monarchies that we know do not have
liberty as their object directly, as those of
which we have just spoken; they tend only to
the glory of the citizens, the state and the
Prince.
But from this glory results a spirit
of liberty which, in these states, is able to
do as great things, and perhaps to contribute
as much to goodness as liberty itself.
The three powers are not there distributed and founded on the constitutional model
of which we just spoke (England).
They have
each a particular distribution according to
which they more or less approach political
liberty; and if they do not approach it, the
monarchy will degenerate into despotism. 36

The overwhelming moral importance of moderation is

reflected also in the beginning of Book XXIX, the book

which concludes the theoretical discussion of De
L'

Esprit des Lois and which many commentators believe

IS the true end of the book. 37

Here, Montesquieu

declares that the intent of his major book, his life's
work, was to prove that "the spirit of moderation ought

to be that of the legislator; the political good, as the

moral good, can always be found between two limits.

""^^

The moral spirit of moderation must permeate the esprit

general of any nation regardless of its particular form
of government.
L' Esprit

general is the central discovery and or-

ganizing principle of De

L'

Esprit des Lois .

In so far

as it sets forth a conception of political space it de-

scribes an interlocking set of institutions and insti-
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tutional relations, physical, social and
political,
unified into a single system according to the
particular

circumstances of each particular state.

This general

attempt to explain social and political life from a

single unified perspective is held together by the two

fundamental moral concepts, liberty and moderation.
Can Montesquieu devise a new language to describe these
ideas?

It

is to his attempts at this definition to

which we now turn.
3.

Citizenship in moderate governments

ning of Chapter Six of Book XI,

.

At the begin-

"Of the Constitution of

England," Montesquieu defines political liberty 'for the
citizen' as:

this tranquility of spirit which derives
from the opinion that each has of his security;
and in order that one have this liberty, it is
necessary that the government be such that a
citizen does not fear another citizen.
.

.

.

The state must secure the citizen's person and property
so that he is free to act without fear.

Just as fear

governs despotisms, the opposite principle governs moderate states.

The private life of the citizen must be

free from arbitrary political repression.

Liberty does

not necessarily manifest itself as participation in

political decisions but as the freedom to utilize one's
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property, including one's body and mind, according
to
one's own interests.

The purpose of law in the broadest

sense of the constitution or fundamental law is to construct an institutional context in which the subject
can
be secure.

But Montesquieu's view here is not one of

absolute freedom, for any institutional context itself
requires constraints on the citizen's action.
ing freedom in terms of security,

By defin-

as freedom from fear,

Montesquieu has reconciled liberty with political constraints, so long as those constraints are clearly pub-

licized as laws.

Liberty, then, is not absolute, but

only the freedom to do what the law permit s.^^

This

still leaves Montesquieu with the need to describe how

citizens can legitimately act in public, for they are
not merely private people.

Indeed, the pure privatization of life is another

characteristic of despotism which Montesquieu establishes in contrast to free moderate governments.

Mon-

tesquieu must develop a notion of political action which

describes how citizens can act in the public space established by the system of interlocking institutions and
laws.

He must answer his own criticism of the concept

of interests; the theorist must somehow explain how

self-interest does not represent the private, selfish

concerns of an individual, but can be compatible with
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and reinforce the public interest.

Montesquieu's answer rests upon the
crucial assumption that politics is only a part
of 1' esprit
general.

That spirit describes the whole
of a particular social
life in terms of an interrelationship
of parts, not as
an aggregate of them.
It does not merely describe
a

functional interrelationship, as some
critics who want
to assimilate Montesquieu into the modern
sociological
tradition assume.
There is a fundamental moral purpose to 1' esprit, the protection of the free
subject,

that goes beyond the mere stability of a
stratified

society.

It

strives to establish the context in which

citizens can pursue their own interests while not con-

tradicting the public good.

L'

Esprit general does this

by describing a public sphere in which the citizen acts

which is not political:
ieres.

the world of moeurs and man-

This social world must develop independently of

politics.

Moeurs and manieres cannot be changed by the

laws but through moeurs and manieres themselves.

use of law would

The

'seem too tyrannical.''*'^

The self develops in society not in politics.

The

free autonomous subject that Montesquieu's moral theory

describes is more comfortable in society wherein he can
express himself, pursue his own interests and impress

himself on others.

Action in society derives from in-
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dividual amour-propre.

This is why Montesquieu feels

that in general monarchy is more appropriate
to contem-

porary life than republics.

Modern republicans fail to

realize that political action which supports the
public
good becomes a burden as individuals pursue their own

character and interests, as Montesquieu illustrated in
the development of Troglodyte society.

Given the com-

plexity and extent of the modern state, there is no way
to convert private interests directly into the public
interest

— this

must be done indirectly.

For Montesquieu two solutions are adequate:

the

commercial republic based upon the work ethic in a capitalist economy, and a monarchy based upon the principle
of honor.

In both cases private interests are trans-

formed into the public interest through society.

In

capitalist society individuals are driven by work.

Work

life channels energy into production and acccumulat ion

which leads to the circulation of money and production
of a surplus for the operations of the state.

As we

have seen in Chapter Two above developments in modern

technology allow for increased production and commerce
as well as more rapid and secure circulation of money

through credit and currency stabilization.

These cre-

ate greater wealth for the state while giving all the

citizens a stake in pursuing the public interest.

So
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long as the state acts only to reinforce
the spirit of

moderation, which serves to ward off excess
wealth,

which cuts into the work ethic, individuals can
pursue
their self-interest while producing the public

good."^"^

It

is illustrative to see how women play an
impor-

tant role in Montesquieu's political economy.

They are

the guardians and primary determinants of the contours
of society

action).

(in the sense of public but non-political

The difference between moeurs and manieres is

that the former 'concerns more interior conduct,

the latter concerns 'exterior' conduct.'*^

'

while

Because

they do not respect moderation women tend to deprave
moeurs, but they also determine manieres, in the pro-

cess increasing the demand so necessary to commerce:
The company of women depraves moeurs, and
forms taste: the desire to please more than
others establishes elegance of dress; and the
desire to please more than onself establishes
fashions.
These fashions are important: by
the force of giving oneself over to this
frivolous spirit, one augments without ceasing all the branches of its commerce.

Montesquieu most often seems to speak as

if this were

the nature of women regardless of their particular gov-

ernment.

In pure republics women are dangerous because

their nature inclines them to freedom and in their freedom they are governed by their passions.

The luxury
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which develops must be banned because it undermines the

political virtue necessary to the stability and justice
of the state.

It

is important for my argument to note

that in a pure republic there is no intermediary between

private interest and public interest, the former must
directly be sacrificed to the latter. ^"^

Hence,

in

Montesquieu's view, the action that comes naturally to
women is more appropriate to monarchies where society

can more successfully absorb luxury. 48

Free women are

not rational enough to partake in the direct public con-

sciousness necessary to republics (how different this is
from the model Roxane depicts in the Lett res Persanes

)

Women exercise little restraint in monarchies,
because, the distinction of ranks calling them
to the court, they go there in order to partake of the spirit of liberty which is almost
Each
the only one that is tolerated there.
is served there by their charms and by their
passions in order to advance her fortune; and
as their weakness does not allow them dignity,
but the vanity, luxury always rules them
there. 49
It

seems clear, then, that through this non-political

public society, individuals, men and women in their own
ways, act on their own interests and characters to pro-

duce the public good.
In pure monarchies based upon the principle of

honor the relationship is as clear as

it

is in comraer-
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cial republics based upon the work ethic.

Individuals

act according to their own ambitions; they are purely

concerned with impressing others, all of the action is
refracted through themselves, through their amourpropre. 50

Montesquieu clearly recognizes that this

results in a society based upon deception:

".

.

.

it

is a false honor which leads all the parties of the

state; but this false honor is as useful to the public,
as the truth would be to the individuals capable of at-

taining it."

51

It

is in this context that Montesquieu

uses his famous description that amounts to an 'invisi-

ble hand' as operative in monarchical society:

Honor motivates all the parties of the body
politic; it ties them by its own action: and
it is found that each furthers the common
good, believing that he is furthering his own
individual interests. ^2

Montesquieu has gone to great lengths to distinguish
this public society from politics, and he insists on
the distinction in clear language:

Moeurs and manieres are usages that the laws
have not established, were not able to establish and did not want to establish.
There is this difference between laws
and moeurs, that the laws rule more the action
of the citizen and the moeurs rule more the
actions of men.^-^

Montesquieu's political economy of luxury demon-
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strates most clearly the importance of this non-poli-

tical public sphere.

Luxury represents the excess

riches above what is necessary for physical subsistence,
and it is developed out of the surplus generated by

labor.

54

The primary social function of luxury is to

divide citizens into classes based upon wealth.

In

states where there is complete equality in the 'fortunes' of citizens (it is important that Montesquieu

has come to use fortune here primarily in an economic
sense) the calculus of luxury is equal to zero.

The political function of luxury,
function,
state.

55

related to the social

consists in increasing the wealth of the

These two functions come together in the growth

of modern cities.

VJith Paris

clearly in mind, Montes-

quieu writes:
Luxury is still in proportion with the grandeur of cities, and above all of the capital;
in such a way that it is by reason composed
of the riches of the state, of the inequality
of fortunes of individuals and of the number
of men that are assembled in a certain
place
Indeed, the city represents a new type of market, one
need
based upon unlimited accumulation and the continual

for growth.

The more people there are together in one

place the greater the possibility for self-aggrandizecan rement, the greater the chance that individuals
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fleet their amour-propre in such a way as to distinguish

themselves from others.

Luxury provides the outward

means of expression of this social distinction.^^
Luxury inclines people to act according to selfinterest, not the public interest.

Because of this re-

publics must ban luxury in order to preserve the equality of fortunes necessary to reinforce virtue.

But

in a nation wherein the society, not politics, predomi-

nates,

luxury can have its full effects; the most impor-

tant of which is to create a new type of market based

upon the distinction between 'needs' and 'means.'

This

distinction will become crucial to the nineteenth century political economy of the market, especially Marxist
theory,

in the form of a distinction between use-value

and exchange value.

This distinction creates a new type

of market which nineteenth century political economy

will call a capitalist market:

There results from all that a general inconThose who excel in a profession
venience.
charge for their art the price that they want
even the smallest talents follow this example;
there is no longer a harmony between needs and
means. When I am forced to plead my case in
court, it is necessary that I can pay a lawyer; when I am ill, it is necessary that I can
pay a doctor.
Rather than diminishing commerce, Montesquieu continues,
this new type of market greatly augments it:

"...
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people have more desires, more needs and more
fantasies
when they are together." Luxury, and the market
it produces, requires an economy based upon continual
growth,

and the distinction between a productive and an
unpro-

ductive class.

Furthermore, it does this independently

from politics, and the actors who participate in this

market are not political.
The discussion of women, honor in monarchies and

the political economy of luxury together represent

Montesquieu's argument that citizens act primarily in a
public sphere which is non-political.

In it they can

act according to their own self-interest and still pro-

duce the public interest.

It

remains for me to show

that not only do citizens not act directly to produce

the public good, but that they are essentially frozen
out of it.

The political action appropriate to the

citizen does not take place within political space.
The action and knowledge required by a political space

defined in terms of institutions interacting according
to their own rationality is an objective knowledge of

that system and of the tools necessary to ensure its

proper operation.

That tool which embodies the abstract

rationality of the institutional system of
eral is law.

1'

esprit gen-
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III.

I.

La w;

The Unity of Political Action
and Political Space

The universality of law and

1

'

esprit general

.

Montesquieu, following Gravina, distinguishes between

civil laws which govern the relations of individuals to
one another and political laws which govern the relation
of the citizens to the state.

Together they comprise

the two elements of positive law.
a unity is

'union'

That law is meant as

clear from the description of both as a

(reunion) of particulars.

The political state

is "the union of all particular forces" and the civil

state is "the union of wills.

We have just seen

the important consequences which Montesquieu draws from
the distinction between civil and political spheres of

action; but the principle of their unity is just as

important

—both

are fundamentally systems of law, and

law is always an expression of reason.

Law as abstract

reason retains a static quality in Montesquieu's notion
of politics.

In Book I,

Chapter Three, where he draws

the distinction between the civil and the political, he

declares the universality of law as human reason:
in general, is human reason, in such that
it governs all peoples of the earth; and the
political and civil laws of each nation ought
to be only individual cases where human reason
Law,

is applied.
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This universality of law in human reason
is like-

wise united to the universality of
for

1'

1

'

esprit general,

esprit is the system of relations which estab-

lishes the parameters of law.
L' Esprit des Lois is to

not the laws themselves.

Indeed, the object of De

describe the spirit of the laws,
And to comprehend that spirit,

in otder to make laws correctly, one must understand the

spirit which gorws out of all relations, physical and
moral, which impinge on the life of the state.
laws must follow

1'

Positive

esprit general:

They (the laws) ought to be relative to the
physical character of the country; to the
cold, hot or temperate climate, to the quality of the earth, to its location, to its
extent; to the genius of the life of its people: farmers, hunters, or shepherds; they
should be relative to the degree of liberty
that the constitution is able to admit; to
the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, number, commerce, moeurs,
and manieres.
Finally, they have relations
among themselves; with their origin, the object of the legislator, and the order of
things on which they are established.
It is
necessary to consider them from all these
perspectives.^^

This universality of the spirit of the laws parallels
the definition of

1

'

esprit general in Book XIX, Chapter

Four (p. 558):

Several things govern men: climate, religion,
the laws, the maxims of the government, the
examples of passed events, moeurs, manieres;
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the general spirit results from all of these.
Thus linked to

1'

esprit general the web of relations

which constitutes law has a rationality of its own, in-

dependent of the subjects who obey them.

That rational-

ity is one of balance and equilibrium; political insti-

tutions are related to one another as a physical system
of interlocking parts:

This relation of the laws with the principle,
stretches all the relations of the government;
and this principle receives from it in its
turn, a new force.
It is thus that as within
physical movements, action is always followed
by a reaction. 63
Laws, we must remember, are 'necessary relations deriving from the nature of things' and if they are truly to
be laws they must be invariable.

The forms of govern-

ment work best when subjects do not interfere, when the
laws remain unchanged.

government,

1'

to lawmaking.

From the point of view of the

esprit general provides an objective guide
The imperatives of the system must be

followed if stability is to be guaranteed.

For example,

this notion of an objective rationality embodied in the

general spirit leads Montesquieu to describe the best
monarchy as a machine wherein all of the parts interact
according to plan and in which the future is predictable

:
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Withm monarchies, politics

produces great
things with the least virtue possible; as
within the most beautiful machines, the art
of rule employs as little movement,
as few
forces and wheels as is possible. ^4
The ideal of monarchy requires little input
from

ordinary citizens.

Political knowledge and action must

be restricted to those with a rational knowledge of
1'

esprit general.

Since modern monarchies are more

complex than the simple model would imply, the actual
system of laws would likewise be complex and even in

c^ses contradictory.

But the general model of the ob-

jectively rational system must still hold in the eyes
of the monarch and his advisors.

Montesquieu's ration-

alism here leads him to a conservative philosophy of
law and social change as the one which can guarantee

the smooth, largely uninterrupted movement of the body

polit ic
The goal of legislation in a monarchy is the security and the 'propriete' of the life of a citizen.

This requires many tribunals to make laws on all of the

various aspects of the society.

These tribunals must

be guided by a conservative spirit, their decisions
"ought to be appraised in order that one judges there

today as one did yesterday

..."

Since it must pre-

serve "not only the life and property of the citizens,"
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but also honor,

laws must be made according to "des
re-

cherches scrupuleuses

.

"

The complexity of the interac-

tion of all relevant factors requires a
particularly
intense sort of reason:
It is not necessary to be astonished to
find
within the laws of these states so many rules,
restrictions, and extensions which multiply
the particular cases, and seem to make an art
of reason itself.

Reason here requires as strict an application of a fixed
body of laws as is possible, and the goal of legal judgment is to leave the spirit and tradition intact.

This

strict application of law is reflected in even more me-

chanical terms in republics and governments that resemble republics, where judgments must be made only according to the letter of the laws.

Laws, then, must carefully follow

1'

esprit general.

They must only reinforce those relations which people

have come to accept as natural parts of their social
routines, just as they must follow the principle of the

government.

The legislator must "follow the spirit of

the nation whenever it is not contrary to the principles
of the government," because "we do nothing better than

that which we do freely, and while following our natural

genius (genie)."

67

By following the principle of gov-

ernment, the legislator secures the state and by follow-
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ing 'I'esprit de la nation' he ensures
that particul ar

interests will mesh with the public interest.
is often difficult.

But thi s

Indeed, political life often seems

to require two contradictory courses of action,
both of
which are nevertheless necessary. The paragraph
which

immediately precedes the above quote demonstrates this

dilemma with reference to women:
One may be able to contain women, to make laws
in order to correct their moeurs, and to limit
their luxury; but who knows if by doing this
one would not lose a certain taste which would
be the source of the riches of the nation, and
a politeness of manners which attracts foreigners to it.
It

is crucial that the legislator,

not the participants

themselves, must reconcile these contradictory courses
of action.

Since direct order would be too destabiliz-

ing, too tyrannical, the legislator must address the

contradictions indirectly.

By manipulating moeurs and

manners he must subtly, and as far as citizens are concerned almost subconsciously, coerce the citizens to
act in ways which foster the public interest.

In other

words he must create an ideology, a belief system

through which the individual will recognize his own
interest in such a way that it fosters the public good.

Montesquieu compliments this notion of the orien-

tation necessary to the legislator with a utilitarian
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notion of lawmaking.

The most appropriate laws are

those which are necessary.

deterministic sense.

Montesquieu means this in a

The legislator must make laws

based upon a calculation of their effects.

Laws are

viewed here as causes of behavior and their influence

should remain as pure as possible:
Just as useless laws weaken the necessary
laws, those that can be eluded weaken legislation.
A law ought to have its effect, and
it cannot be allowed to depart from it because
of a particular convent ion. ^8

Laws are means which have natural effects intrinsic to

them which induce certain types of behavior.

The knowl-

edge necessary to the legislator is that knowledge of
the effects laws have on citizens.

Citizens here are

objects, the laws, tools with which to manipulate their

behavior:

"It

is necessary to be on guard that the laws

be conceived in a manner that they do not choke the na-

ture of things." 69

And the paragraph which this sen-

tence introduces makes clear that by 'the nature of
things' Montesquieu means the principle and spirit of

the government. 70

The principle and spirit here are

independent of the laws; the laws are the means to make
sure that citizens conform to them.

In republics,

"nothing gives more force to the laws, than the extreme

subordination of the citizens to the magistrates."
1

71
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Montesquieu follows this by claiming that, "paternal
authority is still very useful in order to maintain

moeurs."

Laws must be capable of manipulating men,

turning the evil of man's nature into good:
A certain candor is necessary in the laws.
Made in order to punish the evil of men, they
ought themselves to have the greatest innocence ^ 2
.

This rationalist theory of law seems to contradict

Montesquieu's appreciation of the more subjective dimension of

1'

esprit general which he embodied in the notion

of the principle of a form of government.

His argument,

then, would seem incomplete without some attempt to

unify these.

His engagement with the debate about the

ancient constitution of the French Monarchy and the un-

derlying theory of history together with a conservative
ideology seem to accomplish this unity.

2.

The conjunction of politics and history .

Montes-

quieu's conservative and object ivist theory of law and

human reason has prepared the way for his adoption of a

particular ideology based upon the historical tradition
of the fundamental laws.

Within this ideology citizens

will recognize legitimate social change as that based

on the conservative principle of redressing the imbalances in the fundamental laws produced by the changes
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in circumstance.
of law,

Furthermore, the abstract
rationality

linked as it is to

1
'

esprit general, allows

Montesquieu to give credibility to

a

particular inter-

pretation of a particular nation's
history.

m

other
words, the historical method based
upon the development
of 1' esprit as a general system
of causes provides a
method for substantiating a particular
ideology so long
as it is based upon a correct
understanding of a na-

tion's traditions.

When discussing monarchy as a form

of government he must claim that
the ancient French laws

embody most clearly the principle of
monarchy.

"^^

Hence, it is important not only for Montesquieu
to en-

join the debate with du Bos' these royale over
the his-

torical development of the French monarchy, but
also to

demonstrate that du Bos' view is based upon prejudice
rather than true historical principles.

The spirit of

French law must be vindicated as based upon an understanding of French history.

Montesquieu realizes that he has based political
theory on different grounds than previous theory.

Meth-

odological and epi stemological problems have been propelled into the forefront rather than remaining in the

background of theory.

In the Lett res Persanes

,

partic-

ularly in the myth of the Troglodytes, Montesquieu has

exposed contract theory as based upon a myth. 75

Its
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View of the past reflected a projection
of values and
perceptions of the present, it remained a creation
of

the prejudices of its creator.

Yet, Montesquieu be-

lieved that his scientific understanding of history
was

different.

In the "Preface" to De L'Esprit des Lois
he

writes
I would believe myself the most happy of
mortals, if I were able to make men free themselves from their prejudices. By prejudices
here I mean, not what causes men to ignore
certain things, but that which causes them to
ignore themselves.

The ideology embodied in the these nobiliare was 'true'
in that it could be shown to have a firm basis in his-

torical fact.
This shifts the major focus of debate in political

theory away from abstract formulations of political
right and obligations to debate about the historical

accuracy and theoretical coherence of particular ideologies.

To Montesquieu,

rival accounts of actual his-

tory, such as du Bos', were more formidable and more

important rivals than either contract theory or rationalist natural law theory.
the latter, as

I

He did not hesitate to use

have shown; they were in fact impor-

tant to his theoretical formulation.

However, the most

important opponents were those who held a different
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interpretation of history.

For Montesquieu, as for

other conservative theorists such as Burke
and nineteenth century political theory in general,
politics
had to be "historicized." Historical method
became a

central point in political debate, just as
political
thought (and philosophy itself) had to focus more
sharply on history.
Yet Montesquieu was not unaware of the epistemolog-

ical pandora's box he had opened.

Just before launching

into the discussion of the French feudal laws, he ends

Book XXIX with a chapter,

"Of Legislators," which raises

the crucial epistemological question of his new formulation, along with the ambiguity implied in basing

a

particular political position on historical 'fact:'
Aristotle wanted sometimes to satisfy his
jealousy against Plato, sometimes his passion
for Alexander.
Plato was indignant with the
tyranny of the people of Athens. Machiavelli
was completely absorbed with his idol, the
Duke of Valentine. Thomas More, who spoke
rather from what he had read than from what
he had thought, wanted to govern all states
with the simplicity of a Greek city. Harrington saw only the republic of England, while a
throng of writers discovered disorder wherever
they did not see a crown. The laws always
encounter the passions and the prejudices of
the legislator.
Sometimes they pass through,
and are untainted by them, sometimes they remain there, incorporating them.^^
De L Esprit des Lois is a self-conscious attempt to
'
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raise historical interpretation to
the level of reason.
The universal rationality described
by the total description of the philosophical and
historical principles
of I'esprit can provide a solid,
unprejudiced account
of the modern state.
Montesquieu was correct to claim
that his enterprise was novel. No one
before had cor-

rectly perceived that the construction of the
state re-

quired a universal account of both political and
his-

torical principles, except perhaps Vico— that they
were
indeed unified by a single overarching principle of

rationality, I'esprit general.

Without his philosophy

of history, Montesquieu's political theory could claim

no more relation to truth than those theories he sought
to expose as myth; but equally important, without his

political theory, Montesquieu's philosophy of history
would have no point.

3.

Law, tradition and ideology

.

Montesquieu's conser-

vatism is cemented by the rule of law.

Despite the

'sociological' orientation of method, it is to politics
in a more traditional sense that Montesquieu returns in

order to unite law in the sense of rationalist deductive

principles with law as representing the shared life of
individual subjects.

through politics

These can only be reconciled

— through

the constitution of publically
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available meaning existing in everyday
life.
Law in
the sense of rational principles
which guide the statesman's action must be legitimized by
an interpretation
of tradition.
The power of Montesquieu's conservatism
is his ability to utilize tradition
to legitimize and

bolster Reason.

His dual conception of law as histori-

cal principles governed by causation, and
hence determinant of principles of action, and as an
organic growth
of political norms out of everyday life,
allows him to

fuse together in a traditional ideology what
later the-

ory would say were irreconcilable.
In this sense we can see how crucial it is to

Montesquieu's argument that historical facts fit his
methodological principles.

The legitimacy of political

norms rests upon a proper understanding of tradition.
If

tradition is to bolster a politics based upon reason,

then it too must be subjected to reason.

History must

be the medium in which reason and tradition meet in the

proper principles of historical insight.

In the con-

crete history of a particular nation the two notions of
law meet and form a unity.

The 'esprit general' is com-

prised of both the laws of history and the laws as norms
of behavior.

The best laws of the future grow out of

those of the past which we can recognize as successful
in history because of identifiable causes.

If 1' esprit

'
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general can become relatively fixed (Montesquieu's ideal
of law as unchanging) then the ideal accomodation has

been reached between the past and the future, between
man and his world.

In order for this to happen

1

'

esprit

general must be knowable, but that knowledge must not
be a prelude to political creativity.

Political crea-

tivity is in the past and the point of the knowledge of

tradition and history is not to change it, but to reinforce it and make it work properly; to forestall its

demise as a society as its spirit confronts changing
circumstances
The desire to reconcile these two sorts of laws re-

quires two sorts of political obligation.
be historically conditioned.

Consent must

One demonstrates consent

not by participation in rights,

especially property

rights as for Locke, but by living within a culture, as

Usbek remains within a despotic way of life although he
has physically left it.

A citizen owes obedience so

long as the tradition is upheld.

But since change must

from
be evolutionary, not revolutionary, and must result

general if it
a rational understanding of 1' esprit

is

right of
to have any hope of success, there is no real

resistance.

Political action directed at social change

reform directed
can only take on a posture of moderate
This change
'esprit.'
at reestablishing the traditional
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requires the same sort of knowledge as does proper rule.
Indeed,

if the ruler acts upon

proper principles no po-

litical action is necessary (or legitimate) on the part
of citizens.

Montesquieu is clearly more concerned with

political obedience than with citizens' participation.
Citizens, then, obey; when things go right, they

do not act politically at all.

And when they do they

must do so on the basis of a highly rational political

knowledge.

The knowledge of rule is rational knowledge

of the historian-philosopher, making sure that the

pieces (systems of relations) of an elaborate jigsaw
puzzle continue to fit in their proper places.

Condi-

tions change, but the task of the ruler is to ensure
that the overall scene that the puzzle constructs re-

mains as clear to external view as possible.

In a dif-

ferent way, Montesquieu accepts the fundamental assump-

tions of the dualistic theory of political knowledge of
Bacon and Hobbes which

I

discussed in Chapter Three.

The internal cohesion of the polity has a single proper

form for any particular polity at any particular historical moment.

History is a fluid set of laws and causes,

yet political knowledge requires that it must be frozen
at a particular point.
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IV.

Conclus ion;

The Modern Ideal of the Citizen

The citizen realizes himself in his social life not
in politics.

He creates his social identity out of eco-

nomic and social interaction rather than in political

action.

Montesquieu's ideal of politics as a rational

science of history leaves little room for the confronta-

tion of the competing interests and self -interpretations
of citizens.

Individual self -interpretations vary as

the systems of relations they confront vary.

Merchants

must act according to the spirit of commerce, soldiers

according to the spirit of war, women according to the
spirit of luxury.

Likewise,

individual action varies

as does the form of government

:

republican merchants

act according to different principles than monarchical

merchants.

Likewise, the various forms of government

set the particular requirements for state control:

for

example, women must be more controlled in republics for

monarchies can more successfully absorb luxury, the
spirit of women.

Individual self -interpretation, then, derives from
one's activity in society.

The goals and purposes one

sets for life and how one relates to fellow human beings
is determined by the particular context of an individu-

al's position in civil society.

What is peculiarly im-
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portant for Montesquieu's
conservative political theory
is that although the citizen's
self -interpretat
ion re-

sults from his recognition of his
own particular condition he has little if any control
over it.
Capitalist
merchants recognize that their interests
are best served
by the economic rationality of
moderate accumulation and
act accordingly, just as noblemen
in a monarchic court
recognize the need to define themselves
in terms
of

their distinguishability from others.

However, they are

powerless to change the political relationships
inherent
in their condition.
Self-conscious reflection on their
condition can tell them nothing that mere recognition
of their objective circumstances does
not already tell

them.

Court life is false, the moeurs and manieres
it

produces deceive and manipulate— but they are necessary
if a monarchy is to survive.

More subtly perhaps,

Montesquieu's theory of political action in De

L'

Esprit

des Lois extends the more pessimistic implications of

Roxane's suicide.

Injustice, illegitimate power rela-

tions, and unnaturalness abound in everyday politics.

The citizen may recognize them, but he must accept them,

he is powerless to change them.
end in the equivalent of suicide

His attempts can only

— which

in political

terms is the fall from moderate government to despotism.
As did earlier thinkers like Montaigne, Montesquieu had
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little faith that attempts to change an
unjust polity
by citizens would result in anything other
than a fall

into tyranny.
What Montesquieu feared, and what all liberal the-

orists feared, was that a citizen's private interest
unleashed and made legitimate by the structure of life
in the early modern state would penetrate and command

the public good.

In general, their solution, one vari-

ation of which Montesquieu's theory represents, was to
locate the primary sphere of action for the citizen

outside of politics, in a 'civil society.'

This is

reflected in a dual notion of political knowledge.

Political knowledge from the point of view of the ruler
is the application of reason in order to obtain the ob-

jective goods of the state

— liberty

and security.

From

the point of view of the citizen, everyday life was

guided by passion and the knowledge of self-interest.
In Montesquieu's constitutionalism formal guarantees of

citizenship take precedence over the requirements of
self-conscious everyday political activity.
But by doing this politics loses its 'life.'

It

becomes more dull and technical, less concerned with

determining the public good according to collective purposes and needs, than with procedures for 'distributing'
goods.

For Montesquieu the best positive laws require

little interpretation.

Even justice becomes a 'good.'

In republics justice represents
the formal ethic of con-

tracts, of self-interest versus
self-interest; in monarchies it represents the proper
assignment of honors
according to 'just deserts.'
Yet the signs no longer
merely represent justice, they are
justice.
The moral
goodness that once permeated political
relationships has
somehow leaked out. The signs and symbols
remain, the
substance has been transferred to other parts
of the

social body.

The contrast with Plato is illustrative.

Justice for the latter was defined in terms of action.
Even the third class of citizens who had nothing to
do

with rule were governed by a justice which
determined
that they do what best suited them, that they
perform

the occupations most appropriate to their nature.

The

content of justice, the fact that they could perform

actions they themselves regarded as just, was most important, not the fact of distribution.

For Montesquieu

and modern liberal theory, distribution becomes the main

determinant of justice.

Justice is fairness:

it

is

moderation in punishments, the equal enforcement of laws
and contracts and most important, the impartial applica-

tion of rules.

Citizens must recognize rules of justice

in their everyday private action but they can take no

part in determining it.

The role of politics under this
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notion of justice is formal and minimal.

Its role is

to ensure that the conflicts of competing claims do
not
erupt into major social conflicts.

Political justice

mediates claims— it is a form of conflict resolution,
not a collective determinant of the public good.

Political virtue is the only principle of action
in Montesquieu's scheme which allows citizens to par-

ticipate in politics.

But the idea of civic virtue,

drawn from the model of classical republics is too
extreme to be applicable in the modern world.

self-sacrifice of

it

The

has a hollow ring in a society

which assumes that individuals act according to their
self-interest.

Political virtue in modern republics

must be arrived at indirectly, through a commercial

capitalist ethic wherein private interest is kept

within certain limits and thereby fosters the public
interest.
Yet Montesquieu's theory retains, as does much

liberal theory, a longing for the ideal of civic virtue

drawn from classical philosophy.

Something about the

idea of citizenship still implies that individuals as

citizens have a right and obligation to determine and
direct the public good in collective participation with
others.

This last ideal haunts liberal theory as some-

thing it knows

it

must aspire to, but which it knows it
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has lost.

We can recognize Roxane's rebellion as noble,

as embodying higher ideals of freedom than the merely

formal procedural freedom implied by the modern ideal
of citizenship than we think is possible for modern

citizens to realize.
Clearly, the originality of Montesquieu's theory
of citizenship is his identification of the public but

non-political realm of moeurs and manieres as the primary sphere of action for the citizen.
trend in early modern theory, which

I

Completing a

discussed in Chap-

ter Three, Montesquieu constructs an ideal of citizenship whereby all who contribute to the maintenance of

the society through producing wealth or safeguarding

private virtues which minimize conflict are as good
citizens (often better citizens) than those who act in
the political realm.

His argument is a more general

form of a widely accepted view of women and the family
in the eighteenth century that has its greatest exponent

in Rousseau.

Women are the guardians of virtue in the

family, which is important as the sphere in which social

norms are communicated to children.
a way of life is located not

The continuity of

in the public forum of

classical Greek society but in the private intimacy of
personal family relations.

Montesquieu's conservatism

seems to extend this model of the virtues of women and
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the family to the life of citizens more
generally.

The

primary function of individuals in their
capacities as
citizens is not to rationally determine the
collective
good, but rather to transmit a particular
tradition, to

follow and safeguard raoeurs and manieres while
providing
for their own happiness and through 'society' the
hap-

piness of others.

The politics which compliments this

in the best of times is the passive ajudication of pri-

vate conflicts, and at worst of times a redirection of

the social order, forcibly if necessary, to put the na-

tion back on the track established by the ancient constitution.

This ideal of the citizen has a long history

in liberal theory in the modern state; in the conclusion

to the dissertation

I

want to trace its implications for

a modern theory of citizenship.

CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSION: MONTESQUIEU AND
THE
LIBERAL THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP

^

Montesqui eu and Liberal Theory

We can describe the dualism
of Montesquieu's theory of citizenship as actually
embodying two different
senses of the citizen, both of which
inform the selfinterpretations of citizens in liberal
polities.
I
have tried to show that he recognized
both senses and
attempted to unify them in a universal
theory of poli^^""^
De L' Esprit des Lois which relied
on a constitu-

tionalism rooted in the fundamental laws of
the kingdom
linked to the possibility of a scientific
understanding
of the history of a political/legal tradition.

Within

this theory of citizenship Montesquieu sought to
incor-

porate

a

notion of political virtue on the part of indi-

vidual citizens into the structure of modern social life
and the state.

Montesquieu accepted the legitimacy of individual
self-interest, which was characteristic of both seven-

teenth century French moral theory and English political
theory.

He likewise concluded, as most of his predeces-

sors did, that individual actors who would act to further
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their own interests implied the
need for a 'society' to
absorb them in such a way as to
mitigate conflict. He
was unhappy with the solution
posed by contract theory
which in his eyes misunderstood the
dynamic relation of
citizens and state power-political
action could not be
reduced to consent without jeopardizing
the political
identity of individual citizens. The
particulars of the

interrelation of citizens and the state were
different
for different forms of government:
monarchy

required a

society based upon rank and privilege to
absorb the private ambitions of the nobility and republics
required
the market and a capitalistic ethic of apporpriat
ion and

profit in order to absorb the individual
self-interests
of merchants.

The structure of Montesquieu's argument

for the stability of both monarchies and republics
is,
in general outline, the same.

Individuals ought to

balance their particular ambitions and the objects of
their world in order to produce harmony in individual
and social life.

By drawing attention towards the per-

son of the king and providing a sphere of action for the

nobility in the parliaments, monarchies create a harmony
among classes.

In Montesquieu's view,

survive,"'" it must

noble class.
of honor,

if

monarchy is to

retain privilege on the part of

This privilege,

a

along with the principle

will channel their ambitions toward achieving
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social recognition.

The king ought to be the arbiti
:er

of rewards and privileges.

In republics, the market

takes the place of the society of
social recognition.
So long as private individual action
is channeled into
commerce the private ambition of merchants,
the dominant
class in republics, can be transformed into
public benefits.
Chapter Two above has demonstrated how,
according
to Montesquieu, modern republics require
the dominance
of a commercial class acting upon capitalistic
motiva-

tions.

Hence,

I

have tried to argue that for Montesquieu

both monarchies and republics require a primarily non-

political but public social sphere to absorb the selfinterests of the nobility and the merchant class respec-

tively in order to produce a stable and just polity.

Counterposed to the moderate form of government, despotism as a form of government fails precisely because it

cannot successfully insulate the state from private

self-interest.
In the introduction I explained the sense in which
I

assert that Montesquieu's theory of citizenship is

'liberal.'

This requires a bit further discussion here.

Montesquieu is a liberal theorist in that he accepts
certain philosophical assumptions which underlie the
liberal theory of state and society.

He accepts that

the authority of the state must be rooted in the auton-
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omous individual who acts primarily
on the basis of passion rather than reason and whose action
is necessarily
based upon the pursuit of self-interest.
the Lett res

m

Persanes he presents individuals whose
personal identities are- bound up with their political
identities.

Politics must somehow provide a space in which
individuals can give form to their natural drive for
self-ex-

pression and freedom.

The despotic way of life in which

the characters find themselves does not allow a positive

expression of this sort and hence the only solution is
tragic self-destruction for the. main antagonists, Roxane
and Usbek.

In De L'Esprit des Lois Montesquieu attempts

to establish a constitutional framework and a theory of
social and political life which can accomodate both the

demands of the state (security) and the need of individual citizens for political self-expression.

that his universal notion of

1'

I

argue

esprit general, by unify-

ing the institutionalization of political practices

within particular governments and the spirit with which
citizens act, attempts, unsuccessfully, to provide

a

conservative theory of the modern state which merges the
dual senses of the citizen as a subject of authority and
as a politically creative actor.

Although he accepts the two senses of citizenship
which liberal theory embodies,

it

is misleading to view
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Montesquieu as a liberal in the Lockean sense.

it

is

deceptive to characterize Montesquieu's theory
of the
state as akin to a Lockean 'minimal' state as
Thomas
2
Pangle does.
The state for Montesquieu does not
merely secure liberty in the sense of protecting
property (although this is one of its functions) but it
also

provides a forum in which individuals identify themselves as men and women.

L' Esprit unifies public life,

political and social, with private life into a whole in
ways in which the theory of the minimal state could

never accept.
The central point of Montesquieu's theory of the

modern state is that the state is an institutionalization of laws.

In the conclusion to Chapter Five

I

ex-

plain the complex notion of law which Montesquieu's
state embodies.

The 'spirit of the laws' describes

above all the common meanings which citizens share which

make the system of laws more than

a

mere set of func-

tional rules 3 and which provides simultaneously for a

stable and just political order.

because they love the laws.

People follow the laws

In other words even the

action in civil society which cannot be overtly political is impregnated with political virtue.

The public

norms of civil society are constituted by the political'

needs of the state and vice-versa.

According to Montes-
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quieu, men must act in certain ways if
the state is to
survive and be just at the same time that they
are free
to act according to their will and passions.
His notion
of political virtue which he distinguishes
from virtue

in general at the beginning of De L' Esprit
des Lois de-

scribes the mediation of the political and the social,
of public and private.

The major mistake of those who wish to assimilate

Montesquieu's theory to the Lockean theory of the state
or to a more modern functionalist model of the state is

to misunderstand the importance of tradition in Montes-

quieu's thought.

He draws on liberal assumptions about

the subject and tends to accept the dualism in political

knowledge between citizen and ruler which is at the root
of the early liberal theory of political knowledge (see

Chapter Three), yet he presents a deeply conservative

political theory, adhering to a stronger notion of custom and tradition than Lockean liberal theory could sustain.

He believes,

as both liberal psyhologists follow-

ing Locke and post-Kantian liberals could not, that tra-

dition and custom would encourage citizens to act virtuously.

His rejection of the abstract assoc iat ionism

of Locke's Essay on Human Understanding paved the way

for a theory in which tradition cemented the social and

political bonds of citizenship.

The Lockean idea of the
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individual as well as the later Kantian
notion of the
self-reflexive individual subject jeopardizes
the central position which Montesquieu assigns
to tradition.
There is for Montesquieu a certain level
at which authority cannot be questioned without jeopardizing
the

possibility that self-interested action can at the
same
time be politically virtuous. Only tradition,
according
to Montesquieu, can provide the social space in
which

this reconciliation is possible.

Hegel's response to

Kantian radicalism is in some ways similar to Montesquieu's response to the abstractness of Hobbesian and

Lockean contract theory.

Although we must be careful

not to overstate the similarities, the comparison is

useful because they both attempted similar things in

their theories and their solutions meet in interesting
ways. 4

They both sought to instill in social and

political life a sense of virtue which was (and still
is)

fundamentally challenged by the theorists, absolu-

tist or liberal, who defined the intellectual milieu
and practice of the modern state.

Locke's theory of the social contract and the

natural justification of private property legitimated
the pursuit of private interest.

Man's natural entitle-

ment to the fruits of his labor gave his private inter-

ests a moral priority over virtuous action in the state;
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the state had its justification not
in the laws of nature, but in the limits of the laws
of nature.
The
state arises for Locke in order to
adjudicate and enforce competing claims and to secure property
in ways
which the state of nature could not. Political
obligation rests on consent, tacit and explicit, which
in turn
rests on a narrow conception of rationality
as a "faculty of means.

This implies a meager role for tradi-

tion in the legitimation of social and political practices .
But for Montesquieu the relation between the citi-

zen and the state is fundamentally different.

For

Montesquieu, unlike Locke, political life is essential
to an individual's personal identity.

person he is outside of
work.

a

He cannot be the

particular political frame-

(Witness how Usbek struggles to leave despotism

behind but is caught in ways he does not realize until
it

is too late

— see

Chapter Four.)

His personality and

character involve him in the stability and moral fabric
of the state, both through the capacity of the state to

protect liberty and property and in the fact that the

private personality must be one with the moral necessities of the state.

Montesquieu couples

a

modern version

of the classical argument that the state is only as good
as its citizens with the modern demands of private prop-
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erty to create a public sphere
freed from collective
control.
It is crucial that for
Montesquieu neither of
these is a claim against the state,
the individual does
not make claims as if a contract
has been violated.
Injustice must be redressed by action,
political when
possible, personal when no political
recourse can be
effective.
(Roxane demonstrates the predicament
of the
individual when politics allows no recourse.)
The best
polity, and the only really stable one, is
the one in
which injustice is redressed by the recapturing
of the
lost tradition.

Hence, Montesquieu fills out the con-

tent of citizenship with tradition, not with
formal

relationships.

The citizen for Montesquieu relates to

the state in a far more intimate and immediate
way than
for Locke.

Both political life and private life have

their legitimate needs and requirements and national
1'

esprit and tradition must unify these.

In essence,

Montesquieu's theory of citizenship is an attempt to
institutionalize the tensions between an individual's

private life and its public expression.
Tradition in Montesquieu's view bears considerable

philosophical and political weight.

To carry its load,

tradition is linked to a scientific understanding of
laws and causes (see Chapter One) which attempts to en-

sure that a particular interpretation of the tradition
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and the esprit general of a
particular nation will have
objective merit. Helvetius' criticism
of the very te rms
of the debate between the these
royale and the these

nobiliare is devastating to Montesquieu's
scheme.^
Helvetius wonders what relevance the
fundamental laws
have to the contemporary moral dilemmas
of political

creativity; he poses a question Montesquieu
could never
answer: why can we not crate a stable polity
on a new

basis,

just as ancient lawgivers did?

Changes in tech-

nology and social relations demand deeper changes
in

politics than Montesquieu's conservative theory was
willing to accept.

The central question for late eigh-

teenth and nineteenth century France was whether

it was

morally and politically possible to transform France
into a republic.

Montesquieu clearly did not think so.

His notion of tradition was not altogether wrong (it

supplies a dimension missing in much early liberal theory) but it was too strictly conceived.

While recogniz-

ing a self-reflective capability on the part of citizens

Montesquieu refuses to allow its consequences for social
change.

His strict notion of tradition as a body of

fundamental laws moving almost unchanged through history

contradicts the developmental history which he argues
states undergo (see Chapter One).

On another level

Montesquieu proclaims and then retreats from the crea-
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tive possibilities o

the liberal political
subject.

The citizen must be

Montesquieu more tha

other early liberal theorists

recognizes that this
dimension, but his

to create his own life
and

:ee

.ust

involve a strong political

.ory of political space
as the

t

institutionalization

.f

not provide sufficie

:

space for the political action

he claims is necessa

r

to citizens.

The relevance o

formal causal relations does

Montesquieu's theory is that it

highlights the funda mtal structure of
the liberal
theory of the citize
That theory contains two dif.

ferent senses of cit

:enship; the relation between them

is problematic,

lually producing tensions within

the polity.

cont

On the

le

hand the citizen is an active

self-creating being

lo

can be fulfilled only through

meaningful political action.

He strives somehow to

participate in estab ishing the meaning and
value of
collective life. On :he other hand the citizen

is a

passive recipient of .Protection, related to the
state
only through the for
The modern dilemma o
is rooted

al

logic of contractual obligation.

the citizen, to which we now turn,

in the coe istence of these two notions of

citizenship.
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Toward a Critical Theory of
citizen.hnp

11.

Any attemnpt to draw conclusions
about the contemporary dilemma of citizenship from
a study of the early

modern state must proceed with
caution.

Certainly some

contemporary theorists still accept the
notion of the
non-political citizen. They accept the
central argument
of early liberal theory that
capitalist civil society
can successfully absorb men's passions

(they are, as the

eighteenth century theorists were, less certain
about
women) so as to render everyday political
action on the
part of individuals unnecessary and to some
degree dan-

gerous.

7

The primary political activity, periodic

voting, becomes less and less a creative
activity and
is reduced to ensuring, however imperfectly,
the

countability' of decision-makers.
view,

'ac-

According to this

in the context of modern corporate capitalism in

an age of high technology, even this already minimal

activity must be minimized further if modern democracies
under complex advanced capitalist economies are to suc-

cessfully manage social and economic life.®

This view

shares certain assumptions with the eighteenth century
argument in its conclusions and general orientation.

Advocates of

it

accept the individualist theory of man

and the primacy of economic action and economic ration-
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ality.9

Likewise, they share the faith
of the Lockean
tradition and of classical political
economists that the
formal notion of citizenship,
necessary to free individuals to pursue their self-interest
in the market, can
adequately ensure the compatibility
of capitalism and
democracy. Yet we must be careful to
recognize the
altered context -the modern corporate
capitalism guided
by the managerial state is vastly
different from the
vision of entrepreneurial commercial
capitalism linked
to a constitutional state which guided
most early lib-

eral theorists.

There are points of contact and the

modern theory has roots in the early theories, but
they
are not the same theory.

The importance of the separation of the ruler and
ruled by a non-political public civil society which is
at the heart of early liberal theory of citizenship is

that it initiates a change in the contours of the concept of citizenship.

We now use the word citizenship

in two senses without investigating the connection be-

tween them.

In the first sense citizenship refers to a

formal set of criteria for participation in the polity
and the nation.

It

delineates essential criteria of

nationality (native born or nationalized) which distinguishes a citizen of one state from that of another.
It

also initiates individuals into certain procedural
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protections and rights guaranteed
by the courts and the
institution of voting. The formal
notion of citizenship
purges the life of the individual
of any authentic political action. Politics tends to
become a rational
field
of policy-making, the province
of technical decision-

making which relies on an abstract
characterization of
ends
"happiness of the greatest number," "the
public
interest, "-which legitimizes the
isolation of means as
a separate study, thereby vitiating
the possibilities
for rational participation in decisions
by citizens.

—

According to this formal notion, the primary
action
of citizens is obedience to authority,
unrestrained pursuit of private interests in the economy,
and complacent
participation in the moral norms and customs of
culture
and society.

Political creativity is not a legitimate

category of action.

VJith

reference to politics, this

is reflected clearly in the attitude toward
public of-

ficials as experts who merely process the 'inputs' presented to them.

Politics tends to become the realm of

'public policy' which processes given 'objective' social

facts defined within a political language drawn from
social science; it is not the realm in which collective

decisions about the direction and worth of public life
are made.

What are to count as relevant social facts

are presented to the public by the private, politics,
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then, only processes them.

An active notion of citizenship
would seem to have
no place in the rigid objective
notion of the political
wherein public decisions consist in the
most efficient
means to affect privately determined
ends.
The spontaneous action and rational reflexivity of
civic virtue can
never be objectified in such a way that
public policy

decisions can be purely scientific matters.

Yet it is

unfair and distorting to characterize our modern
notion
of politics and citizenship as purely a formal
affair.

While we hold to

a

paradigm of politics as formal deci-

sion-making based upon a knowledge which the majority
of the population is never privy to, our political
prac-

tice does embody a certain more active citizenship,

-""^

both within the formal structure and outside of it.

Our

practice of voting does embody a legitimate sphere of
creativity for ordinary citizens, especially on the local level, although the increasing manipulative uses of

the media by candidates jeopardizes this, especially at
the national level.

We tend to reject or at least hold

at a certain moral distance those political machines

that deny any input to ordinary citizens.

to staging theatrical events,

a

In addition

relatively new phenome-

non, political parties do allow for certain active par-

ticipation in real decisions for individual citizens.
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Politics as the adjudication
and struggle between
competing visions of the
public good does not taKe
place
the formal governmental
structure but does, at
least
to some degree, in
political parties at the
local level
and occasionally at the
national level. Outside
the
formal system, the embodiment
of an active conception
of Citizenship is the
legitimacy of civil disobedience,
indeed, we often accord a
certain nobility to those
whom
we recognize as jeopardizing
their private safety

m

and

interest in order to force into
political discourse a
sincerely felt vision of the
public good. Our most
revered political heroes are those
who took an initiative in projecting a public
spirit into a public discourse that had atrophied in its
purely formal character.
We revere public spirit and
political creativity
when it appears as genuine and
sincere, but we are leary
of embodying this in everyday
politics.
To the extent
that we legitimize active citizenship
it is extraordinary.
Participation in political campaigns is voluntary
and occurs at widely spaced intervals.
For most participants and for other 'party regulars' it is
a way of

spending leisure time, a pursuit separated from
the

private world of labor.

The extra-ordinary character

of civil disobedience is even more clear.

Our prevail-

ing conceptions of citizenship embody these two notions
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Of active and formal
citizenship but they remain
separate.
Government remains a formal realm
which eschews

any notion of political
creativity and the realm of
legitimate political creativity
is carefully circumscribed so as to insulate everyday
politics from it.
In contemporary theories of
the citizen the two

senses of citizenship are often
recognized.

Robert

Pranger distinguishes a political
culture of power
wherein citizens are generally passive
from a political
culture of participation in which citizenship
is more
active.
A similar distinction is developed
by

Joseph Tussman's Obligation and the Body Politic
where
he distinguishes between 'members' who are
citizens with

obligations and duties and 'agents' who are leaders and
concerned with the responsibilities of power.

More re-

cently, George Armstrong Kelly^^ has distinguished

between 'civic' and 'civil' notions of citizenship, the
former an active sphere of participation and the latter
a more passive sphere of rights and protections.

In both Pranger 's and Tussman's work the contradic-

tion between these two is laid bare.

Pranger

's

solution

is to eschew the world of power for the world of parti-

cipation.

This solution is inadequate for it fails to

understand that the dichotomy as Pranger poses it is
false.

Participation contains power and vice-versa.
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The crisis of the citizens is
not that they are too much
involved in the culture of power or
too little involved
in the culture of participation,
but rather that they
are simultaneously pulled in both
directions. They un-

derstand themselves both as creative actors
in politics,
as well as passive partners in
formal power relations
over which they have no control.
Likewise Tussman seeks a solution to the
dilemma
of the modern citizen by replacing the
stale privatized

politics of the market, the haven of the passive citizen,

with a political education towards public roles.

Tussman 's view is more compelling than Pranger's for it
is less abstract and more sensitive to the nuances
of

civic virtue.

Yet his solution remains too idealistic.

Recognizing the dual nature of the modern political subject, as creative member of the sovereignty and as the

subject of authority, Tussman exhorts us to eschew our

private interests for the public good, to place our public self above our private self.

"revitalize the public tribunal."

We must, in his words,
In short,

Tussman

asks for a return of republican virtue, of self-sacrifice for the public good.

But like Pranger, Tussman

implies too great a dichotomy between the two senses of
the liberal citizen.

He fails to realize that systems

of obligation and legitimation are rooted in systems of
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power,

in structures of domination
and subjection.

Tussman relies on an idealized
notion of the forum in
Which political discourse takes
place. The idealism of
Tussmans solution becomes clear as soon as we
recognize
that political education in
modern liberal democracies
is permeated by the power
relations that sustain
(and

are sustained by) the market.

Tussman realizes this but

yet sees no way out but to pit
the forum against the
market in hand to hand combat as if
they were, at least
in principle,

equal.

Tussman is correct to lament the

fact that the market has already won.

Both Pranger and Tussman misconceive
the nature of
the dilemma of the citizen. Both seem
to see the contradictory nature of the citizen as imposed
upon him,
that his life presents him with a clear
choice to be a

passive or active citizen.

This misconceives the crisis

in democratic citizenship.

It

fails to realize that the

range of self-interpretations available to citizens
is

more fluid.

The practice of citizenship does not in-

volve exclusively passivity or creative action, but

rather making practical judgments in everyday life in a

complex and contradictory set of meanings.
Hence, a contemporary critical theory of citizen-

ship which seeks in some sense to 'solve' the crisis in

democratic citizenship must involve several dimensions
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Which are often either missing
or undervalued in the
contemporary literature.
It must first recognize

that

the crisis of the modern democratic
citizen requires a
fuller understanding of the dual
nature of liberal citizenship.

The dichotomy between participation
and pas-

sive/formal citizenship is inadequate
as

a

description

of how citizens understand their
public role.

This

leads theorists to pose the dilemma in
terms of a series
of other dichotomies which in actual
social relations
are mixed: participation, power; the
market, the forum;

private interest, public interest.

The range of con-

cepts in which the debate has taken place is
inadequate.
Citizens in modern democracies are not faced
with the
types of choices this language implies.

citizen is involved in

a

The liberal

cluster of possible self-inter-

pretations which are involved in institutions and practices which embody contradictory notions of the proper
role of the citizen.
My argument about the two senses of citizenship is

that they are both part of the language of the practice
of citizenship in liberal democracies and that they make

available to people

a

field of contradictory or at least

competing legitimations of citizenship.

In an extreme

form our political language distinguishes two types of
self -interpretat ions regarding political action--that
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political action on the part of
citizens is only legitimate periodically, and then
only within prescribed
institutional practices (such as
voting), a competing
interpretation however is also
available in the belief
that citizenship requires a
merging of individual and
social identity in everyday action.
The former leads
to periodic participation according
to strict institutional norms and a corresponding
patriotism which urges
that the citizen's primary self
-interpretation
is as

follower; whereas the latter leads to
more active forms
of participation either through
established institutional practices

etc.

.

.

— i.e.,

.—or

campaigning for office, lobbying,

in more

'grass roots' organizing in com-

munities and in the workplace.

Citizens in modern lib-

eral democracies must be described as
involved in a

cluster of meanings drawn from both of these.

Given the

complex and open ended nature of possible points
of contact between these two senses an interpretive
dimension
is necessary to any modern theory of citizenship
in

order to give a coherent, even if not

'

consi stent

'

-"-^

account of the meaning of citizenship for the participant s
An adequate theory of citizenship must be embedded
in a theory of the state.

The life of the citizen can

only be understood in the context of the relations of
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domination and subjection institutionalized
in the state
and their forms of legitimation.
Citizenship
will take

on different meanings at different points
in the life
of the state.
At moments of crisis, the uncertainties
of public authority and the meanings
associated with it

tend to lead the citizen in competing and
contradictory

directions— toward

a further dulling of the sense of

active participation (except in the blind sense of
obe-

dience characteristic of modern patriotism) and hence
toward greater repression by the state, or to a heightened awareness of the participatory implications of ci-

tizenship and the rise of challenges to the state from
outside.

In other words in periods of crisis the bal-

ance between the two senses of citizenship which accords

liberal political society with a certain degree of sta-

bility and cohesion breaks down and citizenship tends
to veer off towards either extreme.

The actual particu-

lar movement can only be discussed with reference to

particular crises at particular moments.

•''^

The main thrust of a critical theory of citizenship
must be to probe the emancipatory capability of the current crisis of citizenship.

As

I

have posed the contra-

dictory nature of the liberal theory of the citizen a

possibility emerges in the attempt to revive and reinterpret civic virtue as a crucial dimension of citizen-
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ship.

What possibilities does the contemporary
situa-

tion allow for not merely participation on the
part of
citizens but for active involvement in the creation
of
public norms and values as part of everyday life?
is not a question of

This

reviving older notions of partici-

pation (an anachronism and historical impossibility) or
of merely increases in participation for its own sake,

without questioning the structure and rules of that par-

ticipation.

What is at stake is the possibility of mod-

ern citizens to recapture control over the directions of

their collective existence which the tendencies of advanced capitalism have vitiated and the liberal theory
of citizenship is powerless to affect.

The purpose of

this dissertation has been to look into liberal theory
at

its early stages in order to discover the roots of

the current crisis as well as the possibilities for the

future
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elemeitsT^%ir^''''''^'
T^^^^ between
^ proportion
a quantity of metal
^nH
quantity of money; (2) the
propo^t^on betCp.n fv,^^""^
tween
the various metals (silver,
gold, copper) ?o
used as money; (3) the weight and
Itandard'^of eve^y
piece of money; (4) the 'ideal"
value-i.e.,
the level
of debasement of coinage.
XXII, 10.
12 XXII,

10,

13 XXII,

2,

659.

651.

^'
Joseph Schumpeter, History
of „
Economic Analysis, ed Elizabeth Boody
Schu mpeter
^^ew York:
Oxford University Press, 1954, especially
Deuletoglou, "Montesquieu and the
^^^1^^°^ Nat ions," The Canadian Journal of Ecnnnm
io
and Political Science XXIX;
iv^y.. lo^^t)
.

1

15 The paradoxical and tragic
character of the
Spanish situation is mentioned at the beginning
of
Chapter 22 of Book XXI (p. 645) and emphasized
more
powerfully
the early essay "Sur les Richesses de
1 Espagne."

m

1^ "Richesses,

17 Ibid

.

,

18 XX, 4,

p

,

"

p.

15.

10.

587-8.

19 In Chapter Five
below I will show how central
the commerce of luxury is to the coherence and stability
of monarchy.
20 Montesquieu's
strongest denunciation of Law's
system is in Book II, Chapter 4, p. 248, where he says
that the System threatened to plunge the French monarchy
into despotism.
In Book XXII, Chapter 10 he also criticizes it for creating severe imbalances in trade, threatening the value of French money (p. 666).
21 XII,

2,

459-60.

22 XII,

2,

459.

23 XX,

4,

p.

588.
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aous personal r.sleTlTlkil^
fTrT^e'l.^r.r
makes some favorable remarks
about craftsmen but
still accepted traditional
arguments that f L?^ f
?herf Lwo?thin:
^°
''"^
o^ch::.
act^r" Witf^""^
acter.
With regard to workers, although
he sairi ii?r?
about them, and nothing about
them
'cLss' he did
develop some perceptive critiques as
of the capitalist
capitaUst
market.
See Chapter Five, below.

ITT'
,

T

insightful discussion of the
^!
ment^ of f?""
the importance of contract law for developthe rise of
^ig-^''"^^^^
R L^^Lew Law and the Rise o f Capitalism (New M^eieLe
York:
-^ui^K.
M*
Monthly Review Press, 1977)
„.

f

.

26 XX,

585.

2,

XXI,

5,

604.

See especially Albert O. Hirschman, The
sions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton PasUniversity Press, 1977).
29 XIII,

17,

470.

"Reflections Sur Monarchie Universelle,"
Pleiade, p. 19.
(Hereafter "Monarchie Universelle.")
31 Ibid.

32 IX,

2,

371.

33 IX,

1,

370.

34 IX,

1,

369.

35 IX,

3,

371-2.

36 X,

5,

382.

37 See Chapter One
above.
38 Montesquieu cites Spain
opt imum size.
IX, 6, 374.
IX,

6,

374.
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X,

9,

384.

41 See Chapter Five below, especially
the discussion of the political economy of luxury.
X,

43

9,

385.

"Monarchie Uni verselle

,

"

p.

20.

44 Ibid.
45 X,

1,

377.

46 See Grot i us. The Law of War and Peace
(Book
Chapter I, sections 16-18) where he argues that the
right to self-defense for sovereign states must be interpreted more broadly than the right of self-defense
of individuals.
II,

47 X,

2,

377.

48 This is the same fundamental insight that
Rousseau develops in his maxim that governments, not
people, make war.
Important modern laws of warfare,
such as the immunity of non-combatants (already enunciated in Grotius) derive from this principle.
49 See Qiapter One above.
50 This was also true for the Romans.
Montesquieu argues that their political decline in the colonies was related to their moral decline. Their failure
to continue to follow the policy of respecting the autonomy of conquered societies led them to commit atrocities which were reflected in increasing conflicts at
home.
See Romans Chapter VI, p. 108.
,

51 X,

2,

378.

52 Ibid.
^^ There are four laws which govern conquests:
natural law (the preservation of the species); (2)
the law of natural enlightenment (lumiere) which is generally that we should treat others as we would want them
to treat us; (3) the laws of formation of political society; (4) the law of the nature of conquest itself
that the natural spirit is that of conservation not of
aggrandizement or destruction. X, 3, 378.
(1)

—
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54 X,

4,

55 X,

11,

56 X,

4,

380.
385.

381.

57 Again,

the practice of slavery in
must carefully follow the laws and spirit this case
of the international community.
It must be undertaken only when
the alternative is anarchy, and then only for
a
duration until the population has been brought tolimited
Montesquieu gives the not very convincing example order.
barbarian treatment of the Romans in the provinces of the
the collapse of the western empire as a justifiable after
instance. X, 3, 380.
58 Thomas Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy
of
Libera^lis"' (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973);
Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (1977).

59 Albert Sorel,

(New York:

Europe Under the Old Regime
Harper and Row, 1947).

Lettres Persanes

,

p.

195.

^1 Ibid., p. 196.
^2 Ibid., p.

197.

^3 Ibid., p. 199.

CHAPTER III: Political Knowledge and Citizenship:
Roots of Liberal Theory

The

Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, in Man and Citizen
Bernard Gert (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
-'-

,

ed

.

1972)
^ Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston:
Little, Brown & Company^ 1960) p. 54.
^ Just as some contract theorists did not intend
the contract in a temporal sense but as a phenomenological foundation of the polity, the psychology of which
must be continually reinforced, I mean this single act
as a single type of act, not as a single act of creativity which happened long ago and then is no longer
applicable.
I take Hobbes, though not Locke, as the
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paradigmatic case here. On Hobbes see
Leo Strauss The
Political Philosophy of Hobb.. and
on Locke's idea' oF^
consent which ditters from that of
Hobbes see ^ohn Dunn
(Ca^bridgef^Cam-"^'
^!a!!''''^"'
'^^^^
"Consent
in the Po?^t?c^ T^^^'^^
Historical .oornal

iJ'(r967r;ri53-?82?

4 My view here owes much to Jurgen
Habermas,

Doctrine of Politics in Relation to So.7^? oi^f^'^'^i
Theory and Practice trans. John
SJoi^ V'lS^""?^^'
(Boston:
The Beacon Press, 1973) and Wolin
y^o^n?
1960
,

\

;

5 All references to Aristotle's
Politics are to
the translation by Ernest Barker (Oxford!
O^ord University Press, 1946) and are cited by the book,
section
and page.
I, i, p. i.

^

Politics

"7

1,

ii,

I

,

ii,

12-13.

13.

8 The position of the slave is ambiguous.
In
the ethical sense of the state as "an association of
equals and only of equals" the object of which is "the
best and highest life possible" the slave has no place.
Yet in a functional sense he is an integral part of the
whole, the state.
See VII, viii, 4-9.
9 VII,

10 VII,

4-5.

vii,

viii,

11

I,

V,

12

I

,

xi

i

,

13

I

,

xi i

i

6-9.

6.
2
7

,

See Barker's notes on p. 38 of the Politics
15 VII,

16

I,

l''

III,

18

I,

3-4.

ix,

ii,
i,

ii,

13.
12.
8.

.
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III,

iv.

2^ III,

iv,

3,.

2^ III,

iv,

5.

22

discussion in Nannerl O. Keohane
D>,,-i
Philosophy
and the St^t ^ in France (Prinr^o^S
A
Princeton University Press, 1980).
"

references to Bodin are to The
Six Books

otherwise notea.
I,

iv,

14.

I,

vi,

18.

26 I,

are listeaV'^^^lK/c^^^;:"^!^^

viii, 25.

I,

i,

2.

22 I,

i,

5.

2^ I,

vi,

20-1.

"^^
^ later essay, "A Custom of the Island of
Montaigne justifies the suicide chosen by an old
woman who believed that the only point to continued
life
would be a more painful death.
II, 3, pp. 261-2.
All
references to Montaigne are to The Complete Essays
of
Montaigne, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1965). References are to book, essay
and page.

Cea,

..^^

31 Essays

;

I,

32 I,

25,

103.

33 I,

14,

39.

34 II,

1,

25,

243.

35 For a study of

lie development of
skepticism
trom Montaigne to Descartes see Richard H. Popkin, The
History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes 2nd
edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
,
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^"^

I,

21,

75.

I,

14,

42.

Auerbach, "The Human Condition," in
Mimesis: L^''^''^
The Representati on of Reality in
erature trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton:
Princeto n
^rLinceron
University Press, 1957).
•

3^ II,

12,

364.
^^""^

after^l588"
41 I,

20,

refers to material published

65.

See the opening essay of Book II,
Useful and the Honorable."
43

1,

23,

80.

44

I,

23,

79.

"Of the

45 Ibid.
46 II,

11,

308.

47 Montaigne fears this implication of legitimizing cruelty in both the private and public spheres.
In
the essay, "Of the Useful and the Honorable," (III, 1)
he argues at length that while we must at times accept
evil and injustice in the affairs of state we must do
so only rarely and with caution.
In essence, even the
necessary evils of state action require the virtue of
self -cont rol

48 II,

11,

310.

49 II,

11,

311.

50 I,

39,

Ibid

175-6.

.

175.

52 Ibid.

176.

53 See

54

I,

Auerbach (1957).
28,

137.

This essay describes Montaigne's
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It
E

•ly

ag(

55 Ibid.

56 Ill,
57 Ibid

58

623.

3,
.

I,

13,

33.

59 I,

28,

136.

60 I,

28,

140.

61

1,

23,

86.

62

1,

42,

193.

63 1.

42,

196.

64 Montaigne asserts
public life even more strongly in the "Apology for Raymond Sebond" where he asserts the similarity of the
motivations and passions of princes and private men (p.
350).
Later in the "Apology" he asserts the virtue of
the apolitical nature (almost anti-political) of societies in the new world to show the powerlessness of political knowledge (and knowledge in general) to produce
goodness (p. 367).
65 1,

3,

9.

Montesquieu's notion of 1' esprit general in
its institutional dimension (see Chapter Five below) is
similar although it borrows the language of physical
science.
Rather than merely a series of parts, Montesquieu describes the body politic as a system of relations; to change one is to unbalance the entire system.
As I show in Chapter Five he uses this transformation
in language to present a modern version of a conservative theory of social change.
That Montaigne's fear of change is rooted in
traditional religious and cosmological vision is evidenced at the conclusion of the essay, "Of Sumptuary
Laws" (I, 43, 198).
a
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I,

23,

88.

I,

23,

90.

70

I have called this theory
'absolutist' in part
because it is developed initially hy secular
theorists
of the absolutist state, as well as in
part because it
postulates an absolute separation between the
knowledqe
of citizenship and the knowledge of rule.
"71

See Francis Bacon, Works, ed Ellis and
Spedding, 14 vols. (New York: Garret Press, 1968) III:
294.
All references to Bacon are to this edition and
are cited by the volume and page.
.

72 Works,

73 Ill,

IV,

20-1.

156.

"74

Also see the second of the three limitat ions
to knowledge set out in "The Advancement of Learning,
Works, III, 266.
75 Bacon himself uses the
image in the
ment of Learning," Works, III, 266.

76 Works,
77 IV,

IV,

Ad vane e-

24 and III, Aphorism XIII, p. 49.

24-6.

78 III,

389-90.

79 III,

385.

80 III,

357.

81 III,

387 and III,

82 III,

209.

83 III,

366.

84 IV,

"

357.

32; and see Aphorism III, p.

85 III,

268-70.

86 III,

270-3.

87 III,

272-4.

47.
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89 III.

302-314.

90 Ill,

302.

91

Ibid.

92 III,

314-19.

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed Michael
Oakeshott (New York: Collier, 1962)
p.
All references to Leviathan are to this edition.
,

.

m.

discussion in Chapter 8, "Language,"
T wV^^, ^l"^
of J.W.N.
Watkms, Hobbes s System of Ideas (London:
Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1973), 109-118.
'

9^ Leviathan

,

p.

113.

96 De Give

,

p.

111.

97 De Cive

,

p.

110 fn.

96 Leviathan

,

p.

99 See Watkins

54.

(1973).

Leviathan, p. 62.
De Cive
-"^^

,

Leviathan

p.
,

217.
p.

45.

103

I don't believe that Hobbes' theory of the
self can accomodate a view of reason that will allow men
to make such judgments.
Hence, he can never account for
the legitimacy of public decisions except to say that
they are legitimate because the sovereign made them.
In Hobbes' society there can be no discourse about the
public good, for there is no way to determine whether a
law is in the public interest or merely the particular
interest of the sovereign.
See Leviathan p. 41.
,

Bacon, Works,

IV,

27-9.

Hobbes, De Homine, in Man and Citizen (1972).
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CHAPTER IV:
ship

m

The Political Expression of Self:
the Persian Letters .

Citizencitizen

I,

All references are by letter and
p. 47.
^^^.^^^^fl^tion by J. Robert Loy (New York:
Me^^diar 1963) unless otherwise noted. I
Meridian,
have occato an entire letter in which case I
hav^ ? '^l^^'^^
^ page reference.
My discussion of the
^^no.r
importance of vision
Montesquieu's work is indebted
to Jean Starobinski, Montesquieu par Lu
i-meme
(Paris^ vt-aris.
Editions du Seuil, 1953T:

f

2

IX,

3

XLVII.

m

55.

4 LXIII,

134.

5

XXXII, 89-90.

6

XXIII,

"7

XXXI,

8 X,
^

76.

89.

58.

Nicomachean Ethics

10 Ethics

,

II,

3,

,

II,

1105a,

3,

1105a.

lines 32-4.

11 We must also keep in mind that for Aristotle
the greatest virtue is in political action (see Ethics,
I,

2).

12 See the discussion of amour-propre in Nannerl
Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France (1980), especially Chapters 9 and 10, which shows how widespread
this view was in different forms in seventeenth century
political and moral theory.
13 Letter X, p. 26.
This is undoubtedly an attack on the rationalist natural law tradition. This
paragraph is fascinating if we recognize that the thrust
of the argument of the Troglodytes upholds, in a new
depth and complexity, the view of both Grot i us and
Pufendorf. Montesquieu is, in one sense, completing
the political reinterpret at ion of natural law as internal moral sense (which Shaftesbury had done for ethics)
presented in more rationalistic form by Grotius and
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Puf endorf

14 XII, p. 62.
1^ See above, p. 140, and
XXIII,

1^ XIV,

76.

66.

17 See Alessandro Crisafulli,
"Montesquieu's
""^^ Troglodytes:
Its Background, Meaning and
Significance," PMLA LVIII (1943): 372-392,
where he
Troglodyte myth is a direct to response
?^;^«^KK^^^^T^^^
to Hobbes, I agree.
For a counter interpretation see
Thomas Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Libe
ralism
(Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1973), especially
^
Chapter Three.
18 XCIV,

179.

1^ See J. Robert Loy, Montesqu ieu (New
York:
Twayne, 1968).
20 Again see Crisafulli
o

(1943).

1

See Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the
Interests especially pp. 31-55, and Keohane (l980),
especially Part II, pp. 119-240.
,

Hirschman, p. 32.
23 LXXXIII,

24 XCV,

165-6.

180.

25 Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees," which
Montesquieu often refers to, makes a similar point.

2^ Pascal's Pensees had clearly developed the
view of the failure of virtue as a form of action in
the modern world.
y7

See Hirschman 's discussion of Montesquieu
70-80 and 117-127), which I find interesting but
too schematic. As my argument implies, Hirschman assumes that Montesquieu was more favorable to the concept
of interest than he actually was.
(pp.

28 XIV,

66.
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Persian Itt.^l

'

1

.Zlf^^^"

'°

translation of the

30 The unpublished completion
of the storv is in
Loy's translation, p. 284.
(Also in Mes t-ensees
pJnsKs
Pleiade, I, p. 1616.)

—

,

"'^^'^ °^
disadvantaged,
n^.^.^^i^/''^^''^^^^''^
particularly
in light of Montesquieu's liberal
^«=i.ax
economics.

32 XLVIII,

33 XXXV,

108.

92-3.

34 XLVIII,

108.

35 VIII,

54.

36 XVII,

68.

37 XXXV,

93.

38 See XLVI (civic morality as a basis
of true
religion), LX (Jews), LXXXV (the proposed expulsion of
Armenians from Persia—perhaps the most overt statement
of religious toleration in the Lett res Persanes
), and
XCVI I (European physical science produces truth without
religion Montesquieu even tells the dervish that "thow
must soon change thy thinking." (p. 184)).

—

39 XCIV,

179.

40 This is certainly meant by Montesquieu as a
general warning to European monarchs not to overstep
legitimate power. The rest of this letter, along with
the following one, argues for a moderate monarchy.
41 VI, 51.
Also see LXII where Zelis declares
that Usbek is really the slave of his wives (p. 133).

42 XXXIV,

43 CLV,

91-2.

274.

44 LXIV, 135.
45 IX,

55-6.
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XV,

67.

47 LXIV,

48 XXI,

136.

74-5.

49 IX,

55-6.

50 II,

47-8.

51 IX,

57.

52 VII,

52.

53 IX,

56.

54 XX,

73.

55 XXVI,
56 LXIII,

81; XLVIII; and LVI.

134.

57 XXXVIII.

CHAPTER V: Citizenship in Moderate Governments:
Universal Politics of De L' Esprit des Lois

The

1 In a recent study, Montesquieu and Social
Theory (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), John Baum
claims that Montesquieu's view approaches Parsonian
f unctionalism.
Later in the chapter I will argue that
this is an incorrect and ahistorical reading of
Mont esqui eu

For the term 'universal politics' I am indebted to a paper by Michael A. Mosher, "The Particulars of
a Universal Politics:
The Case of Montesquieu and
Hegel, " presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the
2

American Political Science Association, Washington
D.C., August 28-31, 1980.
All references to De
V, 9, p. 298, note (a).
Esprit des Lois are to the Pleiade edition unless
otherwise noted and are cited by book, chapter and page^
3

L'

4 V,

9,

289.

5

6,

280.

V,
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6 Marx,

for example, will argue

that the die;tinction between society and the
sLte
is rea!ly Lre
Ideology.
Politics permeates civil

society

- - reflection
considered

?e?Ss''

civil

orpower
relations.
If^M
if Montesquieu
this
possible
alternative formulation he did not
incorporate it Lto
^--sanes, ^oe^f ^r^ser^t
^ilf^irw' '^t^Last
the case of despotic regimes,
In fact til'oo
f
conjunction
of the social and the politi^
o^i
with the public and private, defines
desootl<,^°!f
potism
as a Jform of government.
•

7

IV,

1,

261.

8

IV,

2,

262.

9

IV,

2,

262-3.

10 IV,

3,

265.

11 IV,

6,

266-7.

12 See Lettres Persanes,
13 I am following Melvin

of this phrase.

14 XII,

11,

15 XII,

4,

433.

16 XII,

1,

430.

2,

431.

441.

17 Ibid.

18 XII,
19 XI,

4,

395.

20 Ibid.
21 Jean Bodin,

Six Books of the Commonwealth
ed. M.J. Tooley (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, nd Book
Chapter 2, p. 8.
,

)

22 For a different view,

I,

see Thomas Pangle,

Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973)
The arguments of
the founding fathers, especially Hamilton's, are much
.
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closer to Hobbes than to Montesquieu.
23

See my discussion of Montesquieu's
moral
psychology in Chapter One above.
24 XIX,

4,

558.

20,

430.

25 Ibid

26 XI,

This interpretation of Montesquieu's
concept
Of* liberty distinguishes it from the
more negative conception that Pangle (1973) attributes to him.
It serves
to argue, as other elements of my argument
imply, that
locating Montesquieu's version of liberalism in
the
Lockean tradition is inadequate and distorting to

Montesquieu's thought.
I

28 See Roger Callois's note to Book II,
Chapter
in Pleiade II: 1498.

Lettres Persanes

,

Letter Three.

30 Mark Hulliung is correct to argue that
the
general orientation of Montesquieu's work from his
earliest essays to his final Defense de L'Esprit des
Lois is to criticize the absolutist monarchy of Louis
XIV by associating it with despotism rather than monarchy.
This is clearly one ideological purpose of the
simplification of the forms of government. However,
Hulliung goes too far when he argues, as is the purpose
of his book, Montesquieu and the Old Regime (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976), that Montesquieu
wants to replace the French monarchy with a republic.
31 XI,

32 V,

5,

396.

19,

304.

33 See the Republic
trans. Francis M. Cornford
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1941) sections
543A-576b, pp. 265-300.
,

34 In addition to the general end of government
as security each government has a purpose which is
unique to its own character and spirit. My argument is
that although Montesquieu does not explicitly state that
moderation and liberty are general ends of government.
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he treats them as if they are. A universal
results from the necessary interrelation of politics
the general
ends of security, liberty and moderation.
35 XI,

4,

395.

36 XI,

7,

408.

3 7 For
a discussion of the problem of the order
and coherence of De L' Esprit des Lois as a text see
Neumann (1949). For a recent attempt to argue that the
entire book is coherent, I think an unsuccessful one,
see Pangle (1973) pp. 279ff.

38 XXIX,

865.

1,

39 XI,

6,

397.

40 XI,

3,

395.

^^ See Chapter Four above.

See note #1 above. Also see Raymond Aron,
Main Currents in Sociological Thought Volume 1
Harmond sworth
Penguin Books Ltd
1965).
,

(

:

43 XIX,

,

44 See above, p.
16,

46 XIX,

8,

,

564.

14,

45 XIX,

.

7.

566.
560.

4^ There is,

as I have said, a hybrid form of
republic, the commercial republic, wherein virtue is
produced not by direct self-renunciation but through
the renunciation necessary to the work ethic, which
generates a replacement for political virtue out of
civil society.

48 VII,

4,

336.

49 VII,

9,

341.

50 See my discussion in Chapter One.
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52 Ibid.

5^ XIX,

17,

5^ VII,

1,

332-3.

55 VII,

7,

333.

566.

56 Montesquieu develops a principle of class division here which is 'Marxian- in its general
character,
The principle is that classes are differentiated
by
their place in the system of production.
Hence, there
are workers who produce commodities through
their own
labor, and an unproductive class which lives
off the
surplus of the workers.
_

57 VII,

1,

335.

58 Montesquieu cites
Mandeville's Fable of the
B^Qs as a source of this argument. VII, 1, p. 333,

not e 6

59 VII,

2,

335.

60 VII,

1,

334.

61 I,

3,

237.

62

I,

3,

238.

63 V,

1,

273.

64 Ill,

5,

255.

65 VI,

1,

307.

66 VI,

3,

311.

67 XIX,

5,

559.

68 XXIX, 16,

880.

69 Ibid.

See the remainder of the paragraph (XXIX, 17,
880)

.

"71

V,

7,

283.
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"72

XXIX, 16, 881.

73 VI,

10,

319.

74

"^^^^
"^^^^ adequate descriptions of
this
See Elie Carcassonne's classic
account
in
Montes quieu et le P r oblem e de l a
Constitutinn v.^:!....^
^P^^"^' -^^27) and F ranz Neumann's
bril
i
liant summary
his introduction to the Hafner edition
translation of The Spirit of th. t..w.
?^q2qV^^''^^
recent work ot J.Q.C. Mackrell,
rtl ^^^^^^^^^^
ll:
t
?r
Feudalism'
in Eighteenth-Century Fran^.
!^
(London:
Koutiedge & Kegan Paul, lyyj) tor the context
^""^ ^^""^ Hulliung's fresh and novel
account^^.'^o^?^^
^
ir.
.
debate.

m

-

,

(

976

1

)

See Chapter Four, above.
"76

XXIX,

CHAPTER VI:
Citizenship

19,

882-3.

Montesquieu and the Liberal Theory of

It is misleading to call Montesquieu's use of
the forms of government 'descriptive' as opposed to
'normative' as some recent commentators do, such as
Richter (1979), Baum (1979), and Werner Stark, Montes quieu, Pioneer of the Sociology of Knowledge (London:
Routledge and Paul, 1960). The argument is too often
couched in terms of whether Montesquieu preferred a
monarchy or a republic.
(See Hulliung (1976) for an
attempt to argue that Montesquieu is really a republican.
Also see Chapters 4 and 5 of Pangle (1973).) This
is really a non-issue, for under different conditions
Montesquieu would support either a monarchy or a repub-

lic

.

2

See Chapter Three of Pangle (1973).

For this interpretation see especially Baum
(1979)
^ I am indebted here to Michael Mosher's essay,
"The Particulars of a Universal Politics" (1980).

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under standing 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1959)
2: 385ff.
^

,
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6 See Helvetius' two letters,
one to Montesauieu
and one to A.M Saurin, reprinted
in Destutt de ??acy-s
A Commentary and Review of Montesg ui^n .
of the
^i^ew York:
Burt Fran klin, 1^69, original,
?81l) :

^^"""^ classical liberal
teris^Jo^^J
teristic of modern conservatives see approach characGeorge Stiqler
(Chicago:
Chicago Univ:r;ity

^ess!'l9yg)!"^

8 See especially the Tri-lateral
Commission
report. The Crisis of Democracy (New York:
New York
University Press, 1975).
^ See the "Introduction" to Stigler
(1975).
For a brilliant critique of these individualist
theorists see the series of essays in Part II of C.B.
Macpherson's Democratic Theory.: Essays in Retrie val
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1973).

10 The best recent argument for the coexistence
of two competing senses of citizenship is George Armstrong Kelly, "Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship,"
Daedelus 108: 4 (1979) 21-36. Also see the several
essays on citizenship in Michael Walzer, Obligations
Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970)
11 Robert Pranger,

(New York:

The Eclipse of Citizenship
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968).

12 Kelly

(1979)

13 The distinction is from Charles Taylor,
"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of
Metaphysics XXV: 1 (1971) pp. 3-51.
I'*

See Part III, "On the Logic of Legitimation
Problems," Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston
Beacon Press, 1973).
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